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PROSPECTS OF A MODEST EMPIRICISM, I

ISRAEL SCHEFFLER

INTRODUCTION ¹

THE heart of modern empiricism has been its doctrine of empirical meaning, with its sharp line between the verifiable and the unverifiable and its rejection of non-analytic, ² non-experiential statements as nonsense. This doctrine has, however, fallen on evil days. Increasing logical precision in philosophy has weakened rather than strengthened it, while advanced theoretical physics seems more and more a living counter-example, to be accommodated only by stretching the doctrine out of all shape. Once a proud polemical tool, the doctrine has thus come to be treated as a problem or a proposal. Yet the label "empiricist" continues to function as a philosophical symbol, and it is not sufficiently realized that the decline of the doctrine calls for new examination of the label. Indeed, it is not too much to claim that without such new examination, the idea of empiricism may be thought empty; or, shall we say, meaningless.

I want to address myself, then, to the task of such examination, offering first a brief review of the philosophic career of the doctrine and a critique of a recent revision, and going on to formulate a modified empiricist thesis, and to consider its basic problems and some general approaches to them. In Section I, I shall survey early attempts to state an empirical or verifiability criterion of cognitive significance and to indicate difficulties encountered and philosophic consequences. In Section II, I shall criticize the recent revision in terms of translatability. In Section III, a modified

¹ I wish to thank Professors C. G. Hempel, N. Goodman, and N. Chomsky for their criticisms of an earlier draft of this paper and for helpful discussions of related problems.

² "Analytic," as used throughout the present paper, embraces both analytically true and analytically false statements.

empiricism in terms of inclusion will be outlined and its consequences explored. Section IV will be devoted to a consideration of two outstanding problems faced by such empiricism: the problem of dispositional terms and the problem of theoretical or transcendental terms.

I

THE EMPIRICIST SEARCH FOR A VERIFIABILITY CRITERION OF COGNITIVE SIGNIFICANCE: EARLY ATTEMPTS AND DIFFICULTIES

1. *Material Adequacy.*

Early formulations of the verifiability principle of meaning were intended to obviate the need for weighing the truth-claims of every purported doctrine or thesis, since some supposed theses were held clearly recognizable in advance as meaningless, i.e., neither true nor false. Thus, a basic criterion of adequacy governing formulations of the principle demanded that every sentence satisfying it be true or false and, conversely, that every true or false sentence satisfy the principle:

Criterion of (Material) Adequacy (I): $(S) ((S \text{ true} \vee S \text{ false}) \equiv S \text{ meaningful})$

C. A. (I) could clearly not have served as the wanted principle itself for it would not have enabled the bypassing of issues of truth or falsity in determining the meaningfulness of disputed theses. What was wanted, rather, was some *independent* criterion which would enable us to pick out the neither true nor false sentences, so that a point-by-point study of their claims to truth might be spared, and which would at the same time enable us to select for serious investigation just those sentences which are, as a matter of fact, true or false. In the Introduction to his 2nd edition of *Language, Truth, and Logic*,^{*} Ayer states, for example, "I sug-

^{*} A. J. Ayer, *Language, Truth, and Logic*, 2nd ed., (London and New York, 1947), pp. 15-16.

gest that it is only if it is literally meaningful, in this sense, that a statement can properly be said to be either true or false."

2. *Empiricist Adequacy.*

Not every principle satisfying C. A. (I) would have met *empiricist* demands, however. The desired reduction of the notion of meaningfulness had to be, for non-analytic sentences, a reduction to experience, i.e., in terms of predicates applying to observables or experienceables or their semantic parallels ("is an observation-predicate," "is an observation-sentence," etc.), and auxiliary semantical notions such as logical implication or deduction, and denotation or application. Of course, variant formulations seemingly ignored this restriction on their basic terms by employing solely notions of verification, confirmation, or prediction. But it will be no distortion if we take them in every case to refer to verification or confirmation by, or prediction of, observable occurrences or experiences. The very use of notions of verification and prediction (variously explained, partly in terms of logical deduction) serves to epitomize the core idea of early formulations, viz. that some deductive relationship with observation-sentences is the necessary and sufficient condition of *empirical* significance. Because "is a possible experience" and other such object-language terms are more obscure than some of their always-available semantic counterparts, it seems preferable to state our second criterion of adequacy semantically. Moreover, instead of referring to deductive relationships, we will use "is a deductive-relation term" to apply to any relative predicate definable (with the use of truth-functional and quantificational logic) by "logically implies." Non-semantical formulations of C. A. (II) will, however, readily suggest themselves to those who find them preferable.

Criterion of (Empiricist) Adequacy (II): $(\exists x) (S) \{ x \text{ is a deductive-relation term} \cdot (S \text{ meaningful} \equiv S \text{ analytic} \vee (\exists y) (y \text{ is an observation-sentence} \cdot x \text{ applies between } S \text{ and } y)) \}$

As Ayer phrased it, "Let us call a proposition which records an actual or possible observation an experiential proposition. Then

we may say that it is the mark of a genuine factual proposition, not that it should be equivalent to an experiential proposition, or any finite number of experiential propositions but simply that some experiential propositions can be deduced from it in conjunction with certain other premises without being deducible from those other premises alone." ⁴

3. *Non-universality.*

Finally, since the whole point of the principle was to generalize the conditions under which it is otiose to seek to decide the truth-claims of putative theses, meaninglessness could not turn out vacuous under analysis, i.e.,

Criterion of Adequacy (Non-universality) (III): $\sim (S) (S \text{ meaningful})$

To quote Ayer again, "Our charge against the metaphysician is not that he attempts to employ the understanding in a field where it cannot profitably venture, but that he produces sentences which fail to conform to the conditions under which alone a sentence can be literally significant. Nor are we ourselves obliged to talk nonsense in order to show that all sentences of a certain type are necessarily devoid of literal significance. We need only formulate the criterion which enables us to test whether a sentence expresses a genuine proposition about a matter of fact, and then point out that the sentences under consideration fail to satisfy it." ⁵

Joint fulfillment of these three criteria would, then, have served two major purposes: (a) to characterize generally every true-or-false sentence in terms of easily applicable predicates, enabling us thereby to eliminate, rather than try to decide, the truth-claims of every other sentence, and (b) to exhibit the domain of non-analytic significance as experiential in purport, to show, e.g., that (and how) every non-analytic truth-question relates to observation-questions, and that non-analytic questions which do not so relate lie outside the boundaries of inquiry. The philosophic traditions of Hume and of Kant were thus to be jointly vindi-

⁴ Ibid., pp. 38-39.

⁵ Ibid., p. 35.

cated and given rigorous logistic statement: Kant's insistence on the exclusion of some issues as beyond the limitations of human reason (C. A. III) was, in effect, to be fused with Hume's derivation of knowledge from experience (C. A. II).

4. *Difficulties with Completeness Requirements.*

The fate of early attempts to construct a definition of significance meeting these three criteria has been critically reviewed by Professor Hempel.^{*} Very briefly, definitions requiring what he calls "complete verifiability in principle" or "complete falsifiability in principle" (by asking of every empirically meaningful *S* [in Hempel's reconstruction] that it or its denial, respectively, be non-analytic and be logically implied by some finite, consistent class of observation sentences) violate C. A. (I) (material adequacy) in both directions. For (a) each such definition judges as empirically meaningless either all universal or all existential statements, and mixed quantifications, in the face of the fact that we have empirical truths and falsehoods of each type, and (b) each such definition judges as meaningful either some (truth-functional) disjunctions or some conjunctions with nonsensical components, none of which compounds we regard as true or false. Furthermore, if C. A. (I) is to hold, then since the denial of every true or false sentence is itself true or false, denials of meaningful sentences must themselves be meaningful. But in ruling empirically meaningless either all universal or all existential statements, each definition we are now considering withholds this reciprocal property from either the corresponding (non-analytic) existential or universal denials which it, respectively, admits as significant, thus again violating C. A. (I). It may here be noted that a combining definition which proposed either-complete-verifiability-or-complete-falsifiability as a definiens for "empirically meaningful," thus admitting both purely universal and purely existential sentences,

^{*} See C. G. Hempel, "Problems and Changes in the Empiricist Criterion of Meaning," *Revue Internationale de Philosophie*, XI (1950); reprinted in L. Linsky, *Semantics and the Philosophy of Language*, (Urbana, 1952), for the classic treatment, with numerous examples, of the difficulties involved in early attempts.

would still violate C. A. (I) in the left-to-right direction by ruling mixed quantifications all empirically meaningless, while continuing to violate it in the opposite direction by ruling significant both certain disjunctions and certain conjunctions with nonsensical components.

5. *Difficulties with Incompleteness Requirements.*

Definitions abandoning completeness requirements in the above sense have typically required instead, of every empirically significant *S*, that it be a component of some conjunction logically implying an observation-sentence not also implied by the other conjuncts alone. In essentially this form, verifiability principles have figured strongly not only in positivistic but also in pragmatist writings. However, as above described, they run afoul of C. A. (III), barring significance to no sentence, as Ayer himself admits in acknowledgment of a criticism by Berlin.⁷ Thus, any sentence *N* can be conjoined with $N \supset O$ to imply *O*, where *O* is an observation-sentence, and does not follow from $N \supset O$ alone. Such definitions also violate C. A. (I) in granting significance to certain conjunctions with nonsensical components. The latter violation characterizes also every attempt to revise such definitions by restricting the domain of admissible other conjuncts, while for Ayer's particular revision in the second edition of his *Language, Truth, and Logic*, Church⁸ proves that it virtually violates C. A. (III), (i.e., for every statement *S*, it renders either *S* or its negation significant), provided only that there are three observation-sentences such that none implies any other.

6. *Philosophic Consequences of Above Difficulties.*

In the face of such developments, it seems impossible simply to reiterate early formulations such as we have been discussing.

⁷ I. Berlin, "Verifiability in Principle," *Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society* XXXIX, pp. 225-248, Esp. p. 234, and Ayer; op cit., pp. 11-12.

⁸ A Church, review of Ayer, op. cit., *Journal of Symbolic Logic*, 14, (1949).

It is natural that the more central some early formulation has been for a given mode of philosophic practice, the more disastrous will an outright relinquishing of it appear and the more tenacious will be the search for *ad hoc* repairs. Goodman's * reminder that philosophic criticism of specific meaningless discourses does not depend on a *theory* of meaninglessness is thus quite to the point, as is the example of other modes of critical philosophy which have not been prevented from giving potent, piecemeal critique by their traditional lack of interest in stating a general theory underlying their methods. After all, one could not construct such a general theory unless the notions of empirical significance and meaninglessness had some clear predefinitional applications anyhow, while the very defects of the proposals we have discussed are relative to such predefinitional applications. But if particular philosophic critiques do not depend on a general theory of significance, neither can they serve in place of such a general theory. The moral of the recent developments sketched above seems to be this: Early formulations of the type discussed must be dropped, both as theoretical analyses of cognitive significance and as critical tools of the applied philosopher. Philosophic critiques can however employ other methods and tools, while the search for a general theory is an independently legitimate undertaking which is not proved quixotic by recent failures. What is, however, shown by the latter is that, construing empiricist requirements on a definition of significance after the manner of C. A. (II), we have so far not been able to avoid violating either C. A. (I) or C. A. (III), and have been able, moreover, to see why certain types of avoidance-proposals are foredoomed to failure, e.g., no ingenious restrictions on the other conjuncts, for theories of the Ayer type, can reasonably be expected to render meaningless all conjunctions with some meaningless components and also avoid virtual universality of significance.

While the possibility of a general definition of cognitive significance is, then, not in question, it may plausibly be doubted if an adequate definition is likely which takes seriously the

* N. Goodman, *Fact, Fiction, and Forecast* (Cambridge, Mass., 1955), p. 58, n. 1.

empiricist requirement C. A. (II). If no alternative requirement can be given which is equally empiricist in spirit and also more promising, then we have a failure of empiricist philosophy, unless, of course, some flaw in the other two requirements can be shown. Professor Hempel¹⁰ takes the first course, abandoning the attempt to satisfy C. A. (II) and proposing instead a translatability requirement.

II

THE TRANSLATABILITY CRITERION OF COGNITIVE SIGNIFICANCE: ITS RATIONALE AND DIFFICULTIES

7. *The Translatability Formulation of Empiricist Adequacy.*

Hempel's alternative idea is simply to specify a vocabulary containing logical terms plus a finite number of observation-predicates, and a (customary) syntax governing sentence-formation (and inference), and then to characterize cognitively significant sentences as those translatable into this restricted language. Control over vocabulary would eliminate from this so-called empiricist language all nonsensical predicates, while control over syntax would eliminate from it all nonsensical sentences formed exclusively out of logical signs and remaining predicates. Presumably this syntax would need to be rather complicated to exclude such sentences: consider "Galaxies divided by $7/8$ are sad." Yet, there is theoretically no reason to suppose that it could not be constructed. Thus, given the exclusion from such a language (let us call it "*E*" for "empiricist") of elementary sentences presystematically deemed meaningless, the problem of compounds with such components disappears, while the customary logic incorporated in *E* guarantees sentencehood for all types of quantified statements and for denials of all sorts, thus obviating a basic difficulty with completeness proposals above discussed. At the same time, since not all sentences are translatable into *E* (i.e., go over into well-formed sentences in primitive notation in *E*, when suitably transformed in accord with appropriate definitions),

¹⁰ Op. cit., pp. 50 ff.

universality is avoided. The idea is, then, to characterize cognitive significance generally in terms of a specific relation T (translatability) to a well-specified language meeting stated conditions, much as logical truths can be described as those bearing a complex relation R to listed logical constants, i.e., such that free reinterpretation of all their components other than these constants fails ever to produce a falsehood. Hempel's alternative to C. A. (II) may thus be written as:

Criterion of (Empiricist) Adequacy (IIA): (S) (S meaningful $\equiv (\exists L$ (L is an empiricist language . S translatable into L)).

Though, of course, a definition still needs to be constructed satisfying C. A. (IIA), i.e., explicitly characterizing some empiricist language, reasons are already apparent for thinking C. A. (IIA) more likely than its predecessor to be capable of joint fulfillment with C. A. (I) and C. A. (III). These reasons, summarized briefly in the preceding paragraph, hinge essentially on the fact that C. A. (IIA) requires a fixed relation to a language subject to our deliberate manufacture: controlling this language ourselves, we can by careful design eliminate objectionable predicates and syntax and avoid universality.

8. *Difficulties with the Translatability Formulation.*

Nevertheless, there is a subtle difficulty in C. A. (IIA) which is independent both of the fact that we can exercise total control over E , and of the problems involved in designing E so that it will be materially adequate.¹¹ The latter problems have been widely discussed (and will be here examined in subsequent paragraphs): they relate to dispositional and abstract theoretical terms. Our present difficulty has, however, gone unnoticed, though sufficient in itself to incapacitate C. A. (IIA). This difficulty relates to the notion of translatability.

Presumably, what is involved is *legitimate* translatability; the translation must not be based on merely nominal definitions.

¹¹ I mean by "materially adequate" here something both more restricted and vaguer than C. A. (I); the two ought not to be confused.

Were this not so, every sentence would turn out meaningful, since any purported term can be arbitrarily correlated by nominal definition with some primitive term or complex of terms within any system, provided formal requirements are met. Indeed, any whole sentence could, in this manner, be arbitrarily correlated with some systematic sentence in primitive notation, and since thus translatable, would be meaningful. To object that such arbitrary correlation would really be taking as definiendum not the disputed term or sentence at all, but only a completely different homonym, is to acknowledge precisely the difference between nominal definition of a term and definition which is controlled also by extra-formal requirements relating to the term's familiar meaning or extension; it is in effect to withhold the label "definition" from correlations which flout such requirements. Such merely terminological variance, however, leaves the basic point intact: translatability requires some definitional matching of systematic with presystematic meanings if any sentence is to be ruled meaningless under any formulation satisfying C. A. (IIA).

Now the precise nature of such matching is a matter of some controversy into which we need not enter, beyond noting that certain very strong requirements on it have been shown unsuitable by Goodman.¹² Let us take here the weakest requirements proposed, i.e., those stated by Goodman under the label "extensional isomorphism."¹³ Detailed consideration of the latter is unnecessary for our purpose here. All we need to note is that a proposed definition meeting the minimal demands of extensional isomorphism must still enable truth-value-preserving translations of certain sentences which we are particularly interested in. Indeed, Goodman considers the latter condition, without further specification of sentences of particular interest, to be a criterion of adequacy for any satisfactory view of the definitional matching in question.¹⁴ And while other proposals put forth even stronger conditions, this minimal condition is unquestioned.

Thus, for a sentence *S* to be legitimately translatable into a

¹² N. Goodman, *The Structure of Appearance*, (Cambridge, Mass., 1951), pp. 1-11.

¹³ *Ibid.*, pp. 11-26.

¹⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 11.

system Y , S must be transformable into a well-formed sentence S' in Y , when all suitable components of S are replaced by their primitive counterparts of Y in accord with definitions which are legitimate, i.e. which, at the very least, meet the demands of extensional isomorphism. And every such definition must be truth-value-preserving for at least some translated sentential contexts in which the definiendum figures presystematically.

Now, when a presystematic sentence is syntactically jumbled, as, e.g., "Galaxies divided by $7/8$ are sad," (or, worse, the same words in reverse order) there may be legitimate definitions for all its component predicates in terms of the primitives of Y , and yet appropriate replacements in accord with such definitions throughout may fail to yield a well-formed sentence in Y . In such a case, our original sentence is not legitimately translatable into Y . Now if our sentence is not thus translatable into any *empiricist* system, it is clearly meaningless under C. A. (IIA). Thus, the ability of C. A. (IIA) to exclude at least some cases of meaninglessness, hinging on syntactic jumble, seems clear. Indeed, there is a sense in which our sample sentence (but not its reversal) is intuitively grammatical (or unjumbled) in form, so that the notion of syntactic jumble *as we have used it* relates not to intuitive grammaticality but just to the possibility of excluding a sentence by reference to a deliberately restricted syntax, coupled with this sentence's independent obnoxiousness. If a sentence is not jumbled because not obnoxious, we would not want to exclude it, and could easily so frame our empiricist syntax as not to exclude it. But are there sentences which, though obnoxious, are not jumbled, i.e., excludable by the method just outlined?

Consider the case of nonsense words which look like predicates, e.g., "is a glame," "is froomy," and the case of words like "is spiritually ectoplasmic," "is an entelechy," "is identical with the Absolute." The former we unhesitatingly declare meaningless and rule every given sentential context containing any to be neither true nor false. The latter, with many sentential contexts seriously defended, we wish nevertheless to declare cognitively meaningless, having no context with truth-value. For the purposes of our present discussion it makes no difference if we disagree over the precise composition of the list of terms of

which this is true. It is enough that we agree on its being true of some nonsense words, and it is more than enough, as well as quite likely, that we also believe *some* terms to have no sentential contexts with truth-value though having currency at some time for some member of the language community. Consider now a sentence containing such a term, e.g., "Some persons are spiritually ectoplasmic." Can we validly rule this sentence meaningless under C. A. (IIA)?

To do this, we need to establish its non-translatability into every empiricist system *E*, via legitimate definitions by means of *E*'s primitives. These primitives we may be sure, do not include "is spiritually ectoplasmic." We have, however, to decide not simple inclusion, but legitimate definability. This involves, as we have seen, some presystematic context of the definiendum with some truth-value which is preserved upon replacement by its proposed definiens. Suppose that "some—s are . . ." in the sentence above is acceptable as a correlate of some basic locution in *E*, e.g., the existential quantifier, parentheses, and the dot of conjunction, while "person" is legitimately definable by some extra-logical primitives of *E*, as tested by reference to truth-value-preserving translation of some of its contexts. We already at this point note a restriction in applying C. A. (IIA). For in testing the meaninglessness of our present sample sentence, we refer to the truth-value, hence meaningfulness, of some other sentence, namely some context of "person." If circularity and infinite regress are both to be avoided, some sentences must be judged meaningful, then, independently of our proposed test. Given some listing of such sentences, we may subsequently test some others without infinite regress and, moreover, without begging the question, since even if all of a sentence's extra-logical terms are legitimately definable by reference to our independent listing, the sentence may prove meaningless as a whole through lack of well-formedness in *E*, when all legitimate replacements are made.

Getting back to our sample sentence, we have left only "is spiritually ectoplasmic," and we must decide whether or not it is legitimately definable by *E*'s primitives. Now to say whether any of its contexts is translatable with preservation of truth-value, we must be able to say whether any such context has truth-value,

e.g., by reference to our independent listing. But the peculiarity of "is spiritually ectoplasmic" is precisely that none of its pre-systematic contexts has truth-value at all. And to determine this is ipso facto to determine that the sample sentence before us is meaningless through containing such a term. Thus to rule our sample sentence meaningless on grounds of untranslatability requires us to know in advance that it is meaningless.

Suppose someone were to suggest that it is possible that the sentence before us is meaningful even though no context of "is spiritually ectoplasmic" appears on our independent list. In such an eventuality, our test would provide no method for determining this, since all determinations of legitimate translatability have to be carried out by reference to this list. Thus, either the translatability test is incapable of deciding the significance of our sample sentence or else it is completely superfluous in ruling it meaningless, since such ruling requires as a precondition knowledge of the meaninglessness of this very sentence, as reflected in the composition of our list. While inclusion in this list of a particular predicate *P* in some context *c* does not determine the significance of some other of its contexts *c'*, *c''*, etc., such determination to be made by translatability, exclusion of any purported predicate *P'* from the list either leaves every *P'*-context undecided as to truth-value, or determines its meaninglessness without translation. Thus, for the whole class of sentences containing nonsensical would-be predicates, the translatability test is either insufficient or superfluous as a criterion for exclusion. Everything rests on the antecedent composition of our list.

Thus, the use of C. A. (IIA) as a test of significance for pre-systematic sentences involves two difficulties: (a) it requires, over and above the explicit construction of an empiricist language *E*, the independent specification of truth-value (and hence significance) for some *presystematic* context of every *bona fide presystematic* predicate, to serve as a test of legitimate definability, and while such specification will not automatically decide the significance of sentences containing as predicates *only* specified items, (b) such specification, if adequate, must independently exclude as meaningless all sentences containing nonsensical, would-be predicates, which it was the very purpose of our criterion to

exclude; application of the test to these sentences requires that the job be already completed.

III

INCLUSION AS A SUFFICIENT CONDITION OF COGNITIVE SIGNIFICANCE: TOWARD A MORE MODEST EMPIRICISM

9. *Inclusion in Some Empiricist Language.*

The failure of C. A. (IIA) is not a failure in its basic conception, i.e., to characterize the domain of significance by reference to a fixed relationship to some given language. It is rather a consequence of the use of translatability as the fixed relation in question. This use leads us to say that *S* is meaningful only if every suitable component of *S* has some context with truth-value which is preserved upon translation into *E*, and hence that *S* is meaningless, i.e., neither true nor false (by C. A. (I)) if either every context of some component has its truth-value altered by translation into *E*, or if some component lacks any context with truth-value at all. But of course, in the case of the first alternative, if *E* is to serve as a criterion of significance and fails to preserve a truth-value (hence a clearly significant unit), we would declare *E* inadequate. Much more important, however, is the case of the second alternative, since if true, it is tantamount to the meaninglessness of *S* itself and renders the test pointless in such an instance.¹⁹

¹⁹ Professor Hempel, in correspondence, informs me that, while he thinks I am right in criticizing the translatability criterion, he would perhaps now wish to construe such requirement pragmatically rather than semantically, i.e., not by reference to extensions or truth-values, but rather by reference to the ability of the utterer to restate his utterance within some empiricist language. While favoring the development of a pragmatic concept of translation (see I. Scheffler, "On Synonymy and Indirect Discourse," *Philosophy of Science*, XXII, 1955, pp. 39-44), I am skeptical of a method which asks the utterer to restate, i.e. *translate*, his own utterances, and I wonder if any purely pragmatic notion, without some semantic conditions, is adequate. Professor Hempel indicates doubt, moreover, concerning the sense in which an isolated utterance could be said to be restated as

The basic conception of C. A. (IIA) is preserved if we employ *inclusion* in place of *translatability* as the relation in question, i.e., if we characterize significant sentences as those belonging to empiricist languages. Indeed, the difference between the two relations in this connection has apparently been unnoticed and the latter seems to have been at least partly in the minds of proponents of translatability. Thus, e.g., Professor Hempel, in expounding C. A. (IIA), says¹⁸, "In effect, therefore, the translatability criterion proposes to characterize the cognitively meaningful sentences by the vocabulary out of which they may be constructed, and by the syntactical principles governing their construction." Actually, of course, this characterization of vocabulary and syntax relates to the sentences of *E*, while sentences translatable into *E* may differ in either vocabulary or syntax, or both. Consider now a criterion in terms of inclusion or well-formedness in some empiricist language.

Criterion of (Empiricist) Adequacy (IIB): (S) (S meaningful $\equiv (\exists L)$ (L is an empiricist language $\cdot S$ is well-formed in L))

This criterion recalls the usual way in which systems are characterized, i.e., as comprising all and only sentences formed in accordance with stated rules out of a fixed vocabulary. In its avoidance of the notion of translatability, C. A. (IIB) is, moreover, an improvement over C. A. (IIA).

10. *Consequences of Formulation in Terms of Inclusion.*

Owing to abandonment of the notion of translatability, however, a serious restriction in generality results, which needs to be considered at this point. Once having constructed some empiricist language *E*, the idea behind C. A. (IIA) was to assert translatability into *E* as a necessary and sufficient condition of cognitive

a formula in some system whose interconnections contribute to its meaning, and he suggests therefore that the whole question of empirical significance may concern only the expressions of certain well-specified systems.

¹⁸ Hempel, *op. cit.*, p. 51.

significance for all sentences whatever. *E* being a clearly empiricist language, such a definition would have implied, hence fulfilled, C. A. (IIA). Not to have constructed *E*, and to have rested content with C. A. (IIA) itself as a *definition*, would have meant resting the empiricist theory of meaning on the notion "is an empiricist language" and this would have been rather unsatisfactory. Although we might recognize a clear case to which this predicate applies, e.g., *E* itself, the predicate itself is generally vague and likely to be highly variable in use. As an element in a criterion of adequacy guiding us to the construction of *E*, its function is rather narrow and it serves well in this way, but such construction is needed to render the theory in precise and unambiguous form, much as the general predicate "is a logical constant" needs to be supplanted by a finite list before theses concerning logic can take on precision and be discussed with rigor. White¹⁷ has made this point quite generally, and indeed, thinks such a process of finitizing philosophical theses is always salutary.

Having given up C. A. (IIA) in favor of C. A. (IIB), however, we must face the fact that a similar course of finitization (i.e., constructing some *E*) yields no general significance-principle. For while *translatability into E* applies to some sentences outside *E*, *inclusion in E* applies to no sentence outside *E*. Hence, even if *E* is constructed to meet most liberal requirements, it will hardly suffice to include *all* significant sentences of *all* languages. And if this is the case, then inclusion in *E* will at best be a sufficient, but not a necessary, condition of cognitive significance generally.

If we are willing to rest content with C. A. (IIB) as an ultimate *definition* of significance itself, we, of course, do not face this problem and we salvage our coveted generality. But the price is extravagant, involving acceptance of the vague predicate "is an empiricist language" as our ultimate tool of analysis. Further refinement of this predicate by provision of a general characterization of empiricist languages would not represent substantial progress, since such characterization would presumably rest, in part, on the use of "is an observation-predicate," rather than a finite listing

¹⁷ M. White, "A Finitistic Approach to Philosophical Theses." *Philosophical Review*, 60, 1951, pp. 299-316.

of acceptable predicates. But this general term is as loose as "is an empiricist language," and requires finitization no less than its predecessor. We might think, finally, of listing all observation-predicates of all languages as included in *E*'s vocabulary. But such a pooling of predicates, aside from its practical impossibility, could theoretically be carried out presently only for languages already known. In such restricted form, this pooling would be patently unfair to as yet unknown languages, while a method for generally characterizing observation-predicates for these languages is precisely what we lack; if we had such a method, pooling would be unnecessary.

11. *A Restricted Problem for Empiricism.*

Thus, adopting C. A. (IIB) as our (empiricist) criterion of adequacy, we arrive (through construction of *E*) at a sufficient but not a necessary condition of cognitive significance. Again, this result does not show that a general definition of cognitive significance is impossible: if we did not mind taking "is an empiricist language" as primitive, we could use C. A. (IIB), or, if we could construct an adequate psychological theory of observationality for predicates, we might refine C.A (IIB) acceptably. The point is, rather, that the finitizing of C. A. (IIB) by construction of a particular language *E* yields at best only a sufficient but not a necessary condition of cognitive significance. Having rejected C. A. (II) and C. A. (IIA), and having decided on finitization for the reasons mentioned, we have at best a sufficient condition of cognitive significance, unless, indeed, an alternative empiricist requirement is forthcoming to replace C. A. (IIB).

In constructing *E*, we are, then, committed to the significance of its sentences; on the other hand, we do not thereby rule all excluded sentences meaningless. Furthermore, though mere exclusion is not tantamount to meaninglessness, we may be guided in the process of construction by the desire to exclude certain sentences independently deemed meaningless. Given the possibility of constructing an observational *E* purified of meaninglessness as independently recognized, but not including all signifi-

cant sentences, can we make it commodious enough to house all our respectable beliefs in scientific domains? This problem, which naturally grows out of the initial search for a general empiricist significance-principle, is nevertheless distinct, once we give up C. A. (IIA). For, even if we now make *E* commodious enough, we cannot dismiss excluded sentences as meaningless without independent judgment, since it at best provides only a sufficient condition of significance. Nevertheless, though less ambitious in aim, this heir to the earlier problem seems certainly important and has perhaps the advantage of proving more manageable. This new problem, once more, is not to provide a general rule for excluding meaningless sentences, but to specify the construction of some empiricist or observational language *E* containing no meaningless sentences, and adequate for the formulation of all our sincere beliefs of specified types.

(To be concluded)

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TEN THESES RELATING TO EXISTENCE

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1. *Existence is intelligible.*

WERE Existence not intelligible, it would not be known what it was to exist rather than not to exist. But this we know. Not only that, we know what Existence is, both from the perspective of other modes of being, and in itself. This contention stands in opposition to the claims of the existentialist who, supposing that what can be known is just essence and that Existence has no essence, is forced to view Existence as absurd, irrational, unintelligible, in face of the fact that he seems to know it well enough to characterize it in these belittling terms. Our contention also stands in opposition to the Thomists who suppose that Existence can never be known apart from any individual being, in face of the fact that we know it quite well as the independent domain in which Actualities are imbedded and which relates them as contemporaries and keeps them abreast.

Existence has its own essence. A grasp of that essence is of course not yet a grasp of Existence itself. The fact that a grasp of an essence is not yet a grasp of that of which it is the essence is not peculiar to Existence. Nothing—not only Existence—is identical with its essence. The essence of an Actuality is distinct from the Actuality, and he who, with Aristotle, holds that knowledge is confined to a grasp of eternal essences is forced to hold that the Actuality, as over against these, is possessed of non-graspable accidents. Nor is the essence of an Ideal identical with that Ideal. The Ideal is normative, intrudes on other modes of being, and has a temporal role. He who with Hegel views the Ideal as an essence, is forced to distinguish it from itself as working through time to constitute history. There is for Hegel a "cunning" to reason which makes it operate as an agency and foil for itself; but this is but to say that there is a real distinction for him between reason as an unchanging essence, and reason as a changing, effec-

tive, historically significant Ideal. And finally the essence of God is distinct from God himself. God is active, a judge and preserver, whereas his essence is but his unity as distinct from him, the being who has unity. He who, with Spinoza, tries to identify God and his essence must, in order to take account of what has been termed God's will, providence, creative activity, and his footstool the world, distinguish between God in himself and God's multiple transitory modes, or between *natura naturans* and *natura naturata*, the essence of God and the being of God.

The essence of Existence is in a tensional relation to sheer Existence. This last in turn is not a distinct reality. So far as we distinguish it we provide for a tensional relation within it of a subordinate Existence and essence. At every stage of a progressive movement to analytic components of Existence, we come to an essence which has over against it an Existence differing from that essence not in the possession of some quality or character, but in its being, in its function, in the way it acts and thereby affects that essence and other beings.

He who claims to know that Existence is other than essence or reason, knows it as the object of the rational category "Existence"—or if one likes of "non-reason." Every object of that category is other than that category—though to be sure the object embodies the category. If we could know that something was not the object of "reason," we would self-contradictorily know it by means of what would then be the category "not an object of reason."

There is a difference between knowledge and its object; otherwise knowledge would not be possible. But difference is not negation. What is distinct from reason is not beyond the power of reason to apprehend; the object of reason is distinct from it but known by means of it. All knowledge is knowledge of what is other than itself. There is no paradox in this unless to know is to repeat, duplicate, re-present. Existence is intelligible not because it is an essence but because it is knowable through the use of essences, categories, judgments, reason.

2. *"Existence" is a predicate.*

It makes sense to say that something exists. Of course an existing hundred dollars does not contain the least coin more than a possible hundred dollars. No one ever thought it did, and it is hard to understand why Kant thought this a remark worth making. An existent hundred dollars contains a number of actual coins, and a possible hundred dollars contains the same number, but only of possible coins. To say of these dollars that they exist is to say that there are so many actual coins, that they have such and such relations to some other existent and so on. As Kant himself observed, an existent Actuality is that which has determinate relations to what is perceived, which is but to say to something already acknowledged to be existent. Nothing can be added to the possible to turn it into existent—unless it be Existence. This Existence is not another possible; it has a mode of being other than that possessed by the possible. To say of something that it exists is to say that in addition to the particular characters we recognize it to have, it has the inclusive character, the organic predicate of having a career other than any set of characters would provide. This career can be understood; we can note the object's habits and the course of the world and anticipate with some shrewdness just where it will go and what it will do. The going and the doing is its work, and an outcome of its Existence. By recognizing that Existence is a predicate we do not turn it into a feature of an object, alongside its other features, nor do we turn its Existence into an essence. All we do is characterize it in abstract terms, remarking on the fact that it has determinations not provided by what Kant calls our "concepts," i.e., our limited predicates, such as shape, color, sound, etc.

As a rule when we speak of something existing we mean that it has a career in space-time. But the Ideal exists and God exists, and neither exists inside space-time. The predicate "Existence" strictly speaking then has a three-fold use. It marks the fact that an entity, which it characterizes as a totality, either is present, is in a process of becoming, or has more implications than those that follow from an idea of it.

Like any other predicate, the predicate "Existence" can be

predicated erroneously. As a rule we say that such erroneous predication occurs when something is held to, but does not in fact exist in the normative sense of having determinate relations to common sense objects. Thus we normally think that it is an error to say that a hippogriff exists, even though it may exist as an idea. Since every mode of being has Existence within it, every mode, and derivatively every feature, is justly said to exist, though to be sure not in the normative common sense way of existing as an actual object.

When we ask for a proof of the existence of God we sometimes seem to be asking—and this is how Kant seemed to treat the question—whether or not he exists in the way things do. Sometimes we seem to ask whether or not he has a characteristic way of existing. But what we intend to ask as a rule is whether or not he is a real being. We want to know whether or not he controls, determines, delimits the Existence in him. "God exists" is false if it is supposed to say that God exists the way a space-time Actuality does, as a being knocked about in a spatial field, struggling to remain in time. It is false if it is supposed to say that God, an irreducible mode of being, is subordinate to Existence. It is still open to question and demonstration whether or not God has an irreducible being, and whether or not he has Existence in him.

3. *"Existence" is predicable of every idea and predicate.*

Every idea and predicate occurs at some time, in someone's mind or language. It is just this item, with such and such specific relations to others; it is a hard brute fact at least in the psyche or in language. The idea or predicate as a fact, as a "that", as Bradley brilliantly urged in the first chapter of his great *Logic*, is to be contrasted with itself as a meaning, a "what." This "what" is but one part of the total idea, the part with which we are concerned when we speak of essences, of categories, of knowledge. As part of an existent, psychical event, this meaning has an existence there. It achieves external existence only when dislodged from the idea and transported or referred or used by the mind and thereby given lodgement elsewhere. Its career in the psychical

event is the topic of the psychological study of the nature of thought. In contrast, the psychical event, the idea as an occurrence, is more the topic of the psychological or linguistic study of the origin and repercussions of that occurrence. The one study sees that the idea or meaning "dog" is perhaps followed by one of "cat"; the other study remarks that the idea of dog is exciting and is followed perhaps by an unnoticed movement of the hand. Neither of these exhibits the idea as part of a judgment or act of knowledge. Judgment and knowledge require us to dislodge the meaning from its original setting to give it a new existence as part of the cognitive or referential act. It is the idea in this latter sense on which logic concentrates, telling us not what ideas in fact follow on ideas or what acts follow on ideas, but what meaning ought to follow on a meaning if the former is to inherit some such desirable character as truth or clarity or elegance, and so on.

An idea, then, can be said to exist in at least three senses: it exists as a psychical or linguistic occurrence; it exists as a meaning carried by that occurrence; and it exists as a meaning in some cognitive whole, epistemic or logical. As existing in these ways the idea can be characterized through the use of the predicate "Existence." Since the idea of Existence, like any other idea, also has three senses, it too can be characterized by the predicate "Existence" on these three occasions.

4. *To know an idea is not yet to know the career it has.*

To know an idea (idea *a*) we employ an idea (idea *b*) referring to idea *a*'s meaning or occurrence. The idea *b* we have of the meaning of idea *a* does not report the nature of the idea *a*'s career, and therefore does not report the nature of the career to which *a* subjects the meaning which *a* carries. And if we concentrate not on the meaning of the idea *a* but on the fact of it, we will know idea *a* (as we know all things) by means of an idea *c* which is part of a judgment. Idea *c* is distinct from the idea *a*, even when it purports to duplicate it. Idea *c* has a career in judgment, and will have all kinds of relations and activities in the knowing mind that idea *a* does not have. Idea *a*, taken either as an occurrence or a meaning, has a career which no knowledge of it en-

compasses. The knowledge *c* of idea *a*'s occurrence, at the very best, gives us the essence of that occurrence, and this does not go through the career which its object *a* does. No matter how precise our knowledge of an occurrence, it falls short of the fact that it is taking place in a world of contingencies, and that it works itself out in time, and is therefore not available for knowledge even to an absolutely omniscient being—who can know, after all, only what can be known, and not what is not yet there to be known.

5. *The features of beings are involved in careers not identical with those they have as part of the mind.*

The elements in a veridical judgment of perception—the indicated and contemplated—are derived from an external object. As so derived they are subject to various alterations. In the object they are not distinct one from the other; the object is a seamless whole. It is the knower who separates off the indicated and contemplated from the object and from one another. Such separation involves a severance from the Existence, and thus from the career, of the object. It requires, too, the embedding of the elements in a cognizing act having various relations not determinable from the standpoint of the elements, to other acts and other functions, parts, and aspects of the knower, and that with which he is in interplay. No matter how accurate and precise our perception, no matter how successfully we may be able to recapture in the judgment the unity and thus the non-separated nature of the indicated and the contemplated as they occurred originally in the object, there is a difference between the adventures to which the object subjects its features and the adventures to which the knower subjects them. If one could, with the early Wittgenstein, make structural pictures of the world, or if one could, with Pythagorean thinkers, view the world as a congeries of mathematical relations which could be perfectly grasped by a detached or clear intellect, it still would be the case that the adventures of the picture or numbers would not necessarily be in accord with what is outside them.

Similar observations are to be made with reference to any discriminable features of the Ideal and of God. These are some-

times spoken of as though they were absolutely simple; but if this were the case there could be no judgment made of them by means of features derivable from them or even supposed to be in them. Within the Ideal there are creases and foci which precipitate out as limited objectives under the pressure of appetitive beings; within God there are the possibilities and actualities and Existence as judged by him. When we know the Ideal and God, we separate out what was, in them, part of one organic unity, and then give the separated parts lodgment in finite beings and situations, where they are subject to vicissitudes and conditions to which they were not subject originally.

6. *The passage from what is in mind to the object known goes through Existence.*

Mind and what is not in mind are divided from one another by Existence. Knowing is an act which, like every other act, is a delimited bit of Existence, but one whose primary task is to undo the work which was produced in the act of obtaining elements for judgment. Cognition is, then, no mere simple translucent focusing on an objective fact—immediate, without risk of distortion or error. It is an act which begins with the knower and terminates in an object known. That act affects what the knower feels and decides and sometimes does. It makes a difference also to the object, for by making the object the terminus of a cognition, the knower forces it into the foreground, and makes it not only a test of his claim to know but a possible focal point for further knowing and other kinds of action.

In knowing we pass through Existence to a being existing apart from us and our act of knowing. The Existence through which we pass, as well as the existent object at which we arrive, is other than and more than we possess in our cognition. We exist as men while we existentially know through the utilization of but part of our being; what is outside us exists while it is existentially known through the utilization of distinguished facets of it.

7. *Predication produces a change in the meaning of the predicate.*

"Predication" is really a "judgmentation," a reference to a unity of an indicated, or subject, and a contemplated, or predicate. However, since the contemplated contains most of the meaning in which we are interested in discourse, logic, and speculation, we usually are inclined to overlook the other element in judgment and the judgment as a whole.

There is no point in attributing a predicate or contemplated to a subject in or outside us. If we did, all our predications would yield tautologies or contradictions: the first if the subject in fact possessed the predicate we attributed to it, and the second if it did not. Predicates are not predicated; they are but pivotal points in a judgment which, together with the indicated, articulates an object which we also adumbrate as that which stands apart from us. In either case, whether we suppose there is such an act as predication or not, what we ascribe to the object of cognition is distinct, as ascribed, from what it is as something to be ascribed. The predicate as in mind is, in knowledge, referred outside that mind to another existent locus, where it has a career other than that which it had in mind.

The predicate as at the object is an attribute; it may be quite distinct in nature and structure, as well as behavior, from what it is in the mind or language. Still there is a single nucleal element of meaning which can be abstracted from the predicate and recognized to be in it as attribute. The obtaining of that nucleal element may require considerable effort, particularly when the transformation of the predicate is quite radical. The fact that there is such a nucleal element does not affect the fact that the predicate has been transformed in the act of knowing.

8. *Attributes are altered by being abstracted from objects.*

In veridical perception contemplated attributes are obtained from external objects. They are facets of those objects, distinguished by the knower in a way that they are not distinguished in the objects. Knowledge analyzes before it unifies, and the analysis introduces distinctions and borders which were not in

the objects themselves. The elements that are distinguished to constitute a judgment, achieve a function and a career in the mind that they never did have in the fact. The point has been overlooked by many modern logicians. And where it is recognized (see. e.g., W. V. Quine, *A System of Logistic*, p. 7), the act of abstraction is not recognized to be a transformative act—one in which the predicate is in effect changed in nature because it has acquired a different mode of existing.

9. *The perceived is contemporary with the perceiver.*

We perceive what is contemporary with us, and this even if it be the sun or moon or stars. This truth, it is often thought, is contradicted by scientific discoveries in optics, physiology, and the like. But the one thing which it in fact does is to take account of the facts which make any science and any evidence possible. The alternatives to the doctrine of the perception of what is contemporary would seem to be only three: a. what we perceive occurs only in our minds; b. what we perceive is something projected by us on to an environing void; c. what we perceive is distant from us in space and in time. The first alternative denies that there could ever be any objective evidence; in fact it has nothing to know but what is inside one individual's mind. There are no external facts for it, no evidence, no science. The second alternative offers us an objective world, but one of our own making. Once again there are no objective facts for us to know, no evidence for us to attend to, but only a world for us to construct, governed by no requirements but that we should exteriorize what we have somehow in our minds. The third alternative is the most favored today. It alone of the three says that there are objective brute facts, real evidence on which one can rely, and it seems to be the only view which accepts without cavil, the theory that light takes time to travel from place to place. The theory, however, makes a number of rather strange assumptions. It supposes that one can traverse backwards in time. Yet past time is precisely a time which is no longer available. In any case it is unalterable—as are the objects in it—and cannot therefore be open to fresh traversal by the perceiving mind. It supposes too that one

traverses the very path over which some photon came, even though there is nothing in the arrived photon which tells where it came from. And it supposes that the traversal is instantaneous so that one can do in perception what has been defined to be impossible in fact.

There is little doubt that it takes time for a light ray or photon or sound wave to travel over space. But it is not the thing that travels, not the traversal, nor that from which the travel starts that is perceptually encountered; these are deductions from something perceptually known. The arrival of the photon or sound is the arrival of a physical thing at a physical body. This may irritate, provoke, stimulate one to engage in an act of knowledge. That act starts with an Existent, goes through Existence and arrives at an Existent. If it went through the thickness of Existence it would certainly take time before it arrived at the object, and all perception would then be of what occurred later than the ideas in terms of which we knew it—an outcome which would effectively cut us off from our contemporaries. But abstraction, indication, contemplation, adumbration, judgment, reference, are all modes of utilizing only a layer of Existence and thereby acknowledging what lies at a contemporary object's end.

10. *What is in mind tests what is in body, and conversely.*

Empiricists take attributes—and any other features as resident in objects—to test the truth, value, clarity, or meaning of what is in mind. Rationalists take the opposite tack. For them what is in mind tests what is encountered in perception or experience. There is no way of deciding between these approaches, and there is no need to decide between them. Both tests are legitimate. What is in the mind has one career, and what is in the object known has another. Each career is reputable, and for one purpose one can serve as a test for the other; for another purpose their roles can be interchanged. An idea in mind, if separated off from the dross of daily activity, mere contingent neighbors and connections, achieves a purified status and is granted a way of existing more appropriate to its intelligible nature. If then it is clarity, purity, ideal, and intelligible connections we seek or need, mind must serve as the

measure for the world. But if it is practice, experience, other things with which we are concerned, what is in mind can be at best an attenuated, fragmentary, indeterminate version of it.

Although each view is as sound as the other, both are subordinate to a third, which I have sometimes called "Epochalism" because it calls our attention to the pivotal points of the universe or of knowledge, around which inquiry and speculation should persistently turn. Epochalism is that position of which both the empirical and rational views are limiting cases. These limiting cases insist on half a truth to the exclusion of the other, when nothing less than both can possibly satisfy. This is the case not only in view of the effective criticism each of these views makes of the other, but in view of the fact that what is in the mind has virtues denied to it in the external world, and conversely.

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CONCRETE ENTITIES AND CONCRETE RELATIONS

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THE purpose of this article is to examine the conditions, forms, and possibility of the relatedness of concrete entities. Its argument consists of five steps. The first step is a cursory preliminary analysis of the concept of concrete entity and its interdependence with the concepts of entity, identity, and change. The second step is an attempt to discover what relations are possible among concrete entities. The third step is an argument for the *possibility* of the elimination of the concept of relata. The fourth step is an argument for the *possibility* of the elimination of the concept of relations. The fifth step is an examination of the ground on which a decision is to be made regarding the *truth* of either the metaphysic of relationless relata or the metaphysic of relataless relations.

A. *The Concept of Concrete Entity*

If change is taken seriously, no concrete entity can change. For concreteness implies self-identity, and self-identity implies unchangeability. An entity which changes is one before the change, another after the change, and also different at every moment throughout the process of change. Even if the change is strictly accidental, the entity cannot preserve its concreteness. For, if in referring to the entity we refer to it as a whole, as including its accidents, then *this* entity has changed, because one of its accidents has changed. If the entity is regarded as distinct from its changing accident, then the *entity* in no sense has changed at all. But what does change, accidentally or essentially, must lose its concreteness. Therefore a concrete entity must be unchangeable, because a concrete entity must be self-identical.

But how can any entity be not self-identical? If it is both itself and another, then it is not an entity but a pair of entities. At best, an entity which is not self-identical (e.g., a changing entity) is a series of concrete, self-identical, unchanging entities, parallel

to what Whitehead calls "personal order." But even then the series itself would be self-identical qua a series, although its constituents exhibit successive differences. Therefore, to speak of entities which are not self-identical is either not precise or contradictory. It is not precise if two or more entities (e.g., the entity as "itself" and the entity as "another") are referred to as one entity, even if this one entity is then said to be not self-identical. It is contradictory if a self-identical series or collection of self-identical entities is called a non-self-identical entity. Therefore, for the same reason for which a concrete entity cannot change, no entity can change.

Can we generalize our discussion to refer to all entities and to all relations, not merely to concrete entities and concrete relations? We are involved in an august problem: are universals self-identical and therefore unchangeable in themselves, while changeable and therefore not self-identical in their relations to their exemplifications? In another perspective, this problem is whether the exemplifications of a universal are essential, or make a difference to the universal. If universals are equivalent to their concrete exemplifications—that is, if every characteristic of every concrete exemplification of a universal is a characteristic of the universal itself—and if every characteristic of the universal is a characteristic of each one of its concrete exemplifications, then our arguments in this article will be applicable to all entities. But the solution of the above problem is far beyond the limits of this article, and we shall provisionally concern ourselves only with the entities and relations of the concrete world, with concrete entities and concrete relations.

Before we commence the second step of our inquiry, we should like to make two preliminary observations.

First, "lasting through time" does not necessarily constitute non-concreteness. It would do so only if lasting through time constitutes a change in what is lasting through time. If temporal position is essential to the entity, then lasting through time inevitably breaks up the entity, and the latter is not self-identical and is not concrete. If, however, temporal position is not only not essential but wholly irrelevant to the entity, lasting through time would not constitute a change in it and therefore would be compatible with its concreteness. Consequently, concrete entities

must be "perpetually perishing" only within the framework of a particular theory of time which "takes time seriously."

Second, a simple entity, i.e., one that has no parts, cannot change and must preserve its self-identity, for what changes must have at least two parts: that which is replaced by another and that which stays through the change in order to justify the identity of the subject. This means that what a simple is it must always be, and that what it is not it can never become.

B. *The Relations of Concrete Entities*

Could concrete entities be related externally? An external relation is one that may or may not hold between its terms. To say then that a concrete entity is externally related is to say that it has a relation which it might not have. It is equivalent to saying that it is *thinkable* that this concrete entity would be this concrete entity if it lost its external relation. But this is self-contradictory. For the concrete entity would be changed if it lost its relation. And a concrete entity is one that cannot change.

It is quite irrelevant that we may say that the concrete entity is related only *externally*, and therefore that its relations can change without thus producing a change *in it*. For it either is related or it is not. If it is related, its relation makes a difference to it. If it is not related, the problem itself does not arise. Even if we accept the distinction between essence and accidents, and therefore say that the external relation of the concrete entity was accidental to it and that it may not hold without thus producing an essential difference in it, an external relation cannot hold between concrete entities. For its holding "makes a difference" at least to the accidents of the relation. So the accidents could not be concrete. But if it does not make a difference to the essence at all, then the essence is not related at all. But if the essence and the accidents of an entity cannot be regarded separately, but must constitute a whole, then an external relation makes a difference not merely to the accidents but to the concrete entity as a whole.

The theory of external relations arose only because the world was interpreted through the concept of changeable concrete entity.

If what changes is self-identical, then it can change at least some of its relations and still remain one. But the rejection of the concept of changeable concrete entity inevitably leads to the rejection of the theory of external relations. For the concept of external relations is the lifeless offspring of the unholy union of the concepts of 'entity' and 'changeability.' The self-contradictory world of changing entities needed external relations to serve as the disguise of its contradiction.

But if only internal relations can hold among concrete entities, there arises a peculiar interdependence between the two categories of relata and relations. The metaphysic of relata and relations arose on the basis of Russell's attack on the subject-predicate logic. The preservation of this metaphysic, however, depends on the preservation of the radical distinction between the relata and the relations. Thus the theory of external relations is a natural aspect of the metaphysic of relata and relations. And when the former is rejected, the latter begins to lose the ontological balance between relata and relations which is indispensable to it. For internal relations are by their very nature intimately involved in their relata, and the relata are intimately involved in their relations. The radical distinction between them is no longer possible. Two contradictory tendencies arise: the collapse of the relata into their relations, and the collapse of the relations into their relata.

C. *The Metaphysic of Relataless Relations*

If we regard a relation as a particular and not as a universal, i.e., if we take *this* particular, concrete relation as relating these particular, concrete relata, and not as a mere exemplification of this relation, then a relation can be regarded as containing its relata. This would be impossible if the relata are not concrete, even if the relation is concrete. For then the relation would be relating only one of the series of concrete entities which is its relatum. Nor could the relata be included in their relation if the relation is not concrete, but the relata are concrete. For then the relata would be mere accidents of the relation. And, finally, if

both relation and relata are not concrete, there can be two cases. First, if every one of the members of the series of concrete relations which is the relation relates respectively every pair of the respective members of the two or more series of concrete entities which are the relata, then the non-concrete relation could be said to contain its non-concrete relata only in the sense that each concrete relation of the former contains the corresponding concrete entities of the latter. Secondly, if there are some concrete relations or concrete relata which do not relate or are not related by corresponding concrete relata or concrete relations, then the non-concrete relation does not contain its non-concrete relata, although some of the concrete relations which constitute the former may contain some of the concrete relata which constitute the latter.

How does the metaphysic of relation escape the force of Bradley's postulate that (first) "the qualities must be, and (only then) must *also* be related?" The duality in Bradley's qualities arises from his failure to think of *relations* (and the entities they are relating) as *concrete* in the strict sense of the term. If aRb , cRd , eRf , . . . (in other words, if the relation R is not concrete), then a and b must each have a dual character: they must be what they are in their particularity in order to be distinguished from c , d , e , and f ; and also they must possess what c and d , and e and f also respectively possess—the possibility of being related by R . Therefore it becomes absurd to regard a and b as contained in R —for then a , c , and e would not be three relata but one, and the same would apply to b , d , and f .

But if the entities and their relations are concrete, then the above schema would take the following form: aR_1b , cR_2d , and eR_3f . Then to regard a and b as related by R_1 would not entail a duality in them. And regarding a and b as contained in their relation R_1 would entail no contradiction. In fact it would be the only possible view. For if I know R_1 (a concrete relation relating the concrete entities a and b), I must also know a and b —otherwise I may know R , but certainly not R_1 . For in an important sense, a and b would be the "result" of R_1 . Whitehead's prehending thing becomes merely what prehends and not also what must be. In Bradley's terms, it is only the "result" of the relation and not also its "condition"; it does not have the double character of

Bradley's relata, for it is the concrete relatum of a concrete relation. And in Wittgensteinian terms, an object does not *have* a form, but *is* its form, which itself is nothing but its internal relations to other objects.

Thus the existence of only internal relations among concrete entities implies at least the logical possibility of the collapse of the relata into their relations. For concrete entities imply their relations and are implied by them. It is unthinkable that this blue color and that should not stand in the relation of brighter or darker, says Wittgenstein. Whitehead's addition to this statement would be that if the relation of brighter or darker is understood as perfectly concrete, it becomes unthinkable that this particular concrete relation of brighter and darker would not relate this particular, concrete blue and that. Thus this blue color and that could be regarded as mere characteristics of their relation of brighter and darker. They would be aspects of the relational texture of the world.

D. *The Metaphysic of Relationless Relata*

Is the view of relationless relata also logically possible? Is it possible to represent every fact of reality by the use of a language containing only names? Is a metaphysic of relationless relata representationally or logically adequate?

Again we are confronted with the concept of concrete entity. The name of a non-concrete entity is necessarily ambiguous. Usually it is not proper but refers to a class. Such is the case with the names of all ordinary physical objects. Physical objects are changeable, and they are in time. Therefore their names refer at least to a series of concrete entities which usually are different from one another not only temporally (if lasting through time makes a difference to what is lasting through time) but also in terms of their constituents, relations, and characteristics. Consequently, the names of physical objects by definition cannot be perfect. For a perfect name is one that has only one meaning and no other, only one referent or designatum and no other. The same is the case not only with physical objects but with all entities

which are changing and which, in general, are not self-identical. A concrete entity is self-identical and therefore unchangeable. A changeable entity is not self-identical and, in reality, is many. Therefore the name of a changeable entity hides the multiplicity of the designatum. For it refers to the whole series of concrete entities which compose the changing entity, and may refer to any one of them and also may not refer to some one of them. Hence the perfect name of a concrete entity is a simple name, e.g., *A*. (It may not be a simple existent, as "*A*" certainly is not, but it can be a simple name, qua a symbol, not qua an object which also happens to be a symbol.) And the perfect name of an entity which is not self-identical is $A_1, A_2, A_3, \dots A_n$. If the changing entity consists of a finite number of the component-concrete entities, then its perfect name would be finite. If the number of the component-concrete entities is infinite (as should be the case under certain theories of time), then the perfect name of the non-concrete entity must be infinite. Therefore the exclusiveness of non-perfect names in ordinary language and the seeming exclusiveness of concepts of non-concrete entities in ordinary thought can be psychologically explained as necessitated by the fact that under the ordinarily accepted concept of time, every non-concrete entity must consist of an infinite number of concrete entities. Hence its perfect naming becomes psychologically impossible.

Clearly, on the basis of the concept of changeable entity a relationless metaphysic cannot be constructed. For many, if not all, facts of reality would not be representable by mere names. Everything that is hidden by the imperfect name would need a special relational proposition to bring it out in the open. Most relations, elements, and characteristics of the changeable entity are hidden by its imperfect name. This is why most propositions are synthetic, and this is why we think that we get to know reality only through synthetic propositions: for synthetic propositions are our ways of bringing out the hidden referents of the imperfect name.

Some propositions are analytic: they "disclose" elements of the non-concrete entity which have never been hidden by the name. This is why we say that analytic propositions teach us nothing about the world. The fact is that they are simply unnecessary

cognitively—for what they tell us, we already knew from the names in the proposition even before they were incorporated in the proposition. Thus, "Plato wrote the *Republic*" can be regarded as analytic, for it can be held that what it tells us is already told by the names "Plato" and "*Republic*." But the proposition "Plato disliked Athenian democracy" can be considered a synthetic proposition, for it can be held that the name "Plato" hides the fact that Plato disliked Athenian democracy, and that the name "Athenian democracy" hides the fact that Athenian democracy was disliked by Plato. (But the name "Plato" seems to advertise the fact that Plato is the person who wrote the *Republic*, and the name "*Republic*" seems to advertise the fact that the *Republic* is the book which Plato wrote.)

But if it is understood that concrete entities need not be named imperfectly (while changing non-concrete entities must be), then it is obvious that a language only of names can express every fact of the concrete world which is expressed in a language of names, adjectives, and relations, or in a language of only relations. Hence the metaphysic of relationless relata is logically, i.e., representationally, possible.

The picture of the concrete world will theoretically consist of a (infinite or finite) collection of names. The possibility of this may be illustrated by the possibility of transforming every synthetic proposition into an analytic proposition. This latter possibility is dependent on the perfection of names, which in itself is dependent on the establishment of the concept of concrete entity. An analytic proposition, however, as it is defined in this article, is immediately seen to be superfluous. Its only function can be as a reminder of the meanings of the names. But this is a function which may have psychological interest, not philosophical. Philosophically, every analytic proposition is a mere redundancy: it repeats exactly what the names in the proposition say. Hence what it says can be said by the names themselves. And if, given the concepts of concrete entity and perfect naming, all propositions must be reducible to analytic propositions, then everything that can be said about reality can be said by proper naming in perfect names.

Thus the acceptance of the concepts of concrete entity and perfect naming shows the logical inadequacy of the metaphysic

of relations *and* relata, and also shows the logical possibility of both the metaphysic of relationless relata and the metaphysic of relataless relations.

E. *Relataless Relations or Relationless Relata?*

The possibility of representing the world as constituted of relataless relations, or relationless relata, or of relata and relations should not be confused with the truth or falsity of any one of these three alternatives. That it is possible to represent reality as constituted only of internal relations does not show that reality *is* so constituted. It merely exhibits the logical possibility of such a *weltanschauung*, i.e., the fact that if concreteness is taken seriously, every fact of reality can be understood and represented as merely relational. But whether this fact is really merely relational is a problem which cannot be solved by the analysis of concepts. For it is a problem of existence. And whether relataless relations really exist can be decided only by direct intuition of the world, by "looking into" reality.

The case is similar with the opposite view of the world—that the world is constituted of relationless relata. The logical possibility of this view is determined by the analysis of the concept of concrete entity *and* the concept of perfect naming. Every concrete entity is assured of the possibility of its having a perfect name. But a perfect name may leave nothing in the entity or about the entity unnamed, for then it would not be the name of the whole entity but merely of the entity-without-the-unnamed. Hence the logical possibility of representing every fact of reality as relationless, for the mere statement of the names of the relata must already state everything that a relational proposition about these relata can state.

But such is not the case with the third metaphysic under consideration—the metaphysic of relations and relata. For, as we have seen, the appearance of its possibility depends on the unanalyzed character of the concepts of relata and relations. If the world really consists of relations and relata, the doctrine of external relations naturally follows, although perhaps it is not coercive. But

external relations are possible only among changeable entities, and the latter, if taken seriously as non-concrete, can be related only externally. Yet we have seen that the concept of changeable entity is self-contradictory. If it refers to one entity, then it could not refer to it as changing, since then the entity would not be one but many. If it refers to several entities in a temporal order, then each one of these several entities is unchangeable and it is a mere mistake of language to refer to the series of unchanging entities as one changing entity. Therefore the metaphysic of relations and relata depends on a self-contradictory concept. Therefore it is not logically possible and could never be true.

The metaphysic of relationless relata and the metaphysic of relataless relations thus appear to be the only logically possible views. Both appear to be adequate representations of every fact of reality. It should be theoretically possible to translate every name or proposition of the relations-and-relata language into a name or proposition either of the language of relationless relata or of the language of relataless relations. For if every entity denoted by the name or the proposition is broken into the concrete entities of which it must consist if it is to be real, and if proper naming of these concrete entities is achieved, as it should be possible if they are concrete, then either the perfect names of the concrete entities say everything that the relational proposition of the non-concrete entities can say, or the perfectly concrete relation of these concrete entities includes the latter in its own nature and therefore its perfect name says everything that the relational proposition of this relation and these concrete relata can say.

But while the metaphysic of relationless relata and the metaphysic of relataless relations are logically possible, only one of them can be existentially true. Assuming that a world of relations and relata is really logically impossible, the world can either consist of relationless relata or of relataless relations. But it cannot consist of both. Are its constituents relations only or relata only? As we have already stated, this question can only be answered by direct intuition. For it is a question of existence and not of concepts. Therefore its answer cannot be a subject of proof. It merely expresses the immediate realization that the world consists

of mere relations or that the world consists of mere relata. This realization may require a thorough previous analysis, synthesis, destruction, and creation of concepts. But this conceptual analysis does not determine the answer of existence. It is not a logical premise of which the answer of existence is the logical conclusion. It may be misleading and thus may lead to the formulation of an answer which is false. A certain conceptual system may lead to false assertions of existence. But this does not mean that the conceptual analysis determines our intuition of existence, but merely that it determines insufficiently examined *assertions* of existence. A concept is a hypothesis of existence. It may be a false concept because of the manner of its construction and because of its place in a particular conceptual system, in the sense that a false hypothesis has been set up. But whether it is true or false is decided not by its construction, but by its correspondence or lack of correspondence with the world.

What we have done until now is conceptual analysis. We have tried to specify the meaning of the concept of concrete entity and thus the meaning of the concept of existent; of proper naming and thus of name and proposition. On the basis of this specification we have established the two concepts of relationless relata and relataless relations. How we have constructed these concepts determines their truth or falsity in the sense that if they are false, they could have been constructed as false. But, once constructed, what decides their truth is direct intuition of the world. The results of this intuition can merely be asserted. Hence they are essentially incommunicable, for they are results of intuition only to the person who intuits. To the other person they are nothing but another conceptual structure, the truth of which can be decided only by the results of *his* direct intuition of the world.

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CRITICAL STUDIES

ISOCRATES THE PRAGMATIST

W. I. MATSON

AMONG English-speaking philosophers, interest in Isocrates has declined to the point where it is no reproach to one's learning if Plato's pretty (and possibly malicious) compliment at the end of the *Phaedrus* is the whole extent of one's knowledge of him. It is not hard to understand why it should be thus, since all the standard histories of philosophy—even Ueberweg!—ignore him. There are two sufficient excuses for this policy. First, Isocrates never wrote a treatise systematically expounding his philosophical tenets. Second, although ordinary language was on Isocrates' side when he used the word "philosophy" as a synonym for "cultivation of the art of discourse" (*hê tôn logôn paideia*), the Platonists won the semantic struggle¹ and appropriated the word to their purposes; whence the near-tautology that philosophy is a series of footnotes to Plato.

Nevertheless it is unfortunate that the great "sophist" has been cast into the outer darkness. Much of Plato's polemic becomes puzzling if it is not realized that the partisans of "opinion" as against "knowledge" were neither straw men nor the uncultured Many, but the leader and members of a vigorous and influential school, well-matched in their war with the Academy. Furthermore, Isocrates' philosophical views are of interest both intrinsically and as anticipations, sometimes astonishing, of various contemporary movements which profess allegiance to "common sense."

The Finnish scholar Eino Mikkola has called the attention of the philosophical world to Isocrates in the first long monograph devoted exclusively to his philosophy: *Isokrates: seine Anschau-*

¹ Because Platonism was institutionalized, while the school of Isocrates perished with him?

*ungen im Lichte seiner Schriften.*² In this work the more or less isolated remarks and digressions concerning philosophy in Isocrates' orations are collected and, with the help of such inferences as can be hazarded from his general point of view, a coherent philosophical position is revealed in them. The author contends that this doctrine is "equivalent to the contemporary philosophical movement that bears the name Pragmatism."³

The philosophical outlook of Isocrates (Mikkola argues) is based on an epistemology, developed in conscious opposition to the Eleatics and Platonists, which denies that certainty is attainable by man.⁴ If any proof is needed, it is furnished by the fruitless wrangling of "the sophists of old"⁵ over the nature of ultimate reality, and by the ridiculous pretensions of their successors.⁶ Actually, "the multitude of real things is without limit,"⁷ in the sense not of Anaxagoras but of William James' pluralism:⁸ all monisms are preposterous. Metaphysics is out of the question,⁹ not to say useless.¹⁰

Isocrates, however, was a probabilist, not a Pyrrhonist. One sentence from the *Antidosis*¹¹ comes near to summing up his whole outlook:

For since it is not in human nature to attain to a science (*epistēmē*) which would enable us to know exactly what we ought to do and say, for the rest I hold those men to be wise whose 'opinions' of the truth (*doxai*) are such as to enable them usually to hit on the best course

² *Annales Academiæ Scientiarum Fennicæ*, Series B, Tomus 89. Helsinki, 1954. This book will be cited as "Mik". References to the works of Isocrates will be given by title and section.

Besides the omission of a Greek sentence of 19 words, which should complete the quotation ending on page 186 line 12, I have noted only six inconsequential errata in this book of 347 pages. Yet it was seen through the press in less than three months!

³ Mik., p. 171.

⁴ Mik., pp. 21, 171, 250, et passim.

⁵ *Antidosis* 268.

⁶ *Against the Sophists*, passim.

⁷ *Helen* 3.

⁸ Mik., pp. 29, 172.

⁹ Mik., p. 250.

¹⁰ *Antidosis* 261 ff.

¹¹ 271.

of action; and philosophers are those who study how they may most quickly attain this kind of intelligence.

Doxa is not irresponsible guessing, but insight based on experience: worldly wisdom, which education can develop where native wit is not lacking. It is vain to deplore the fact that we cannot be provided with absolutes "to fetch from the warehouse when needed."¹² The first lesson in wisdom is Know Thyself, "that thou art a man, whose portion is uncertainty and error."¹³

The probable knowledge that is in our grasp is a means, not an end.¹⁴ The "cultivation" of Isocrates had as its goal the production of leaders of men. While he did not absolutely condemn abstract studies, he allowed them only a limited usefulness as propaedeutic,¹⁵ and in his teaching they played no part. The Isocratean attitude has been expressed by F. C. S. Schiller:

And the noblest service philosophy can render us is to pass a self-denying ordinance, and to draw our attention away from idle and inactive speculation about reality in the abstract, to the real ways in which ideals are realised and the world of reality is rendered fit to live in.¹⁶

It is a weak point in Pragmatism, whether ancient or modern, that, after we are told that all knowledge is for the sake of action, we naturally want to know what the end of action is to be and that any answer which does not include the furtherance of the things of the spirit, including knowledge, is felt to be unsatisfactory, even by the candid Pragmatist. At this juncture it is customary nowadays to attack the validity of the means-ends dichotomy. It does not seem, however, that Isocrates was aware of the difficulty. When not occupied in defending his own philosophy, he genially lapsed into the view typical of the Greek intellectual: Greek culture is the noblest of human achievements, marking its possessor with an objective and absolute superiority to the untutored barbarian. He made use of the concept of cultural superiority to

¹² Mik., p. 252.

¹³ Mik., p. 48.

¹⁴ Mik., pp. 71 ff.

¹⁵ *Antidosis* 261-269.

¹⁶ *Studies in Humanism*, p. 223; quoted in Mik., p. 73.

justify war against the barbarians, which was, in his thought, the ultimate, grand aim of activity.¹⁷

Mikkola describes Isocrates' theory of value as relational.¹⁸ "A value is a valuing";¹⁹ it has no being beyond consensus of opinion.²⁰ Hence the supreme importance of rhetoric. But the valuing that is value is not mere whim; rather, it is what is found in experience to further the life of civilized society. This is "open-hearted, almost naive Utilitarianism."²¹ Isocrates declared that the motives for all human actions fall into three classes: pleasure, gain, and fame.²² The worthiest of these is fame: living on in the grateful remembrance of posterity. Like a proper Benthamite, he proceeded to point out that individual satisfaction is best achieved by services to the community.

Nor was Isocrates blind to the consequence that circumstances alter values. "Nothing is good or bad in and for itself."²³ "That which appears good or just when done by one man at a particular time, can be bad or unjust at the next moment or when done by another man."²⁴ In this reviewer's opinion, however, Mikkola exaggerates Isocrates' contextualism. In the first of three passages Mikkola cites in support,²⁵ Isocrates declares that the relative importance of the different virtues varies with circumstances, e.g., one should get more points for self-control if one is young;²⁶ in the second, that a certain policy, e.g., war, may lead now to success, now to disaster.²⁷ The third passage is praise of the constitution as the soul of the state.²⁸ It is a mystery why this should

¹⁷ Perhaps it was on account of this inconsistency that Jaeger wrote: "It is deeply interesting to see how Isocrates again and again conceives the essence of culture as a purposeless intellectual and spiritual activity—an ideal parallel to that of the gymnastic contests." *Paideia* (N. Y. 1944), III, 78.

¹⁸ Mik., p. 140.

¹⁹ Mik., p. 140.

²⁰ Mik., p. 141.

²¹ Mik., p. 146.

²² Mik., p. 137; *Antidosis* 217.

²³ Mik., p. 154.

²⁴ Mik., p. 155.

²⁵ Mik., pp. 155 ff.

²⁶ *Nicoles* 44.

²⁷ *Archidamus* 50.

²⁸ *Areopagiticus* 14.

be cited as proving that "Isocrates said quite explicitly that he subscribed to the standpoint of positive law." " There is nothing in any of these thoughts with which Plato, the arch-absolutist, would disagree; the fact is that he made all these points himself.

A theory of value whose climax is a call to arms may be offensive to some ears. It should be remembered, however, that in Isocrates' time the barbarians, both in the east and in the west, were still a threat to the continued existence of Greek civilization. In fact Isocrates' political theory, which is realistic but not cynical, and which praised democracy in an age when most intellectuals rejected it, is one of the most attractive facets of his thought.

It is to be hoped that Mr. Mikkola's book " will stimulate British and American scholars to Isocratean researches. The foundation has been well laid by President Norlin's exemplary translation, " and by two windfalls from scholars German in origin: Book IV, Chapters 2-6 of Jaeger's *Paideia* and the article "Isocrates, Aristotle and Alexander the Great" " by Philip Merlan, the title of which is misleading since the paper contains a concise summary of nearly everything of importance in Isocrates' philosophy, being, so to speak, the chapter missing from Ueberweg.

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²⁹ Mik., p. 157.

³⁰ It is not in every respect a model of what such a study should be. He has padded ad absurdum with the word-count kind of *Forschung*—quite unnecessarily, since the results only confirm points about Isocrates' thought which are explicitly stated by Isocrates.

³¹ Loeb Library, 1928.

³² *Historia* (Wiesbaden: Franz Steiner Verlag), Band III, Heft 1 (1954), pp. 60-81.

PHILOSOPHY AND *EXISTENZ* IN EARLY CHRISTIANITY

GEORGE LINDBECK

I

STUDENTS of the relationship of philosophy to early Christianity find that they cannot ignore the work of either Henry Austyn Wolfson or Rudolph Bultmann. It is fruitful to compare their two most recent publications. For one thing, they are in a way complementary. Bultmann's *Primitive Christianity in Its Historical Setting*¹ pictures New Testament religion as having marked affinities to modern existentialism, while Wolfson's *The Philosophy of the Church Fathers*² describes "the recasting of Christian beliefs in the form of a philosophy . . . a Christian version of Greek philosophy" (p. vi) which took place between about 100 A.D. and the Sixth Ecumenical Council in 681. Thus taken together, these volumes recount what those Protestant historians who have a horror of Hellenization regard as the rise and fall of early Christianity.

However, from another point of view, these books contradict each other, for Wolfson's work gives not the slightest sign that he recognizes anything in even the first phase of Christian history which resembles the "new understanding of human existence" which Bultmann considers its essence (p. 12). Anyone whose understanding of the New Testament has room for the aspects Bultmann emphasizes will doubt that these vanished as swiftly and completely as Wolfson's silence suggests. He will therefore wonder whether the treatment of the Church Fathers does not omit so many factors that it seriously misrepresents even those

¹ Tr. R. H. Fuller (New York: Meridian Books, 1956). From *Das Urchristentum im Rahmen der Antiken Religionen* (Zurich, 1951).

² (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1956).

features of the doctrines of faith, Scripture, Trinity and Incarnation which are discussed.

It is my conviction that this is so. However, as the counter-argument cannot be developed in a few pages, I shall center my attention in what follows on the methodological problem raised by the divergence of these two books. After briefly describing them, I shall first comment on the limitations of Wolfson's approach to the history of thought and then argue that Bultmann's procedure shows that these are unnecessarily restrictive.

II

Superficially these two volumes are incommensurables. The one on primitive Christianity is a slim paper-back which the publishers doubtless hope will attract a mass audience, while the study of patristic thought is a bulky tome which will be read mostly by specialists. The first is a fairly readable, documented summary of a truly formidable amount of original scholarly work. The second is original scholarship itself and, while organized with extraordinary clarity, is much the more forbidding in its presentation. As has already been indicated, their subject matters only partially overlap. About 80 of Wolfson's more than 600 pages are devoted to the New Testament versions of the doctrines he discusses. Bultmann gives a mere 50 pages to the New Testament, 80 to the Old, and 70 pages to the "Greek Heritage" and "Hellenism." These proportions are dictated by his two-fold conviction that Christianity is a syncretistic phenomenon which, nevertheless, embodies an understanding of human existence genuinely distinct from any other in the ancient world.

As could be expected of the man who is generally regarded as the world's foremost New Testament scholar, Bultmann admirably exhibits the grounds for the first of these theses. He may be wrong at times, but he is never ill-informed. His characterization of Greek world views as expressed in both philosophy and literature, and the contrasts he draws between these and the Old Testament, are incisive and illuminating. Despite inevitable oversimplification, the 15 pages he gives to Gnosticism and the mystery

religions are a masterpiece of compressed and clarifying explanation. Above all, this book gives the non-specialist a much better idea than he can easily obtain elsewhere of the procedures and attitudes characteristic of contemporary Biblical studies. He will discover, for example, that in some ways the "neo-orthodox" Bultmann attributes less uniqueness to the teachings of the historical Jesus than does even Edmund Wilson in his treatment of the Dead Sea scrolls; and so he will understand why many scholars in this field consider Wilson's attacks on their supposed unwillingness to recognize what Christianity owes to other sources both puerile and obnoxious.

Postponing discussion of the existentialist interpretation of New Testament religion, I shall make only the briefest of comments on Wolfson's book before turning to criticisms of it. In contrast to his previous studies of Crescas, Philo, and Spinoza³, he here supplies us with relatively little new information. Most of the topics with which he deals have been more intensively studied by others. However, he has gone through the sources for himself and presents us with a picture of the development of the doctrines of faith, Scripture, Trinity, and Incarnation which is as comprehensive as any in existence, and decidedly original in its overall pattern of interpretation. However, as we shall now see, this originality is often—though by no means always—unfortunate.

III

It seems to me that the treatment of faith and the Trinity are especially misleading, so I shall take my illustrations of the deficiencies of Wolfson's approach from these two areas, and then draw some general conclusions regarding the inadequacies of his methodology.

Our first example is the description of Augustine's view of faith (pp. 127-37): "In a purely religious sense, then, faith means belief that whatever is written in Scripture, supplemented

³ *Crescas' Critique of Aristotle* (Cambridge, Mass., 1929); *Philo*, 2 vols. (Cambridge, Mass., 1947); *The Philosophy of Spinoza*, 2 vols. (Cambridge, Mass., 1934).

by what is taught in tradition, is true" (p. 129). This is also what faith "generally means in Judaism and also in the New Testament" (p. 109; cf. pp. 8-9), and indeed in all the Church Fathers. Consequently for Augustine, as for the others, there are two main issues involved in the question of faith and reason: (1) whether faith means the acceptance of the teachings on mere authority, or also includes their acceptance as rationally demonstrated truths; (2) whether the rational demonstration increases, decreases, or makes no difference in the merit of faith (pp. 137-138). Wolfson concludes that for Augustine, as for some other Fathers, faith embraces both rational and authoritarian acceptance of scriptural and traditional teaching, and that the merit of these two types of faith is equal (pp. 130-132).

This analysis, by abstracting from Augustine's total thought, catastrophically distorts his view of faith as, to a lesser extent, it does that of some of the other Fathers. Augustine does in fact hold most of what is attributed to him, but he also holds a great deal more. He maintains, it will be recalled, that what a man can accept or understand with his mind depends upon his interests, his love. It will also be remembered that through uncertainty and anxiety about their future (*City of God* XI, 11-13), creatures have turned their love away from God, in whom is their true being, in order to seek security or distraction in themselves or in temporal things. This is the sin of rebellion and pride, for it is the attempt to make something finite into the ultimately reliable, into God. Salvation can come only through the God-given self-knowledge which perceives this as the true situation, thus humbling a man and redirecting his will and love—and therefore mind—towards God. In this context, faith, in the sense of assent, is the cognitive aspect of the breaking of rebellion and the turning to God in love and trust. It is the willingness to accept by authority or reason the teachings which, because of their proclamation of God's sufficiency and man's total insufficiency, are antithetical to human pride.⁴

⁴ For part of the documentation for the above points, see R. E. Cushman, "Faith and Reason," *A Companion to the Study of St. Augustine*, ed. R. W. Battenhouse (New York, 1955).

Thus when viewed in the framework of his total thought, the existential and voluntaristic aspects of Augustine's doctrine of faith are indeed striking. Wolfson, however, disregards them and concentrates on those features which can be paralleled in Philo (pp. 99-100) and elucidated from Aristotle (p. 131). He ignores the fact that systems of thought have a unity analogous to that of works of art so that the parts can be properly understood only in terms of the whole. As we shall see, his methodological presuppositions explain why he does this.

Two further difficulties resulting from his methodology may be illustrated by his treatment of the doctrine of the Trinity. Most students of the period—even anti-Trinitarian ones like Harnack—would object to his opinion that Arianism is more truly monotheistic than is the orthodox position (pp. 362, 385 f.). To be sure, Arius does agree with Philo that the Logos is created, and so metaphysically quite distinct from the wholly unitary Supreme Being. Wolfson is therefore in a sense justified in dismissing Athanasius' objection that the Arians believe in "two gods." For them, Christ, the Logos, is "not literally God" (p. 362, fn.). However, as historians of doctrine such as Seeberg⁵ point out, Athanasius concentrates his attention not on a problem of metaphysical definition, but on a religious question. He argues that if the Arians think Christ is anything less than the supreme God himself, then it is idolatrous of them to center their worship and their hope of salvation on him. Wolfson forgets the point made by a recent article in this *Review*: theological statements "can only be elucidated by pointing to worship." To treat them as fundamentally philosophical just because they use philosophical language "is a masterly venture in prizing words away from their living environment."⁶

Further, it would seem that even on the level of purely conceptual analysis Wolfson excessively attenuates the unity of the orthodox Christian notion of God.⁷ He says that it may be called

⁵ *Lehrbuch der Dogmengeschichte* (Leipzig, 1910), II, 53-56.

⁶ R. N. Smart, "Being and the Bible," IX (June, 1956), 605-606.

⁷ Such theological proponents of the so-called "social theory of the Trinity" as C. C. J. Webb and L. Hodgson would, I think, be the only writers on this subject who would not criticize Wolfson at this point.

"a combination of Jewish monotheism and pagan polytheism" (p. 362) because it can be shown that the Fathers expressed their fundamental views on the subject by the use of two analogies which ascribe only a slight degree of unity to the Persons of the Trinity. The first of these suggests that the Persons are unified by having a common substratum (*hypokeimenon*) although this—in contrast, e.g., to water as the substratum of oil and wine—is not something real apart from them. The second compares their unity to that of a common genus, although it is added that the species of which this is composed are individual, that is, can have only one instance (pp. 316-17).

Wolfson discusses many other analogies, including those which more strongly emphasize the unity of the Trinity but, contrary to what most historians of doctrine would say, he regards them, not so much as correcting and qualifying, but as corrected and qualified by these two fundamental ones (e.g., p. 359). He considers these latter decisive, not only because of their prominence in patristic literature, but also because their use of technical philosophical distinctions gives them a special significance if one views the development of the doctrine of the Trinity—as he does—primarily as a process of applying Greek philosophy to the problem of simultaneously asserting monotheism and the distinctness of the three Persons. Because no apparatus was available for thinking of distinct immaterial beings as having individual differences, the Fathers conceived of the Persons as individual species (pp. 308-09). As the unity of such beings with each other could not be absolute, they were ultimately assigned the two types of relative unity which we have mentioned. These were selected from the five types of relative unity—originally distinguished by Aristotle—with which classical thought was familiar (pp. 314-15). As a result of this presentation, the reader gets the impression that the concept of the Trinity did indeed verge on tritheism.

It would seem, however, that Wolfson has made things far too neat and clear-cut. Why doesn't he mention that the Fathers describe the Godhead as a very strange sort of common genus, for each of the Persons contains the whole of it? ^a Is it really pos-

^a E.g., Basil of Caesarea, *De Spiritu Sancto*, c. 18.

sible to dismiss the psychological analogy of memory, understanding, and love as irrelevant to Augustine's concept of the Trinity (p. 361) when it is the only one he considers worth developing at length? Wolfson mentions that the only differentiae of the Father, Son, and Spirit are their relations to each other (pp. 340-42, 354-55), but does not point out that this means one cannot think of the Persons as the terms of relations, for the relations of the relata are themselves the relata. Lastly, it would have been helpful if he had somewhere remarked that "three Persons" does not imply that there are three selves, or egos, in the psychological sense of three distinct centers of self-consciousness. These are modern terms unknown in the early centuries of our era, but there is every reason to believe that the Fathers would agree with contemporary Roman Catholic orthodoxy that "In God, just as there is one nature, so also there is one knowledge, one self-consciousness."⁹ After these comments, the orthodox doctrine of the Trinity may seem distinctly less intelligible, but at any rate it will not be supposed to affirm, as Wolfson comes near to suggesting, that the Persons are Thomistic angels or Platonic souls (pp. 309, 361).

The methodology which produces the oversimplifications and distorting omissions which we have observed rests on two major presuppositions: First, "the purpose of historical research in philosophy is to reconstruct the latent processes of reasoning which lie behind the uttered words" (p. vii). Second, "every philosopher in the main course of the history of philosophy either reproduces former philosophers or interprets them or criticizes them" (p. vi). In his other works,¹¹ Wolfson makes it clear that the latent reasoning of which he speaks is both conscious and logical in the formal sense. Thus interest in imaginative, artistic, or unconscious processes of thought is excluded, not because these are non-existent, but because they are judged irrelevant to the history of philosophy. For example, the religious, as contrasted with the purely conceptual, meaning of monotheism is disregarded. Fur-

⁹ *On the Holy Trinity*, XI-XIV.

¹⁰ F. Diekamp, *Katholische Dogmatik*, I (1930), p. 271.

¹¹ *Crescas' Critique of Aristotle*, pp. 24-29; *Spinoza I*, pp. 20-25.

ther, the second presupposition prevents Wolfson from presenting the history of philosophy and theology as the record of constantly fresh and changing ways of apprehending experience or reality. He concentrates on rearrangements of old ideas. He does not deny that there may be new insights into reality or novel ways of experiencing the world, but he would probably say of them, as he does of revelation (p. ix), that although they may be a source of such and such teachings, the historian of thought can take no account of this possibility. His job is to reconstruct the logical interconnections which philosophical and theological doctrines possessed in the minds of successive generations of thinkers.

It must be admitted that this procedure sometimes achieves spectacular, even if unnecessarily limited, successes. It is particularly applicable to learned and systematic thinkers like Crescas, Spinoza, and, to a lesser extent, Philo. To a very large degree their writings may be understood as embodying the logical criticism and reorganization of earlier systems. But because it is assumed that this is all, or at least all that can be investigated, the Philo and Spinoza studies are also in fundamental respects unsatisfactory. The defects of the method are magnified when Wolfson deals with a large group of men, widely separated in time, of very uneven learning and logical power. He succeeds in imposing an external conceptual order on an astonishing amount of refractory material. In the present study, the results are particularly helpful in his treatment of the controversies surrounding the doctrine of two natures in Christ and the major heresies. Furthermore his development of the parallels between Philo and the Church Fathers is a genuine contribution, even though he probably overdoes the similarity when he finds a Philonic, rather than Stoic, source for the "two-fold stage theory of the Logos" (p. 192). Nevertheless he finally succeeds in giving us only the logical skeleton, not the living meaning, of the intellectual developments he traces.

It is important to recognize, however, that Wolfson limits his area of investigation because of the conviction that it is only thus that verifiable historical hypotheses can be proposed.¹² As is shown by the horrid examples of Marxist and psychoanalytic

¹² Spinoza, I, 25-31.

historians of thought, not to mention Spengler and Toynbee, this is an essential consideration. Thus Wolfson's work, unsatisfactory as it is, warns us to approach Bultmann with due caution. We must ask whether his existentialist interpretation of early Christianity is a speculative, rather than historical, reconstruction.

IV

At first glance *Primitive Christianity* presents what seems to be a wildly improbable view of New Testament religion. "Faith," it says, "involves a new existential understanding of the Self" (p. 102). One is tempted to suppose that this means it is an emotionally vivid experience of some sort, but Bultmann, without explicitly saying so, soon makes it clear that he is using Heidegger's technical vocabulary: "for Christian faith, man is freed *for* his authentic self by being freed from himself. . . ."

This shows that the New Testament understands existence "as historical existence . . . not in the categories of natural Being" (loc. cit.). "To believe . . . is simply radical openness to the future" (p. 184). This is startling. Does not the Christian believe in God and Jesus? The answer is that "God is always the One who comes" (p. 186); "the transcendence of God is always his futurity" (p. 195). Further, "the transcendence of God and his grace are one and the same thing. . . . Christ . . . is the revelation of his grace" (loc. cit.). In short, Christian belief in God and Christ is somehow understood as existential authenticity and openness for the future.

Primitive Christianity is too brief a book to more than hint at the historical argument which purports to justify the use of these existential categories. This argument is developed in other works, especially in *Theology of the New Testament*.¹² Even this is not wholly satisfactory for our purposes because Bultmann, although he has written extensively on historical methodology,¹⁴

¹² Trans. K. Drobel, 2 vols. (New York, 1951, 1955).

¹⁴ The most extensive treatment in English is Bultmann's "The Problem of Hermeneutics," *Essays Philosophical and Theological* (New York, 1955), pp. 234-261.

does not do a good job of summarizing his evidence. Fortunately a recent comparison of Heidegger and Bultmann by John Macquarrie illustratively summarizes the historical grounds for the existential interpretation of the most comprehensive of Pauline anthropological terms.¹⁵

In the thought of St. Paul, the interpretation of "body" (*soma*) is crucial for the understanding of other key concepts such as "flesh" (*sarx*), "spirit" (*pneuma*), and "faith" (*pistis*).¹⁶ Bultmann argues that when Paul uses this term theologically it does not designate what an Aristotelian would call a substance, or a part of a substance, but rather the fundamental way of being which is characteristic of man. It more or less corresponds to Heidegger's *In-der-Welt-sein* of *Dasein*. This way of being may be either "according to the flesh"—that is, alienated from the self, inauthentic—or "spiritual"—that is, authentic. Faith is the beginning of authentic existence. The attempt to verify this interpretive hypothesis adheres to the generally accepted canons of historical investigation. Bultmann insists on the same sort of detailed examination of a text, its sources and parallels, that Wolfson practices, and holds that one's final conclusions must be in harmony with the results of this investigation.¹⁷ Therefore the existentialist reading of Paul is supposed ultimately to be justified by the fact that it removes apparent contradictions and so makes the text more intelligible. For example, one—though not necessarily the most important—advantage of the interpretation just sketched is that it explains St. Paul's description of the resurrected body as "spiritual" (I Cor. 15:44). Clearly Paul does not think of body and spirit as two entirely different types of substance, for then this usage would be unintelligible. Nor is there the slightest evidence that he thought of the resurrected body as composed of ethereal matter, or as a sort of ghostly replica of the physical. Many different considerations of this sort converge on the conclusion that in Pauline language terms such as "body," "flesh," and

¹⁵ *An Existentialist Theology* (New York, 1955), pp. 40-46.

¹⁶ *Theology of the New Testament*, I (1951), pp. 92-210, 232-238, 314-329.

¹⁷ *Essays Philosophical and Theological*, p. 256.

"spirit" refer basically to something like Heidegger's existentialia,¹⁸ and only secondarily to objects.

It would seem then that while Bultmann's interpretations are often unconventional—that is, suggested to him by his reading of Heidegger—his methods of verification are at least in part those approved by contemporary scholarship and often anticipated by ancient commentators. It is therefore not surprising that the novelty of some of his conclusions is more terminological than real. For instance, Augustine was forced to abandon his Neo-Platonic preconceptions and admit that for Paul the flesh is "life in accordance with a lie" even when the lie has nothing to do with fleshly passions (*City of God* XIV, 2-4). Luther would wholeheartedly approve the characterization of the fleshly life as one of dependence on temporal things whether these "be pleasure or serious moral effort" (*Primitive Christianity*, p. 192). In reference to the nature of faith, practically all contemporary Biblical scholars, even if they do not think it is best described as "openness to the future," agree that Wolfson's notion of it as belief in the truth of certain statements is hopelessly inadequate if not flatly wrong.¹⁹ Many other points could be mentioned in which at least an approximation of Bultmann's views seems inescapable.

This, however, does not warrant a blanket endorsement of his work. Most of his fellow scholars believe that he is much too thorough-going in his application of existentialist categories, and that he therefore exaggerates the degree to which the New Testament writers existentialize such doctrines as the "Second Coming" and the resurrection of the body. In short, he extends his hypotheses beyond the point at which they can be tested. This is a perhaps inevitable result of his theological concern with "demythologizing" the New Testament.²⁰ Because he holds that

¹⁸ I.e., the fundamental possible ways of being of *Dasein* which constitute *Existenzialität*.

¹⁹ This is true even of the more conservative of Roman Catholic exegetes. "Il ne faut pas oublier que 'croire' dans S. Jean comme dans S. Paul, n'est pas un acte purement intellectuel . . . c'est un acte d'obéissance qui comprend l'abandon de soi-même au vouloir divin." F. Prat, *Jésus-Christ* (Paris, 1933), I, 493.

²⁰ See the essays by Bultmann and others in *Kerygma and Myth* (London, 1954).

the fundamental meanings of what he considers New Testament myths must, with only a few exceptions, be entirely restated in non-mythical (existentialist) language in order to be intelligible to modern man, he is constantly tempted to over-existentialize them in the interests of his apologetic purpose. It would appear that sometimes he succumbs, excusing his defection from history by a theory of the nature and function of myth which is at the very least confused.

Thus the conclusion of our investigation is that the first of our two authors underestimates, the second overestimates, the extent of the testable.

This judgment presupposes some agreement on what constitutes a test of a hypothesis in the history of thought. It can, I think, be said that a considerable measure of agreement does exist in practice, if not in theory. The verification procedures of Wolfson and Bultmann overlap. They both believe that a given exegesis is confirmed in so far as it can be shown to remove contradictions better than alternative explanations. Both use what Collingwood calls "the historical imagination" in applying their tests. Summoning up all that they know of given writer, his milieu and his antecedents, they ask such questions as these regarding a suggested interpretation of his work: If this is what he meant, would he have said what he does? Might he have said something else? Would another meaning equally, or better, account for his words? The application of these criteria is more an art than a science, but they are nevertheless sufficiently definite to enable one to conclude that one of our authors explores an excessively limited range of possible hypotheses, while the other proposes some theories which he really does not try to test in this way.

These remarks do not deny the importance of philosophical and theological presuppositions in an historian's work. But these, to state the matter crudely, are decisive for the hypotheses he advances, the range of possible meanings he explores, rather than for his methods of verification. Bultmann, influenced as he is by Schleiermacher and Dilthey, explains why this is so: "I only understand a text dealing with music if and in so far as I have a relationship to music . . . a mathematical text if I have a relationship to mathematics, and an historical representation in so far

as historical life is familiar to me—in so far as I know what a state is, and what life in a state and its potentialities are.”²¹ He goes on to point out that the same principle necessarily holds in the exegesis of philosophical and religious literature. Thus only someone already aware of existential considerations and modes of thought could possibly find them in early Christianity.

It is for this reason that historians of thought differ as to what they discover in the texts to be. But because the standards of verification are not totally dissimilar, they can, without necessarily abandoning their presuppositions, become convinced that meanings they had not previously envisioned are in fact present. This is why the work of both Bultmann and Wolfson will be read with profit by those who sharply disagree with their two very different pictures of early Christianity.

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²¹ *Essays Philosophical and Theological*, pp. 242-243.

KANT AND MODERN PHILOSOPHY

NATHANIEL LAWRENCE

MODERN philosophy can hardly ignore Kant; it either derives from him or must deal with him. The problems which he faced were not Kant's own. They arise from intuitions not his own. These intuitions were often handled expertly, in points of detail, by his predecessors, but myopically and sometimes cavalierly. Kant's treatment of these problems is marked by its lack of facility, its opaqueness, by its vagaries and crotchets, and most of all by its profundity. The modern schools of philosophy have thus been led to easy distortions of the issues with which Kant was occupied. The analytic-synthetic dichotomy is a flagrant case in point. Anyone whose respect for Kant goes beyond admiring his crucial position in the history of philosophy should welcome efforts to bring the Kantian doctrines themselves into contemporary focus.

There have lately appeared three works on Kant, each of which seeks in its own way to show Kant's importance to contemporary readers. The present essay is largely a review of these works, terminated by some remarks showing how Kant's doctrine of the synthetic function of concepts must be modified for modern purposes.

I

The first of these works, *Kants Ethik und ihre Kritiker*, by Sverre Klausen,¹ is the most confined of the three studies. The essay shows signs of being a doctoral dissertation. It is compact, abrupt, and filled with Kantian idiom. The theoretical treatment of ethics has need of examples, perhaps, as much as any type of philosophical disquisition. Examples in this essay are few and not greatly helpful. The essay is very academic. In addition,

¹ Oslo, 1954.

the brevity of the study makes it almost mandatory that the author write in abstract idiom in order to cover his ground.

The philosophers who are examined are chiefly contemporaries or near-contemporaries: Bergson, Höffding, Herman Cohen, G. E. Moore, Alf Ross, and Axel Hägerström. There are scattered and slight references to other writers. A good deal of the text is spent in defense of Kant against the last two authors on the list. These authors, unknown to me before I read Klausen, are fellow Scandinavians, a Dane and a Swede respectively.

In general, Klausen's effort is to preserve Kant against those who attempt to argue away or translate into some other terms practical knowledge and its a priori foundations. As Klausen sees it, Bergson and Höffding hope to find the strength of the moral injunction in empirical considerations. Moore wishes to remove the predicate "good" from all empirical significance whatever. Cohen, a neo-Kantian, attempts to establish givenness of the moral law without recourse to Kant's conception of a highest good. Ross and Hägerström attempt to show that the idea of a categorical imperative is underivable and therefore chimerical. Klausen rebuts each of these positions in turn.

Bergson holds that instinct underlies the sense of obligation, that this instinct is a form of culture consciousness, and that the rationalization of such instinct represents a derivative formulation into terms of idea. Were this so, says Klausen, then the urge toward unconditional truth should be stronger in primitive peoples, but the opposite actually obtains.

Höffding, says Klausen, believes on the other hand that Kant has forgotten the element of sympathy, a natural human characteristic which, taken with its social implications, urges, by mass pressure, a course of other-regarding action. But, says Klausen, sympathy may be defectively developed, and if sympathy were the root of moral rightness, then it would be impossible to discover and amend the defect by any other principle (save that of consequences, presumably).

Cohen, dispensing with the idea of a highest good, identifies it with the existence of a reasonable being under moral laws. But Cohen thereby removes the main-spring of the works, for

although the categorical imperative is autonomous, the idea of duty does not make sense except through the moral postulates.

G. E. Moore recognizes the non-natural (non-empirical) characteristic of the predicate "good" and insofar does not disagree with Kant. The predicate cannot be identified with anything actual, but rather with a non-actual *Seinsollendes*. However, if it is non-actual it can hardly influence the will insofar as the will is itself the source of observable action, and even if it did, then the will could hardly be said to be free. Klausen's retort to this position is that Moore has used "existence" or actuality in two senses, not recognizing that the way in which the moral law exists for Kant is, by definition, different from empirical existence.

The major disputes of Klausen are with his fellow Scandinavians, Ross and Hägerström. Ross thinks the categorical imperative is chimerical, since it is impossible to derive it from anything—but Klausen replies that the same thing is true of basic mathematical propositions. Ross further claims that the sense of duty arises from disinterested awareness of forces greater than the individual and standing outside him. Through social custom this sense holds power, even where the fear that first gave it force has vanished. But the sense of worth which attaches to the compulsion to do one's duty, says Klausen, cannot be accounted for on this view, yet it is of the essence of duty. (One recalls here a similar argument about force in Rousseau's *Social Contract*.)

The bulk of Hägerström's argument is destructively critical, holding that the objective worth of moral judgments must at last be regarded as illusory. Such worth would have to be established on the basis of truth or falsity, and the techniques for deciding truth or falsity must be just those in which value considerations play no part. This thesis fails, says Klausen, only if theoretical knowledge is the only kind of knowledge. I believe Klausen is insisting (p. 16) that the absence of empirical determination of interest is common to both theoretical and practical knowledge, but this fact does not mean that the two types of knowledge are to be confused with one another.

Because of its limited size and content, the whole debate takes the form of quick thrust and parry with little sustained argument. Ethical writings in six different languages are examined. The

entire thought is reduced to German written by a Norwegian. Under these circumstances it is hard to evaluate the outcome. At the end of the book I felt like a stranger who had come to a philosophical meeting too late to get the main gist. I thought—in this day when “reason” has changed its meaning so much—that Klausen should have investigated why the practical functioning of good motivation is referred to *reason* by Kant.

The text is in miserable shape, with numerous misprints, making hard reading occasionally even harder.

II

Penguin Books has published a unique volume in S. Körner's *Kant*.² For brevity and scope it is unparalleled in English. Two hundred and seventeen pages of text are written with firmness, clarity, and sympathy. Following the traditional emphasis, over half these pages are spent in the analysis of the first *Critique*, the remaining portion being about equally divided between the second and third *Critiques*. Since the first *Critique* stands as the massive introduction to the metaphysical theory of knowledge and to the subsequent *Critiques*, both topically and procedurally, there can be little quarrel with this program.

Several excellences characterize Körner's book. (1) The compression and simplification of the major work of a philosophical giant into small compass is worthy of the attention of any student of Kant, if only because of the perspective gained. Philosophers who expect the language of the market-place to suffice for philosophical discussion probably stand to gain little from Kant. But to the extent that this surprising fancy can be satisfied, Körner's essay is to be warmly recommended. Other, more patient philosophers, who have at long last mastered the major features of the first and even second *Critiques*, will find in Körner's book the summary presentation which their detailed researches have obscured.

(2) The book is written from a sympathetic point of view, with considerable attempt both to meet present challenges to

² Baltimore, 1955.

Kantian doctrines and to abandon those conceptions which are most heavily weighted with the spirit of Kant's time. As examples of the former, there are a simple refusal by Körner to capitulate to the arbitrary limitations on the meaning of "meaning" (pp. 17-18) and the exposure of a small but far-reaching blunder of W. D. Ross in a famous regressive paradox which he attributes to Kant (pp. 131-32). As examples of his willingness to yield Kantian formulations which are limited by their formulator's era, there are Körner's conviction that the Analogies need at least revision in the light of modern physics³ and his impatience with the alleged completeness of the table of Categories (p. 55).

(3) Körner's book has considerable pedagogical strength. I do not mean that it is a book to teach *from* or *by*. It is, however, certainly a book to teach *with*. In the first place, it seems to be a revision of clear and rather simple lectures, embodying certain pedagogical devices which are of intrinsic worth. Secondly, it selects and relates the crucial topics drawn from the endless winding path of the Kantian argument. It is a good head-clearer.

Some of the weaknesses of the work are merely the obverse of its virtues. The brevity of the work will seem to some Kantians intolerable and perhaps scandalous. Complicated issues are swept through at the expense of important detail. Again, pedagogical clarity is sometimes bought at the price of almost unrecognizable caricature. Certainly no serious student of Kant will read Körner's book without wincing.

Occasionally (I believe) Körner's English syntax leads him into strange assertions, such as, "On the one hand, the mere logical possibility of another action, i.e. its non-contradictoriness, is not sufficient since it is *always* logically possible to assume that an event fell out otherwise than in fact it did" (p. 156). There is the standard (from Jacobi on) complaint that Kant attributed causality to things-in-themselves, since sensation is partly assignable to them (p. 41). Kant lends himself to such criticism.

³ I confess puzzlement with Körner's apparent assertion that Whitehead's *Concept of Nature* includes an effort to replace the Analogies by modern substitutes (p. 87).

His doctrine of the thing-in-itself is indeed one of the most wavering of all his doctrines, badly in need of stabilizing reconstruction. Some materials for this stabilizing are at hand in Kant himself (e.g., in the chapter on phenomena and noumena), however. Instead of exploiting these opportunities, Körner concludes his discussion by proposing solutions⁴ to the difficulty which are at least as alien to Kant's thoughts as the flaws which they correct. Again, when Körner comes to the subject of phenomena and noumena, he does not show how Kant's treatment of these topics can be used to amend the difficulty mentioned, contenting himself with the assertion that Kant equates noumena with things-in-themselves. Again, Kant is equivocal on this point. Körner's presentation, presumably in the interests of simplicity, ignores the equally prominent strain of Kant's thought which seeks to distinguish these noumena from things-in-themselves (thus, the moral self is never treated as a thing-in-itself, but is regarded as noumenal), and to distinguish both from the transcendental object.

Finally, there is the inescapable inconclusiveness which must arise, in a brief work, in exposing conflicts of Kantian doctrine with other doctrine, followed by hurrying on to the next subject with little or no guidance as to how the conflict may be settled. As examples, there are the admittedly hasty withdrawal from a solid defense of space as a priori (p. 35), the cursory contrast of Kant on mathematics with Russell, Hilbert, and Brouwer (pp. 39 ff.), and the tantalizing hints of applications of Kantian ideas in the fields of psychometrics and econometrics (p. 81).

In spite of these shortcomings the book is worth many times its cost and will be of use to a very wide philosophical audience, from those who are satisfied with a nodding acquaintance with Kant to those whose interest is of a more persistent kind.

III

Kant's First Critique, by H. W. Cassirer, ⁵ is the second book

⁴ I.e., those of Ewing and Nelson.

⁵ (New York, 1955).

in the Muirhead Library of Philosophy to be devoted to its topic. The other is Paton's well-known, and by now standard, *Kant's Metaphysic of Experience*. The new book differs markedly from the earlier one. (1) Cassirer develops the whole *Critique* topically (thus, Kant's principle of extensive magnitude is the main topic of the fifth of fourteen chapters, and it follows the discussion of the a priori principles of the understanding). (2) Other commentators are largely ignored. Cassirer's work is, as he says, an appraisal of the permanent significance of Kant's *Critique of Pure Reason* (p. 23). (3) Cassirer virtually divorces himself, by silence, from the Vaihinger-Adickes tradition of higher criticism.

Cassirer identifies himself as a Kantian (p. 16) and early warns the reader of what he prefers to regard as abiding in Kant's philosophy and what he considers to be expendable (pp. 12 ff.). In general his approach is summarized as follows: "There have been many occasions on which I sought to defend Kant's general position, while maintaining that his argument required considerable alterations and modifications" (p. 149). Like Körner, Cassirer clears the air of detail which may be profitably examined after the main lines of doctrine have been laid down. Unlike Körner, Cassirer sharply qualifies his pro-Kantian commitments by incisive questioning. Körner often wants to work from Kant; Cassirer often wants to work with him. The smaller scope of Cassirer's effort enables him to wrestle more conclusively with crucial topics. For the student who is concerned with only the first *Critique*, then, Cassirer gives a more satisfactory penetration, one in which the reader more often feels that he has been critically conducted to the heart of the problem. The topical approach is further assisted by a topical index.

This will be a useful book for students, I believe, as well as for teachers of philosophy. The latter will find themselves stimulated—some of them at least—into recognizing that Kant is well worth reconsidering in this era when the wellsprings of many schools of thought are plainly drying up. As for students, I cannot recommend that Cassirer be used by himself; rather he should be balanced by the use of either Kemp Smith or Paton. It is a commonplace that no commentary on Kant is widely regarded as the One Good Book.

There are weaknesses, from this reviewer's standpoint, in the Cassirer volume. There is no space here for contest of the sort which this admirable book stimulates. I choose examples with a view to typifying the kinds of differences to which some readers may be led. I find it disappointing that the deduction of the categories is confined exclusively to the treatment in the second edition. Cassirer justifies this selection on the ground that the first edition is riddled with the language of psychology, rather than that of epistemology. But two things need to be said in this connection. (1) The first edition is rich in suggestion, some of it incautious, which the desperate and somewhat disappointed author of the second edition sought to tighten up in the interests of force, clarity, and invulnerability. (2) I am not able to make the distinction between the psychological approach and the epistemological one as sharply as it is made by Kant's critics. It seems to me a frequently arbitrary one, smacking of the faculty psychology which often hampers Kant's own exposition. I suspect it of being parallel to and perhaps influenced by the exaggerated distinction between fact and value which currently dominates so much philosophical thinking and which Kant himself had to qualify when he came to the second and third *Critiques*.

In Cassirer's treatment of the doctrine of substance (chapter 6) I searched in vain for some concession to the possibility that contemporary metaphysics has pointed the way out of Kant's archaic views by the employment and elaboration of the doctrine of events. I criticize, of course, from the basis of prejudice, but this prejudice is a prejudice widely shared, and no modern metaphysician can ignore it completely. Since part of Cassirer's intent is to bring modern thought to bear upon the persistent problems exposed by Kant, the omission seems inexcusable, even if Cassirer himself is convinced that the doctrine of events has little to offer. It deserves mention, even if approval is withheld. This weakness seems to me the more remarkable, in view of the fact that Kant himself exhibits tendencies in the direction of recognizing the primacy, for certain purposes, of events. For instance, there are several remarkable passages in the treatment of causality which might well cause any modern reader to pause. Thus:

Causality leads to the concept of action, this in turn to the concept of force, and thereby to the concept of substance. . . . [There is no place here for the analytic extension of concepts.] But I must not leave unconsidered the empirical criterion of a substance, in so far as substance appears to manifest itself *not* through permanence of appearance, but *more adequately and easily through action*. . . . [But there is a necessity that something abide in order that the change be grounded in that something.] For this reason *action* is a sufficient empirical criterion to establish the substantiality of a subject, without my requiring first to go in quest of its permanence through the comparison of perceptions.⁶

Such passages do Kant credit, since they are eccentric to the great centrifuge of Newtonian thought. One point is worth mentioning. The citation above is from the Kemp Smith translation. The phrase "of a subject" was gratuitously introduced into the text by Wille, whom Kemp Smith here follows. If one removes this addition, restoring the text to its original condition, the passage even more pungently demonstrates the point I have been making.

One final criticism I should like to make concerns Kant's doctrine of the self. A considerable number of modern philosophers have brought the sharpest attention to the notion of the self as the focus of all "existential" knowledge. Another school brushes off the first personal pronoun as an "index word" and then has great tribulation with the notion of duty when it comes to moral philosophy. In the face of these facts, it seems strange that only sixteen pages of a 357 page essay should be devoted to Kant's notion of the self. From the ruin of Hume's skepticism about the self Kant built an enquiry into self-consciousness which has the gravest consequences for political and religious doctrines, which lays the basis for the Freudian and Jamesian psychologies, as well as the basis for pragmatist "metaphysics," and lays down the challenge which made Kierkegaard realize that either the Christian began with his own existence as a primary fact or he was never able to have it through discursive thought. In addition, since the transcendental ego is trans-empirical, Kant provides Hegel with the immediate occasion for liberating thought from the individual thinker. To be sure, Cassirer's essay is about the first

⁶ N. Kemp Smith (trans.), *Immanuel Kant's Critique of Pure Reason*, (New York, 1953), pp. 228-29; italics mine.

Critique alone, but in an essay which purports to be "an appraisal of the permanent significance" of that work, and in the light of the enormous influence of Kant's speculations on the subject of the self, it seems a shade wooden to spend space, in a critique of the first *Critique*, only in proportion to Kant's own treatment of the subject.

IV

Post-Kantian philosophical thought has little homogeneity. However, of the diverse schools of thought which appear after Kant, most of them have this in common: the emphatic hope that new procedures in philosophy will yield new truths. Kant's pride in the "Copernican revolution" was more contagious than the revolt itself. Thus, while Kant indeed shaped issues that subsequent philosophy could scarcely avoid, many of his major considerations fell into successive misinterpretations of disuse, and did so prematurely. Commentaries on Aristotle and commentaries on these commentaries were thought to be presentations of philosophical truth, but commentaries on Kant, perhaps with the exception of Schopenhauer and the young Fichte, took on the appearance of scholarship undertaken by curators. Probably no great philosopher became an antique so fast as Kant. Pros and cons of Kantian criticism have often turned on the problem of whether to relegate Kant to his period or to stand pat with him in that period.

Each of the works that we have been considering makes its own particular effort to apply Kantian insight to contemporary problems. One of them debates Kant's position in the technical language of the expert ethical theoretician, but sometimes seems to be the work of a disciple rather than that of an advocate. Another is pedagogically strong, but it simplifies the issues for the sake of comprehensiveness, leaving the Kantian position somewhat vulnerable thereby. The third, certainly the most negative of the three, nevertheless succeeds in bringing Kantian issues to modern attention by debating those issues in terms of modern problems. This last work, that of Cassirer, has the added virtue of often attempting to free the Kantian problems from the temporal

provinciality of their formulation. Such procedure is recognizable tribute. It is more in the spirit of Cassirer's approach that I should like to conclude this review of Kantian studies; albeit the subject advanced will be for the most part constructively examined.

Probably no well-known Kantian topic has been led further astray from its original intent than that of a priori synthetic judgments. Even in the ranks of the most hard-headed philosophers the prospect of necessary non-analytic propositions about experience has proved a constant lure. The colleagues of these defectors have spent much effort in exposing the submerged analytic character of such propositions. The controversies that arise in such a treatment of what appears to be Kant's problem largely miss the point. For Kant they would have at best derivative significance. The plain point which stands out only mildly in the commentaries on Kant and not at all well in the debates about Kant is that insofar as propositions are linguistic matters, Kant is not primarily concerned with a priori synthetic propositions. He is concerned with a priori synthetic judgments.⁷ Such judgments are articulated in the form of propositions where the systematization of knowledge is undertaken. These judgments are such as are prerequired for there to be propositions; there seems little doubt that Kant can save himself from the brink of solipsism only by insisting upon the community of "experience." He asks how science is possible, and science is possible only through a commonwealth of rational minds. Community of language may indeed tighten and sharpen the loose community of experience, but what is more important is that community of experience must underlie the ideal of a common language. A priori synthetic judgments for Kant are those judgments through which experience is synthesized. Synthetic propositions express the community of syntheses in experience. Such community of experience may

⁷ Both Cassirer and Körner do make this point with rather more vigor than some of their predecessors. See Cassirer, pp. 110 ff. and especially 124 ff; also Körner, who underscores the point (p.18) and goes on to slur it somewhat later by quoting a deviate passage in which Kant identifies propositions with judgments (p. 24).

perhaps only be *sufficient* to establish an inter-subjectivity of experience, but it is certainly *necessary* to establish any objectivity of experience. This objectivity of experience is itself that through which science is possible. We see here the curious echo of Leibniz' pre-established harmony. For Kant the pre-established harmony lies in the fundamentally identical modes of the understanding common to all thinking subjects. The identity of thought through which experience is formulated is indeed a primary condition of the translatability of one natural language into another. 'It is a debatable point whether or not there is actual community of experience except at very primitive levels, and it may further be the case that the ideal of translatability fails because of ingrained differences in high-order thought which are assignable to linguistic conventions. We are, however, engaged in trying to understand Kant's position, and it seems plain that he regarded the basic categories of all human experience as being the same for all rational beings. Consequently, it is of primary importance to investigate the a priori synthetic elements of experience in their basic form of judgments before passing to propositional formulations of those judgments.

I have already called attention to the temporal provinciality of Kant's formulation of his ideas. Kant believed in the fixity of the human species and its distinctness from other forms of known life. Evolutionary concepts were not foreign to him—for example, the nebular hypothesis in one form we owe to him—but he seems not to have used evolutionary ideas to explain the presence of human beings. The notion of a rational man is a notion to be found in all three *Critiques* in various forms. It is constantly present in the ideas of science, politics, morality, and esthetics. In this respect Kant is the supreme philosopher of the Enlightenment.

Commitment to the fixity of human nature—together with the conviction that there are inescapable categories of human thought—naturally leads Kant to an unquestioned acceptance of the immutability of these categories. A submerged but powerful foundation of Kant's ability to distinguish between the a priori and the a posteriori is this notion of the distinctness and unchanging character of human nature. Kant presumably knew as well as Hume that animals learn by "association"; however, for Kant

human recognition is not merely of a better sort but of a different sort. For one thing, extrapolation from the disciplines of the understanding leads on to the ideal of pure reason, and however much men may fall into error in the misconstruing of the Ideas of reason, these Ideas reside in a faculty which distinguishes men from other beings.

Since we are presented with the gradual emergence of Homo Sapiens from "intermediate" types, we are now faced with the problem of whether or not there can be categories of thought which deserve the term "a priori synthetic." Suppose we accept the conventional caricature of animal cognition as arising by "association." Then, if we further presume human cognition to be simply a derivate of the animal capacity for association, we may suspect that the "a priori synthetic" element in human thought is spurious, being only highly conventionalized association, which like its primitive forbear, is empirically derived. In short, Hume may have been right after all: the apparent necessities or rules of the understanding are only customary principles disguised as ineradicable. This possibility is strengthened by the fact that from a cultural point of view not all of the "intermediate types" have dropped out. Certain elements in the "rationality" of Papuan natives are not of a markedly Kantian kind.

Men interpretatively *mold* their experience at the point of having it. This insight we owe to Kant, and it is to the discredit of philosophy that the experimental elaborations of this fact have had their greatest impact on psychology, anthropology, and linguistics. As has been suggested above, it seems to be highly plausible that those summary categories which underlie all special classifications of the stream of experience have themselves emerged slowly as human consciousness has emerged. Moreover, the rate of evolution in the revision of basic human concepts may have proceeded faster than that of physiological evolution. For example, in *Western* thought since Kant's time there have been repeated efforts of considerable success to install the notion of event in place of that of substance as the ultimate building block. We must pause here to make an important distinction. Kant was simultaneously engaged in defending the idea that there are basic inescapable categories of thought and in identifying those "pure

concepts of the understanding." We must not suppose that if his list of twelve needs revision we have thereby disproved that there are such fundamental pure concepts. Accordingly, let us presume that Kant's list is archaic, that metaphysics requires the revision of such lists, and that Kant's infatuation with his own architectonic is an object primarily of historical interest. Kant assumed that there must be such categories in order for experience to be possible. In so presuming, he is merely insisting that experience as we know it has a fundamental structure, interpretative in character. This structure, he insists, has no existence of a knowable sort apart from the interpreter. By definition it does not belong to unknowable things-in-themselves. In correction of Kant we must focus our attention on the notion of experience *as we know it*. With his assumption of the fixity of the human species comes Kant's commitment to the proposition that experience must always be the same. But if we take evolution seriously, we are presented simultaneously with a developing universe and the development of men striving to know this universe. In short, the term "experience" denoted for Kant a process whose fundamental structure could not alter, but within which empirical detail was constantly revisable. Insofar as the biological doctrine of evolution pertains to human consciousness, and consciousness is the mental side of experience, the *basic* structure of experience must always be recognized as alterable. Kant assumed a *closed* denotation for "experience." I am insisting that the doctrine of evolution demands an *open* concept of experience.

Such alterability of what is meant by "experience" is not to be thought of as a victory for the Humean point of view, however. It does not follow that because the concepts *fundamental* to experience are subject to metamorphosis, their variability is of the same sort as those of the concepts of things *within* experience. The discovery that the attribute "white" is not necessarily confined to the essence of being a swan is not a discovery of the same sort as that which holds that the fundamental entities of the world are events and not objects. The contingency of the color of swans is expectable, on principle, in either the common language of objects or the more tortuous language of events. The *contingency*

of the color of swans should not be confused with the *mutability* of the concept "object."

Non-metaphysical analysis of the techniques whereby experience is structured as it arises can easily yield categories which are merely empirical, since they are only governed by particular purposes, rather than the completely general one of co-ordinating all aspects of understanding. To ask, in a grocery store, for a dozen streams of events characterized by the ingression of apple-ness would not be merely ludicrous; it would be to challenge communication. The clerk is probably—so far as he can raise his experience to the level of organized thought—experiencing substances, apples. If he is also experiencing streams of events in which these apples are mere ingredients, it will take some education, not to say argument, to make him recognize the fact. But whether or not he recognizes the fundamental mode of his apprehension (of events, let us say, as being the primary units of experience, from which he defines substances) is not germane to the discussion. What is important is whether or not the concepts he employs in the mere *having* of experience can all be brought together under fundamental concepts which are comprehensive for his experience and that of anyone else, either grocery clerk or scientific experimenter. *The functioning of such concepts in the discrimination of experience need not entail their ready recognizability.*

We can now perhaps throw some light on a Kantian question: How is metaphysics, as science, possible? The science which Kant envisages must be one in which all the empirical concepts are subsumable under completely general and fundamental concepts. Kant assumed that these latter concepts were unalterable because he assumed that human nature was fixed. He supported the categories which he elicited, the twelve of the "Deduction," by deriving them from their logical counterparts and showing the temporal conditions under which they are actually applied to the structuring of experience. It did not occur to him that experience itself might be otherwise structured, nor that the logical forms which served as archetypes for the categories could serve as well as they did precisely because they were formalizations of those categories themselves. He assumed, that is, that the logical forms of judgment

were not derivative from the categories. There is, I believe, a fine chance that the basic categories are mutable. Such mutability does not prevent them from being completely general and therefore from functioning as master-forms for all subordinate concepts. I repeat that this mutability should not be confused with the revisability or contingency of empirical concepts, which *depend upon a priori concepts* in order to be intelligible. There is an equally good chance, in my estimation, that when such intuition occurs, and when it becomes suitably recognized, it will be possible to elicit logical forms from these categories which will correspond to them. *In short, the logical forms are formalizations of the structure of experience, and are dependent on it, not vice versa.*

To argue the above suggestions conclusively would take space in excess of what a review essay permits. I wish to close, however, with a citation from Kant which is surprising in its possible anticipation of alteration in fundamental concepts. The citation should also be called to the attention of all who think that Kant believes that a science of metaphysics is impossible. In speaking of such a science he says that great firmness will be needed to bring to "fruitful growth a science *indispensable to human reason*—a science whose every branch may be cut away but whose root cannot be destroyed." *

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* Kemp Smith, p. 58; italics mine.

ETHICAL NATURALISM RENOVATED

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NATURALISM has had two meanings in twentieth-century discussions relating to ethics. In a wider sense "naturalism" has stood for a general philosophical point of view the essence of which is a denial of supernaturalism, including most forms of idealism. "The ethics of naturalism" in this sense is any ethics forming part of a philosophy which rejects all supernaturalistic conceptions of the world. But since the publication of G. E. Moore's *Principia Ethica* in 1903, and especially in the writings of his intuitionist and non-cognitivist successors, "naturalism" has had also a more special meaning when used in ethics; it has meant any ethical theory which holds that an ethical judgment is simply a true or false ascription of a definable and natural (or empirical) property to an action, object, or person. Opposed to ethical naturalism in this usage is not supernaturalism but a pair of positions: (a) intuitionism, also called "non-naturalism," which holds that an ethical judgment is a true or false ascription to something of an indefinable and non-natural (or non-empirical) property, and (b) non-cognitivism, which in its extreme forms claims that an ethical judgment is not a true or false ascription of any property to anything, but something very different, like an interjection, a command, a wish, a resolution, or a prescription.

Thus ethical theory has been involved in a double controversy, the general controversy between naturalism and supernaturalism, and a more special one between naturalism, intuitionism, and non-cognitivism. These two debates have been variously mingled. Naturalists in the one sense have not always been naturalists in the other. Some naturalists in the broad sense have also been naturalists in the narrower (John Dewey, R. B. Perry), but some of them have been intuitionists (G. E. Moore, B. Russell before 1912), and many of them, especially recently, have been non-cognitivists (A. J. Ayer, C. L. Stevenson). Again, supernaturalists have sometimes been intuitionists (H. Rashdall), sometimes

non-cognitivists (some religious existentialists and neo-orthodox theologians), and sometimes naturalists (J. B. Pratt, Thomists).

Now Rice is a naturalist in his general philosophical position, but he does not argue for this naturalism in the present book.¹ It is assumed and is present as a background all the time. Thus there is a Garden of Eden motif, as the title indicates, but without any Christian theology, though not without natural piety. No doubt Rice thinks of himself as reasserting naturalism in this wider sense also, in the face of the resurgent Catholic and Protestant moral philosophies of Berdyaev, Brunner, Maritain, Niebuhr, Tillich, and others. Still, it is the more special controversy which is in the center of his stage here, and it is naturalism in the narrower sense which he is particularly concerned to reaffirm, though, in so doing, he gives it a "radical restatement."

It is worth noticing that in refurbishing ethical naturalism Rice is not alone. We are today, in fact, having a kind of revival of such a naturalism, which has not had it as easy in this century as one might expect. First there was a period during which many books and articles reviewed critically metaphysical ethics and naturalism, and came out with intuitionism, as Sidgwick and Moore had. Next came a period when philosophers took a critical look at naturalism and intuitionism, and emerged with an emotive theory, as Ayer and Stevenson did. Then for a time it was the fashion, set by S. E. Toulmin, to take up naturalism, intuitionism, and emotivism in turn, and to decide for a sophisticated form of non-cognitivism which Rice calls "informalism." In all of these discussions naturalism was under attack, but now things are different. We have, for the first time, a number of books in which philosophers review naturalism, intuitionism, emotivism, and informalism; and whatever this may portend, they all end by reasserting naturalism!²

¹ Philip Blair Rice, *On the Knowledge of Good and Evil*, (New York, 1955).

² Cf. P. B. Rice, op. cit.; W. D. Lamont, *The Value Judgment*, 1955; G. Hourani, *Ethical Value*, 1956; B. Blanshard, *The Impasse in Ethics—and a Way Out*, 1955. C. I. Lewis, *The Ground and Nature of the Right*, 1955, should be listed here, even though he does not run through the various alternative views, and is not unambiguously a naturalist in the present sense. Two articles should also

Of these works Rice's is surely one of the most important, and I shall concern myself with it. It is a book by a philosophical statesman; the author takes part seriously in ethical controversy, but reflectively and with a large vision which embraces opposing views and keeps the larger setting of moral judgments constantly in mind. It is also the work of a man of letters, and is written with more literary taste and general sensitivity than are most recent books in ethics. Both of these virtues are manifested in the existence here of many passages in which wise substantive insights and valuable reflections on method and perspective are expressed in such a way as to make the book worthwhile for their sake alone.

In dealing with Rice's book, however, I shall not go over the whole question of the tenability of ethical naturalism as restated by him. I shall only concern myself with some points in his re-statement of it which will be involved in any estimate of its tenability. And I shall consider only what he says about judgments of moral obligation, leaving to one side his views about judgments of value. A short summary of his position is required before we can proceed.

The first question for the ethical naturalist is this: is an ethical judgment simply a true or false ascription of a naturalistically analyzable property to some object? The intuitionist and non-cognitivist both argue (the naturalistic fallacy, the open question, etc.) that it is not, and Rice finds their arguments convincing. Simple naturalism must be given up. But intuitionism, with its essential dogmatism and its non-empirical epistemology, cannot be accepted. The mistake of the simple naturalist is only in thinking that an ethical judgment is *merely* a statement to the effect that a certain object has a certain natural property—if anyone ever thought this. (In a plausible chapter Rice argues that so-called naturalists like Mill, Santayana, Perry, and Dewey did not in fact think this.) The nature of the revision needed is made clear by the non-cognitivist; naturalism must explicitly recognize that there is an important non-cognitive element in an ethical judgment,

be mentioned, J. Harrison "Empiricism in Ethics," *Phil. Quart.*, 1952; R. B. Brandt, "The Status of Empirical Assertion Theories in Ethics," *Mind*, 1952.

though it may and should retain its claim that there is also a cognitive one (as a constituent of the judgment, and not merely as a reason for it.) Non-cognitivism, in inferring that an ethical judgment contains in itself no true or false assertion, is going farther than the argument requires, and throws into jeopardy the whole structure of reasoning in ethics (for if it were true, there would be nothing in an ethical judgment which could be supported logically by inductive or deductive methods, and the suggestion of a third logic is "crypto-intuitionist" and "unintelligible").

In saying that an ethical judgment has both a cognitive and a non-cognitive constituent, Rice has not yet distinguished himself from Stevenson, who is willing to grant, though he does not *insist*, that an ethical utterance has a cognitive *constituent*, as well as being supportable by factual *reasons*. He does this mainly by arguing for a kind of monism. Where Stevenson holds that the properties which are asserted in a moral judgment are many and variable, and can be fixed only by "persuasive definition," Rice plugs for the view that there is basically a single property which is asserted of actions by all judgments of moral obligation, and that the identification of this property is not merely a process of "persuasion."³

Thus, while Rice borrows something from each of the houses he visits—simple naturalism, intuitionism, and non-cognitivism in its various forms—he ends by declaring a plague on them all. But it is only a very light plague which he declares on naturalism, for he proceeds to build right next door. He does this, he says, not only for the reasons indicated above, but because he believes "that the intuitionists and non-cognitivists, for all their contributions, have reached the limits of advance by the methods they have used hitherto, and that solution of the riddles in which ethical theory is bogged . . . can be made only by renewed attention to the larger natural and social context of valuations, emphasized by naturalism and largely neglected by recent schools of analysis for more restricted questions of logic and meaning" (p. 100).

Briefly, then, Rice's view is this (see pp. 13, 120 f., 271 f., 281):

³ Much of Rice's criticism of Stevenson does not seem to me to be well-taken, but I like the direction of his effort.

a moral judgment like "A is right or obligatory," so far as its "primary" meaning goes, consists of two parts: an assertion that A has a certain natural or empirical IP or Identifying Property, and a non-cognitive Matrix Meaning or MM!. That is,

A is right = A has IP; MM!

Here a particular moral judgment is being analyzed. The schema for a "maxim" like "We ought to be just" would be:

Every just act (probably) has IP; MM!

As for a basic "principle" like "We ought to promote the greatest general good," Rice seems to think that it will have the same schema:

Whatever promotes the greatest general good has IP; MM!

But this cannot be, for on his view the IP in question just is the property of promoting the greatest general good, and the principle would, on such a reading, say:

Whatever promotes the greatest general good promotes the greatest general good; MM!

No, for Rice this principle (and he does not believe any others are ultimately valid) must be represented as follows:

Whatever promotes the greatest general good; MM!

or perhaps

(x), if x promotes the greatest general good, then MM!

A number of questions arise. (1) What is the nature of the MM!, the non-cognitive aspect of a judgment of obligation? Rice speaks of it both as a "force" and as a "job" or "function" of the judgment, and he carefully recognizes that "ought" sentences may have a variety of forces or functions, cognitive or non-cognitive. But he believes that there is one job or force which is "primary," namely, a non-cognitive one which he calls the "trigger function." "The 'ought' or the 'right' . . . expresses the fact that a choice has been made, and serves as a signal to release the action" (109). "The 'ought' signifies that the alternatives have been explored as

thoroughly as feasible, and expresses a decision. The decision then, assuming that the relevant conditions have been fulfilled, releases or triggers the act" (232). Saying that the "ought" is prescriptive or imperative serves approximately, but only approximately, to identify this "central force," which is "to set in motion an act after a process of deliberation" (112).

One could ask about the mechanics involved here. Presumably it is my *utterance*, "I ought to do A," which has this force. But how does it express a decision or release an action? Through some "emotive meaning" which it has or through some information which it conveys? Can it both "express" and "release"? Is it the utterance or the decision expressed which releases the action? Are "prescribing" and "triggering" as similar as Rice seems to think? But the real question is whether this kind of account of the central function of "I ought," which is similar to that of Nowell-Smith, can be correct or not, however the details are worked out. I do not believe that it can. When one is faced with a decision and asks, in a non-moral sense, "What should I do?", this may be equivalent to asking, "What shall I do?"; and the answer, "I should do A" equivalent to "I shall do A," as Rice implies. But it is "What morally ought I to do?" and "I morally ought to do A" that we are concerned with, and I cannot see that they are equivalent in force to "What shall I do?" and "I shall do A." Their force is more like that of "What am I justified in doing (or unjustified in omitting)?" and "I am justified in doing (or unjustified in omitting) A."

If "I morally ought to do A" expresses a decision, it is not, so far as I can see, a decision to do A but a decision about what should be done—a decision made, as it were, by a part of me and not by my whole will—so that I may conclude that I morally ought to do A and yet not do or even try to do A. Rice admits that "I ought" may fail to release action because of weakness of the flesh. In this case it does not have all the force one would like to see it have, but it remains a full-fledged *moral* "I ought" nevertheless. If so, "I morally ought" is not primarily a trigger. It is true, as Rice points out, that even "I morally ought" normally appears in a context of decision, and that asking "What morally ought I to do?" and answering "I ought to do A" are in a *sense* "useless unless

they eventuate in the firing itself." The normal point of moral deliberation and judgment is the effective direction of action. But that "I morally ought" is essentially triggering does not follow, even if it so normally. It may still be appropriate and useful to say "I morally ought to do A," before one decides to do it, to express the fact that one thinks he is justified in doing (or unjustified in not doing) A. Here "I morally ought" appears not as an expression of decision, nor as a trigger of action, but as a *guide* to decision and action, perhaps even as *one* determinant of the outcome. If one's flesh is not too weak, etc., it may serve to release action, but this is not of its essence. Rice himself claims that "I morally ought" not only triggers action but does so with the implication that the action is justified by appropriate considerations; it seems to me that its moral force lies in this implication, not in the triggering. A moral judgment seeks to guide and even to trigger conduct, but it may fail. Then it may not have the desired *force*, but its moral *meaning* is complete, as a guidepost has its uses and meanings even if it is not always followed. A moral judgment is not as such a movement of the entire will, though it hopes to be, just as "There is a car coming" is not as such a warning, though it may have this purpose.

In what Rice says about justification there are, as we shall see later, the makings of a rather different (and in my opinion more tenable) view of this matter.

(2) As has been indicated, Rice holds that there is a single IP for all judgments of moral obligation, that this IP is not merely a reason for such judgments but a constituent in their primary meaning, and that it is the property of promoting the greatest general good. Thus he offers us a kind of utilitarian "definition" of "morally ought":

I morally ought to do A = A promotes the greatest general good; MM1

This definition he does not regard as merely "persuasive." He does not lay it down in advance, and he does not answer the question, "Why ought we to promote the general welfare?", by saying that this is the very meaning of the term, as Moore thinks naturalists must. Neither does he advance conduciveness to the general good as what we explicitly have in mind when we use

"ought" in a moral sense; Moore's arguments, he thinks, show that this is not the case. He offers his definition as the very tentative conclusion of a reflective enquiry into our moral judgments. What kind of an enquiry? As I understand it, an enquiry into the reasons which may be advanced in order to justify judgments of moral obligation. It is generally agreed that to justify morally such a judgment as "I ought to do B," we show that B is just, keeps a promise, prevents harm, etc. (in short, that B has some Conferring Property or other). But we may ask for a justification, Rice thinks, of the "maxims" requiring us to be just, keep our promises, etc., and he argues that such a justification can only lie in the claim that justice, etc., promote the greatest general good. Here, of course, he must answer the arguments of the deontologists, and, indeed, a discussion of them forms a large part of his defense of his "definition." I cannot say that I am convinced by this defense of utilitarianism, but his discussion is a good one as far as it goes.

I can raise only a few questions about this. Is such an enquiry a normative one, that is, is Rice contending that our only duty ultimately is to promote the greatest general good; or is he arguing that the promotion of the greatest general good is ultimately the only reason which we in fact give in justification of our moral judgments? But suppose that we agree that *the* justifying reason in morality is conduciveness to the greatest general good. Why should we go on, as Rice does, and say that an assertion of such utility is a constituent of, and not merely a reason for, the judgment "A is morally right." This does not follow; Hutcheson accepts Rice's findings that the justifying reason for a moral judgment is utility, but holds that a moral judgment is simply an expression of a peculiar sentiment. That "I ought to do A" is justified by showing A to be optimific does not entail that it asserts A to be optimific—at least if we do not assume that "justified" has a logical force here, which would be begging the question. Rice may reply, "Yes, but, since moral judgments are justified by an appeal to utility and only by such an appeal, let us say that they assert utility of their subjects." But would we gain anything by doing this? If "p asserts that A is optimific" only means that p is justified by showing that A is optimific, we make

no advance. Then "being a constituent of" is the same as "being a reason for."

Perhaps the proposal is that we should henceforth mean to assert that A is optimistic when we say it is right. I am not sure that Rice's naturalism does not come to this. To say that it does would, of course, not be to condemn it. But why should we adopt this proposal? Why not remain non-cognitivists with a "monistic" conception of ethical reasoning, as Hutcheson did? Rice's reply would be that, on a non-cognitivist view, there is only a psychological connection between an ethical judgment and the reasons for it, not a logical one; or, in other words, that moral conclusions can be logically supported by inductive or deductive reasoning only if they include an assertion of some sort. Let us assume that, other things being equal, it is desirable that judgments should have logical connections with the reasons given for them, and that no third "logic" is available. Still, on Rice's view, it will be only the cognitive component of an ethical conclusion which will follow logically from the reasons offered; the rest of it follows, if at all, only psychologically, and the rest is essential to its being an *ethical* conclusion. The MM! in the conclusion will follow only if there is an MM! in the premises, and even then it will not follow logically. Simply to show that A is for the general good will not logically entail any sort of triggering; in fact, it may not even suffice causally to release action, in which case other "persuasive" considerations will be required.

Rice argues in support of his naturalistic proposal that it keeps us closer to "the larger natural and social context of valuations." Historically this may be true, since so many of the non-cognitivists have limited themselves to analysis. But this relative neglect of the larger context of moral judgments is due to the view that moral philosophers should stick to analysis; it is not necessarily implied by non-cognitivism, as Stevenson has shown.⁴ In fact, S. E. Toulmin has a good deal to say about this larger context.⁵ In saying this he may be breaking through the

⁴ "The Emotive Conception of Ethics and its Cognitive Implications," *Phil. Rev.*, 1950.

⁵ *The Place of Reason in Ethics*, Ch. 10, 12; cf. also the articles of H. D. Aiken.

boundaries of analysis, but he is not doing anything inconsistent with his non-cognitivism.

(3) Rice's radically restated naturalism appears then to have no essential advantages over a monistic non-cognitivism. It is even tempting to ask if there is any real difference between these two positions, when both of them include a utilitarian theory of justification (i.e. of what Rice calls "validation") and a triggering conception of the primary job to be done by a moral judgment, so that they differ only on the question whether utility is asserted or merely presupposed in such a judgment.

Let us suppose, however, that these two positions are really different. Is there any reason for regarding Rice's as a form of naturalism rather than as a form of non-cognitivism? True Rice's position is monistic, and non-cognitivism has usually been pluralistic. But the latter may be monistic and even utilitarian, as the examples of Hutcheson and Hume show.^{*} More to the point is the fact that on Rice's view "I ought to do A" has a constituent which is true or false, and follows logically (by induction or deduction) from empirical premises. We have seen, however, that this does not imply that the methodology of justifying A is any more logical than it is for Stevenson, especially if justifying A involves bringing me to the point of deciding to do A (as it does on Rice's stated view of the force of "I ought," though not on the view implied in his account of justification). Saying that "I ought" has a cognitive constituent is not enough to make one a naturalist in any important sense, even if one is a monist where Stevenson is a pluralist. Whether one who concedes that moral judgments have an important non-cognitive meaning is a naturalist or not must depend on his conception of the relation between the cognitive and the non-cognitive elements in such judgments. If one regards the non-cognitive aspect as primary, one can hardly be called a naturalist, except in the broader sense of being opposed to supernaturalism (if one is); but if one conceives of the cognitive aspect

^{*} Even the view of the Oxford informalists is more monistic than Rice recognizes, for many of them agree with him in accepting a utilitarian theory of the justification of maxims or rules. Cf. P. H. Nowell-Smith, *Ethics*, chs. 15, 16.

as primary, it would still seem appropriate to call him a naturalist even in a narrower sense. Unfortunately Rice's account is not very clear. Sometimes he speaks of the cognitive and non-cognitive elements as both belonging to the primary meaning of "I ought"; sometimes he says that the primary or central job of such expressions is to trigger action. On the former view, we shall need to know more about how the two are related before we can answer our question; on the latter, we seem to be forced to regard Rice as a non-cognitivist. But Rice also speaks of the considerations asserted by an ethical judgment as justifying the releasing of the action, which is the non-cognitive function of the judgment, and this seems to give the cognitive element at least a moral primacy. In one place he even passes the whole problem off as unimportant ["All that matters is to include both elements" (271 f.)], and perhaps it is, but not if one wishes to be a naturalist rather than a non-cognitivist.

Rice must mean to hold that a sentence like "I ought to A," in its primary use, (1) asserts that A has a certain property, and (2) releases A into the world. If he does not hold that it does (1), he cannot be regarded as a naturalist. But his holding that it does (1) is not enough to make him one; we must still know how its doing (1) is related to its doing (2). It will not suffice to say that its doing (1) justifies its doing (2), for this a non-cognitivist may allow. Perhaps Rice is thinking that "I ought to do A" accomplishes (2) by way of doing (1); or more accurately that my belief that A has the property in question (utility) causes A to be released (notice, this is to say that it is not the whole utterance with its non-cognitive aspect that triggers the action, but only the cognitive part of it). He might then maintain either that this belief by itself produces A, or that it does so by enlisting some desire of mine. But then the case of "I ought to do A" seems to be very like that of "There is a car coming" said to another as one is crossing a street. In the latter case, too, one can speak of a cognitive job of asserting and conveying information, and a non-cognitive one of releasing (or inhibiting) action. The non-cognitive job is (or at least may be, if the sentence is spoken in a somewhat matter-of-fact way) accomplished simply by way of

doing the cognitive job, if this enlists a desire to live on unhurt, as presumably it will.

Now, if "I ought to do A" is like "There is a car coming" for Rice, then he can regard himself as a naturalist, for this is what naturalists have been concerned to maintain. However, he must then give up his insistence that a certain kind of non-cognitive force is an essential part of the primary meaning of "I ought to do A." For one would not claim and could not plausibly argue that any particular kind of non-cognitive force was an essential part of the meaning of "There is a car coming" (other than that of releasing belief), even though one might contend that "There is a car coming" is always used for some non-cognitive purpose or other (other than that of expressing or arousing belief).

If "I ought to do A" does not achieve its end simply by virtue of asserting what it asserts (and enlisting whatever desires this information enlists), but also by virtue of some other potency it owns (e.g., "emotive meaning"), what is this potency and how does it operate? Is it the presence of this factor which determines the methodology of ethical reasoning, as Stevenson maintains, or is it the presence of the cognitive factor, as a naturalist must insist?

I have no quarrel with Rice's interesting discussion of the logic of justification in ethics. (His view is that a particular judgment like "I ought to do A" is morally justified by appeal to a maxim like "We ought to keep our promises," which is justified by appeal to a principle, viz., the principle "We ought to promote the greatest general good.") I fully sympathize with his insistence on appealing to principles, and on looking for a single principle, though, as I said, I stop short of following him to his utilitarian conclusion (which he himself holds only tentatively). Of more importance for us here, and really very stimulating, is what Rice says about the justification of principles. He maintains that a principle cannot be justified in the sense of being demonstrated or "validated," just because it is the ultimate premise of moral reasoning. Nor can it be self-evident or self-justifying. Yet it stands in need of some sort of justification, for one may ask with respect to what it enjoins, "Why should I?" Rice's suggestion is that it can be "vindicated," and what he says here is a valuable contribu-

tion to contemporary discussion, even if it is not entirely clear or conclusive. He goes beyond what recent non-cognitivists have done; in fact, this seems to be one reason why he regards himself as a naturalist, since the non-cognitivists have generally stopped short of a quest for vindication and have sometimes abjured it. I share Rice's sense of the legitimacy of such a quest, but actually nothing that he does in pursuit of it is inconsistent with non-cognitivism. A non-cognitivist may not only join in this quest; he may even make "the appeal to human nature" which Rice does, as will become clear later.

The problem is to justify the principle, "We ought to promote the greatest general good." Now this principle, as I indicated earlier, does not include a factual assertion, as lesser judgments of obligation do, though Rice sometimes suggests that it does. Its schema is:

Whatever promotes the greatest general good; MM!

It signifies "a linkage of the factual or descriptive and the normative or prescriptive elements" (278), but it does not assert such a linkage, else it would be capable of empirical validation; and neither of its parts is an assertion. Rice seems to take it as equivalent to the "definition" or "definitory principle":

X is morally obligatory = A promotes the greatest general good; MM!

But this is not an assertion of purported fact, and contains no such assertion. In any case, though one may accept this definition if he regards the utilitarian principle as vindicated, he need not do so, for he may prefer to consider an assertion of utility merely as a reason for a moral judgment and not as a constituent of it. The prior question is about its vindication as the basic principle of moral validation. We have already described Rice's case to show that it is the basic premise of such validation; now the question is about its own status, and my point is that, since on Rice's view the principle is not an assertion, vindicating it is not showing that

⁷ Cf. D. H. Monro, "Are Moral Problems Pseudo-Problems?", *Mind*, 1956.

it is true. It is more like persuading us to accept it, that is, to commit ourselves to the promotion of the good.

Rice explores the notions of vindication (a) by an appeal to the "the congenital a priori" (i.e., to a commitment which is a necessary ingredient in human nature), and (b) by an appeal to acquired life-involvements or "second nature" (he seems to equate this with "pragmatic justification," but I do not find the use of this phrase very clear here). There is a third possibility, which Rice touches on but does not distinguish from the other two, viz., (c) an appeal to a drive which is innate in human nature but not necessary in the way in which the congenitally a priori is, e.g., altruism (cf. 177). The principle "Seek ends," he argues, is congenitally a priori and thus vindicable, but it and other such congenitally a priori principles do not suffice for ethics; no ethical first principle can be wholly justified in this way. "Vindication may appeal to the human make-up, but it must finally be the human make-up as shaped by a social situation" (190), i.e., "second nature." "[The] linkage [between MM! and the general good] is made neither by empirical verification nor by sheer stipulation, but partly by our congenital structure and partly by our life-involvements, or rather by the two in interaction" (278).

But what form is vindication to take then? It might consist in showing that we already are in fact committed by our nature (first or second) to the principle in question. Some of what Rice does runs along this line, e.g., his contention that the principle of utility is the "structural presupposition" of our pre-discursive and lower-level moral judgments. But Rice does not think that such a demonstration can constitute vindication, though it may contribute to it. "We cannot deduce or induce principles from our best verified theories as to what human nature is, though these exercise restraint upon us and offer guidance" (192). A principle cannot be fully justified in our sight by a line of argument which a spectator standing outside the normative process and seeking to understand it might use. They must be espoused by us as participants; they must pass the scrutiny of our "moral consciousness" or "global sense of directedness," and this may on occasion "reject or modify the presuppositions that have guided us hitherto" (190-194, 194).

For Rice, then, the "vindication" of the principle of utility must consist in moving us to commit or recommit ourselves to it. Nothing is involved that a non-cognitivist cannot allow. Now, we may ask if it makes any difference what means are used to lead us to wed or re-wed this principle. For Rice, once the principle is admitted, only appeals to it are good or relevant reasons for other moral judgments, but what about it? Does anything go here, so long as it is effective? Rice need not take this view, and I do not believe that he does, though his identification of the non-cognitive aspect of moral judgments with triggering seems to imply it. Rather, he appears in this part of his discussion to think of vindication in the following way. There is in us something often referred to as "conscience" or "moral consciousness," which he prefers to call our "global sense" of moral adequacy. This he thinks of as part of our "second nature," as a "compounding of active forces" which is "shaped by long buffeting from the world," or "pounded into us by social compulsions, but is also critical of them" (cf. 186, 190 f., 194 f.). A principle is "vindicated," once this question has been raised, if and only if this element in our nature re-affirms it after having been presented with whatever considerations may be deemed relevant, among them, perhaps, facts about human nature and implicit previous commitments. This global sense may "err" but only it can judge its own aberrations (195).

Here there is an "appeal to human nature," but the vindication does not proceed so much by establishing facts about human nature (first or second), as by appealing to something in human nature (mainly "second") as a kind of judge or tribunal. And only a part or aspect of human nature is so appealed to. Hence only considerations which will move *it* to espouse or re-espouse the promotion of the general good are relevant in the process of vindication. It is not required that we be persuaded to commit ourselves to it with our whole souls; and *additional* considerations or methods which are calculated to do this are strictly irrelevant. Espousing a moral principle does not entail acting upon it.

The problem of passing from factual reasons to an ethical conclusion has been much discussed, and some have introduced the notion of a "third logic", peculiar to moral reasoning, to deal with

it. But such a view as Rice's (if the above is Rice's view, as I think) has an answer to it. No *inference* from factual premises to ethical conclusions, in any logical sense, is involved in ethical reasoning. What happens in the case of a principle is that our moral sense is *moved* to a favorable or unfavorable response, which it expresses by saying "We ought" or "We ought not." And once a principle has been accepted (consciously or unconsciously) it serves as an ethical premise for the derivation of lower order judgments with the help of factual considerations.

But if this is Rice's view, then, in the analysis of judgments of moral obligation, he should not have identified the element signified by "MM!" with the capacity to release action (which involves a decision of the whole will) but with the taking of a favorable (or unfavorable) stand by the moral sense or whatever it is in us that is committed to the promotion of the general good (which is not the entire self).

Of course, there is much that could be said or asked concerning such views about the vindication of ethical principles. It would be interesting to compare Rice's appeal to human nature with that of Lewis.* And one might ask about the "global [moral] sense." How can it be a product of social life and yet be capable of criticizing social rules and institutions? How is it related to our commitment to rationality? Can it be identified with the sentiment of sympathy? Whence comes its authority, especially its authority over other elements in our nature? I do not mean to imply, however, that Rice would have any difficulty with such questions; it is just that I wish he had gone on to consider them more explicitly. He does give us a chapter on "the moral authority" which is well worth reading on this difficult subject, but it is not so clear as one would like, and does not really raise the question just indicated.

This, then, is Rice's naturalism restated. Whether it is tenable or not in general I have not considered, except for trying to show that there is no reason for preferring it to a monistic form of non-cognitivism, if, indeed, it can be distinguished in any

* Op. cit. (Rice himself discusses Lewis' appeal as made in *Analysis of Knowledge and Valuation*.)

important way from such a position—and I am not at all sure that this would have disturbed Rice very much. My main criticism has been directed at his view that the primary force of "I morally ought" is to express decision and trigger action, and I have found support for my criticism in what Rice himself goes on to say about justification. Apart from this I find many points which are unclearly treated, and many enquiries which are not pushed quite far enough to be convincing. But Rice offered his book as "simply an effort to propose a general scheme which may help to get ethical theorizing started again from the stalemate in which it has been bogged" (270), and I do think that he has put moral philosophy farther on its way by the lines of thought which he has thrown out and helpfully explored. All the topics taken up are suggestively dealt with, and every direction taken needed taking. Someone had to do just what Rice tried to do, and while one wishes that he could have given us a more finished work, we may all be glad that he put his studies in book form when he did, for they are the fruits of rich reflection and full of insights and enquiries which must be taken seriously.

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THE REAL AND THE REALIZED

DOROTHY WALSH

SIR Herbert Read has a wide first-hand acquaintance with art, an extraordinary range of artistic sensibility, and—no small matter—an ability to write in such a way as to combine essential modesty of manner with uncompromising boldness of claim.

There can be no doubt about the boldness of the claim presented in *Icon and Idea*.¹ It is to the effect that art is not simply an essential aspect of human culture, but *the* essential instrument in the development of human consciousness. Everything that appears as idea in philosophy, science or religion has first appeared in art as icon or image. The artist is the pioneer, the original discoverer; it is he who extends the frontiers of consciousness. He is the most indispensable maker of human culture and, if we are to take certain passages in this book at face value, the artist is in some sense the maker of the world—of “reality.”

Read is aware of the boldness of this claim and he offers, in the preface, an apology “for presenting a somewhat revolutionary theory in what may strike the reader as a perfunctory manner.” The thesis, he considers, could be consolidated only through “a detailed knowledge of the comparative history of civilizations”—something available neither to the author nor, presumably, to the reader. We cannot, I think, object in principle to the intellectual enterprise of launching into the domain of public debate a thesis supported by partial evidence. To do so would be to disallow the value of speculative adventure. Yet for such an enterprise it is of the greatest importance that the thesis—the central claim—should be made as clear as possible. The question therefore arises: is Read’s basic thesis fully clear?

I believe that many a reader will find this book, written with such verve, such display of artistic sensibility, such imaginative boldness, and such apparent clarity, elusive, evasive, and

¹ (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1955).

extremely troublesome to lay hold of. The difficulty has its source in uncertainty as to whether the basic claim is primarily historical or primarily philosophical. The difference is important, for the kind of evidence that would support a strictly historical claim is of a different order from the kind of considerations relevant to a philosophic theory.

The claim as initially stated would seem to be primarily historical. In the preface Read says "... in this book I am attempting to establish for the symbols of art a claim to priority which is historical." I take it this cannot mean simply that art is older than science or philosophy and, perhaps, religion. It must mean that the ideas of philosophy, science, and religion are historically derived from the icons or images of art. If this is the claim, the claim is clear, but the evidence offered in support of it is not merely partial—something fully conceded by the author—but not the *kind* of evidence one would naturally expect. Puzzlement over why Read has not seen this is resolved when one realizes that, in all probability, the claim has not had its genesis in a study of cultural history but springs directly from basic convictions about the nature of art and of man's activity as artist. These convictions dictate the proposition that nothing *can* be in idea that was not first in image. It *must* be so.

Since I believe that ambiguity concerning the basic claim is the central difficulty, I propose to consider the content of this book first from the point of view that the claim is primarily historical. I shall then consider the subject-matter on the assumption that the basic claim is about the intrinsic nature of art and of art creation and, indeed, about man, the world and reality. In doing this I shall attempt to separate out what Read has attractively, though puzzlingly, blended together.

If we take the claim as historical, we are asked to believe that, as a matter of historical fact, the ideas of philosophy, science, and religion have been derived from the images earlier presented in art. How would a student of cultural history arrive at such an hypothesis and what would be the kind of evidence we would expect to find offered in support of such a claim? I think we would suppose that the cultural historian should have discovered a particular case of the genesis of an idea (philosophical, scientific,

or religious) from the images presented in a particular art. He would then discover another case of clear derivation, and then another. At some point he might risk the inductive generalization that this kind of sequential development is the customary state of affairs. The evidence—however partial—would consist in showing how *in point of historical fact*, some original development in philosophy or science or religion has its inception in the images of art. I do not believe that evidence of this sort is to be found in *Icon and Idea*.

What Read undertakes is something highly ambitious and full of interest. He examines seven epochs in the history of the plastic arts from paleolithic times to the present and states what he believes to be the main revelatory import embodied in the characteristic images. In paleolithic art it is the animal; in neolithic it is formal design—harmonious pattern; in Greek art it is the human—the image of Man; in Gothic it is the transcendent or numinous—though this had its inception in Sumerian architecture; Renaissance art provides the awareness of a “substantial” external world; modern art expresses the reality of the subjective—man as individual person, but in the modern age there is also the as yet only partially adumbrated awareness of a new apprehension of non-figural constructive design far more ambitious than anything hitherto attempted.

All of this—which is far more interesting than the summary suggests—is, nevertheless, not directly to the point so far as the thesis as a strictly historical claim is concerned. The crucial evidence of the *specific derivation* of the ideas of philosophy, science, or religion, is lacking. It is not enough that art is earlier than philosophy or science. Historical wisdom is based on the most scrupulous avoidance of the fallacy of *post hoc ergo propter hoc*. It is, I think, significant that no cultural historian, intent on tracing a sequential development out of art into philosophy, science or religion, would think of doing what Read does, namely, begin with paleolithic art. The cultural historian would know that if he is to trace a causal development between art and something else he must deal with an age in which both of the cultural phenomena he is attempting to relate can be found. It is equally significant that Read writes with greatest confidence about the

earliest periods and that when he reaches a period in which the kind of data that would be relevant to the historical claim might be found, a note of hesitation can be heard.

We are told, for example, that the ancient Greeks were the first mathematicians. If so, here is the birth of idea, and here is the occasion to show how Greek mathematics developed out of Greek pictorial design. This is not shown. When we come to an age such as the Renaissance, it would seem that there must be sufficient data to allow some specific influence of art on philosophy or science to be traced. But this is not undertaken. It is said that the artists presented the image of a "substantial" external world. Perhaps this is so, but we still do not know if this is the *cause* of what subsequently appeared in philosophy or science.

In short, I think it must be said that if we regard this book as primarily concerned to set forth a factual historical claim it is seriously defective. It is not defective because the evidence is partial but because the kind of evidence that would be relevant is absent. For the strictly historical claim, a single carefully traced out and well supported case of causal genesis of a particular idea of philosophy, science, or religion from a particular art movement would be more to the point than everything that has been offered. I believe that Read does not see this because he has not, from the beginning, envisioned his thesis as the strictly historical claim it is stated to be.

I now turn to "the other story" about this book. We begin, not with the data of cultural history, but with speculation about the nature of the work of art and the intent of the creative artist, and we are quickly involved in elaborate metaphysical assumptions. The central notion is provided in a quotation from Conrad Fiedler. "Artistic activity begins when man finds himself face to face with the visible world as with something immensely enigmatical. . . . In the creation of a work of art, man engages in a struggle with nature not for his physical but for his mental existence" (p. 17). Art is the means by which man enters into mental possession of reality. It is his nature that he should seek to do this and it is essential for his nature that this activity should be perpetually sustained and renewed. "One must imagine a constant force, a blind instinct, groping towards the light, dis-

covering an opening in the veil of nothingness and becoming aware of significant shapes. The specifically aesthetic act is to take possession of a revealed segment of the real, to establish its dimensions and define its form. Reality is what we thus articulate, and what we articulate is communicable only in virtue of its aesthetic form" (p. 20).

It is evident that Read believes the artist to be both discoverer and creator. It, therefore, becomes pertinent to ask: what is it that the artist discovers and what is it that he creates? By reference to many passages in this book, it would seem that what the artist directly creates are forms, images, icons, symbols. Indirectly, of course, the artist creates, in the sense of causes, an enlargement of apprehension, and since these apprehensions become part of the texture of culture, the artist plays a creative role in human culture. What the artist discovers, on the other hand, is reality—"not reality as a whole, that is beyond our human capacity," but some "modality of existence." However, this distinction between what is created and what is discovered becomes blurred in other passages of this book. The images of art are not simply images of reality, they *are* reality. They are reality for us, and the suggestion is present that the only reality we can talk about is what is real or "significant" for human experience.

"It must already be evident that the notion of reality underlying this book is, in the philosophical meaning of the word, empirical. Reality is a construct of our senses, a chart that slowly emerges as we take soundings of our feelings, trace the contours of our sensations, measure distances and altitudes of experience" (p. 73). Putting aside all question of this interpretation of "empiricism," it is evident that the view expressed is that reality is what comes into being as it is made. The artist creates the world. But, if this is so, in what sense can he be said to discover? It would seem that any theory of art as discovery must presuppose a doctrine of the antecedently real.

This blurring of the difference between creation and discovery is unfortunate because Read's thesis concerning the priority of art requires a clear distinction. In the first chapter he raises the question about progress or evolution in art. His thesis requires

him to claim that "aesthetic awareness has progressively increased in scope and depth," but his acquaintance with works of art requires him to recognize that the work of a modern artist, such as Picasso, is not necessarily "better" than the paleolithic cave drawings. His solution is that art does not evolve if what we are considering is the ability of the artist to embody his insight in image, but that art does evolve if what we are considering is the range and depth of insight available. This would seem to mean that art as discovery may be said to progress, but that art as creation may not. Since this distinction is necessary for his thesis it is unfortunate that there should be such ambiguity in the use of the term "reality."

It seems to me that what is needed here is a distinction between the real as that which exists (or subsists) independent of human cognition and the real as that which is realized in human awareness. From the strictly aesthetic point of view nothing is more natural and appropriate than to accept as "real" what is artistically realized. The pictorial animal is an animal. The child unhesitatingly says it is an animal. Partial sophistication may make us say that it is a copy or an imitation or a representation of an animal, but further sophistication restores us to initial innocence and we say that it is an animal. Of course the pictorial animal is not the biological animal. The very survival of meat-eating primitive man is testimony to the fact that he could not have suffered serious confusion on this matter. It may be that paleolithic man attributed magical powers to the pictorial animal and believed that it could exercise control over biological (existent) animals. We do not know. Let us suppose, with Read, that it was not for the enlargement of physical power so much as for the enlargement of mental apprehension that the pictorial animal was created. The pictorial animal exhibits, in a vivid and steady way, the value traits of animal vitality and animal power. The actual power of the existent animal is of a different order. It is not contemplated in vision but suffered in encounter. Encounter is urgent and practical, and successful action allows no opportunity for full realization. This realization is to be had through the creation and apprehension of the pictorial animal.

Such considerations allow us to recognize without confusion the sense in which the pictorial animal is "more real" and the sense in which the existent animal is "more real." But such considerations suggest that art is concerned with exhibiting value traits that might be ascribed to things, or embodied in things, rather than with a knowledge of things simply as such.

Returning now to the claim about the priority of art, and putting aside all question of historical evidence of causal genesis of idea from image, let us ask: is it intrinsically plausible that science developed out of art? Science, in its early descriptive stage, is concerned with comparing and contrasting and classifying. What, to venture a speculative guess, might the ur-scientist be like? Would he be the man who contemplates long and intently the image on the wall of the cave in preparation to feeling his way to idea, or would he be the man who, in cutting up the slain animal preparatory to eating it, is arrested, however momentarily, by a fleeting theoretical interest in some observed structural similarity or difference between this animal and another? The latter, I believe.

Croce asserted the logical primacy of the aesthetic. But Croce proceeded by fiat. He simply chose to define the aesthetic as including *all* cases of perception. On the basis of this decision it was simple to assert that the scientific phase of the spirit was based on the aesthetic—for how could you classify or compare things unless you first perceived them? Presumably Read does not intend to take this line, for such a position renders the whole historical inquiry redundant. Yet Read's constant references to Collingwood, who has been so influenced by Croce, suggests that something of this sort may be covertly operating. If this is the case, it may explain why the real as the independently existing and the real as the realized are so constantly confused.

In this discussion I have stressed what seem to me to be the difficulties and the problems. I would like to say, in conclusion, that anyone interested in the plastic arts would be wise to read this book, which is full of individual perceptive insights. Philosophers who write about art have tidier ideas but they often lack

what Sir Herbert Read has, which is an enormously wide first-hand acquaintance with art and the difficult but wholly desirable combination of cultivated sensibility with innocence of eye.

Smith College.

EXPLORATIONS

SUBSTANTIAL FORM IN ARISTOTLE'S *METAPHYSICS* Z; II ELLEN STONE HARING

D. Form and Definition²¹

A DEFINITION states the essence of something primary.²² Substantial form is its own essence, is primary, and is the essence of individuals. Definitions, therefore, express form. Three major difficulties attach to this conclusion. Definitory statements signify and elucidate a universal species—"such as 'man,' 'syllable,' or 'circle.'" Substantial form ought, thus, to be one with a species; it is not. In the first place, as any definition evidences, there is something concrete—materialized—about a species; the species is not pure form. 'Man' is not 'soul' but 'rational animal,' a 'certain bodily being.' In the second place, as the structure of a definition shows, a species is analyzable into parts. Form is supposed to be ultimate, unanalyzable. In the third place, a definition holds for many individuals; a species is a common nature. For reasons not yet entirely clear, a form cannot be common; it is not the common nature instanced by individuals but the ground of the common nature. Z, 10 through 15 are organized around these three difficulties. What is pressingly needed is an account of the relation of form and universal species. This explanation is wrought in Z, 10-11, which explore and resolve the first difficulty.

²¹ For the first part of this study, see this *Review*, X (December 1956), 308-332.

²² Z 4, 1030a6-11: "Therefore there is an essence only of those things whose formula is a definition. But we have a definition not where we have a word and a formula identical in meaning [3 lines omitted] but where there is a formula of something primary; and primary things are those which do not imply the predication of one element in them of another element."

²³ See *Topics* 103b16, 139a28, 143b8. See also Z, 4, 1030a11-16.

D 1. *Definition's Reference to Matter.*

Definitions pertaining to wholes—that is to individuals, whether or not the individuals are strictly *ousiai*—appear to be concerned with both form and matter. A syllable is defined as such and such a combination of letters. "A circle is a certain sort of plane figure." The generic part of the definition—indicated by the phrase "of letters" and "plane figure" in the instances given—corresponds to matter, the differential part to form. "One part of the definition must play the part of matter, the other that of form." "If a definition is really about matter and form, essence should somehow comprise matter and form. If matter is this important, what becomes of the primacy of form as the *ousia*, the very being, of individuals? If essence involves matter, what becomes of the identity of form and essence? Z, 10 and 11 resolve these problems." Definitions are shown to be ultimately about form; thus the primacy of substantial form and the identity of this form with essence are preserved. The defense of form as the primary intelligible is extremely important. In the course of it Aristotle must work out the connection between universals and form. Form emerges as the determinant of both universals and individuals.

Aristotle's reasoning in Z, 10-11 has three stages. In the first, Aristotle proposes two different definitions for our consideration". The definitions contrast, at least superficially, for one appears to elucidate a whole by reference to its material parts, while the other does not appear to do so. Aristotle then in effect shows that the form of a whole can be taken in three somewhat different ways: We may be concerned with form by itself (the primary intelligible), or with the essential determinacy which is form-hav-

⁹⁴ See Z, 10, 1034b22-27.

⁹⁵ H, 6, 1045a33-36: "Of matter some is intelligible, some perceptible, and in a formula there is always an element of matter as well as one of actuality; e.g., the circle is a plane figure' . . ."

⁹⁶ H, 3, 1043b30-33.

⁹⁷ Z, 11, 1037a21 to the end, is the climax of Z, 10-11, and shows clearly what questions Aristotle has been facing.

⁹⁸ Z, 10, to 1035b2.

ing-its-formal-effect-in-a-milieu; in the latter alternative, the essential determinacy may be so taken as to be particular or as to be typical. In each of the three cases, form as the primary intelligible is the governing factor. On this basis, it is possible to clarify the character of the two definitions originally proposed as suggestive of a difficulty.

"Since a definition [$\delta\rho\iota\sigma\mu\acute{o}\varsigma$] is a formula [$\lambda\acute{o}\gamma\omicron\varsigma$], and every formula has parts, and as the formula is to the thing, so is the part of the formula to the part of the thing, the question is already being asked whether the formula of the parts must be present in the formula of the whole or not. For in some cases the formulae of the parts are seen to be present, and in some not. The formula of the circle does not include that of the segments, but that of the syllable includes that of the letters; yet the circle is divided into segments as the syllable into letters." "

The problem presented by definition's reference to material parts is clearly recognized. If wholes are defined by reference to their parts, the parts are prior in nature to the wholes. "But the latter are thought to be prior; for in formula the parts are explained by reference to their wholes, and in respect also of existing apart from each other, the wholes are prior to the parts." ⁹⁹

Now definitions are a kind of recognition. To recognize something is to acknowledge a 'what.' It is, necessarily, to be preoccupied with determinacy, with intelligible reality in some guise or other. In the very nature of the case, prime matter is insusceptible of recognition. (We have other and less direct ways of dealing with it.) Recognitions perforce depend upon forms; and the only recognitions which need here to be examined are those which pertain to individual wholes, and their substantial forms. Differences among recognitions will correlate with differences in the way forms are taken.

"The form or the thing as having form should be said to be thing, but matter by itself must never be said to be so." ¹⁰¹ This

⁹⁹ 1034b20-27.

¹⁰⁰ 1034b26-34. Wholes exist complete in their own right. Parts must exist in a whole, to exist fully. See this *Review* X, pp. 310-311.

¹⁰¹ 1035a7-10.

remark indicates not only the unrecognizability of matter, but the first broad distinction among the ways a 'what' is acknowledged. We may be oriented toward form alone, or toward the thing qua informed. If we are oriented toward form alone—for example concavity, or the soul, or the shape which makes this bronze a statue—patently we are concerned with something to the *nature* of which matter makes no contribution. Matter is not even associated with our object as its milieu. Form is taken without any inherent reference to its domain. "Of concavity flesh (for this is the matter in which it is produced) is not a part but of snubness it is a part; and the bronze is part of the concrete statue, but not of the statue when it is spoken of in the sense of form."¹⁰² We can take form in an isolative fashion; and then our object is a primary intelligible.

Alternatively we may be concerned with form as integral to individuals. The simplest instance is our recognition of a certain thing as being a thing—or as being a thing of a given sort, a man or a syllable. Suppose we confront an individual and state our recognition, "This is an X." We are not, from Aristotle's point of view, mainly reporting the fact of matter's presence. We are reporting a determinacy present here. The 'here' is matter; but it is only background. Matter per se is not evident to us, but only matter in so far as it is informed. The determinacy is uppermost. The determinacy is the formal effect of form. Is there anything to the determinacy except form? The answer is "no and yes." There cannot be any constituent feature, any positive content, in the determinacy except what is in some sense proper to the form. The determinacy must be form. On the other hand, the determinacy is not totally identical with form. This would, for example, blot out the difference between concavity and 'the snub.' The determinacy must, so to speak, be causally continuous with form, and yet in some other way different. Matter makes the difference. The individual is form having its formal effect in matter. Matter's role is to afford form an expansion. There is a difference of state, but no difference of content, between form per se and form-expanded-in-a-milieu. To recognize an X is

¹⁰² 1035a3-6.

directly to acknowledge form-expanded; this is ultimately, however, to respect form as the primary intelligible. Matter is not negligible in such an occasion of recognition, but is evident under the aegis of form.

To recognize that this being is an X is somewhat different from concluding that all X's are such and such. In the former case, we confront form-having-its-formal-effect-in-a-particular-milieu. In the latter, we have prescind from the particular milieu. We are no longer immediately interested in the elucidation of this individual; we are concerned with what elucidates this and many others. The determinacy which was found in this X has been made an object rather than a means, and in the shift it has been separated from this or that matter. It has not, however, been purged of all materialization, so to speak. The purged determinacy is still form-expanded; but it is typical rather than particular. The particular was form having its formal effect in a given milieu; the typical is form having its characteristic effect in a typical milieu. However, just as particular form-expanded is ultimately significant of form the primary intelligible, so is typical form-expanded.

Now definitions are invariably general; they pertain evenly to each and every individual of a given sort. The definitions must also refer ultimately to form, the primary intelligible, since the definitions are statements of recognitions. Since definitions are general, they will not deal with a particular form-expanded. They must either take form isolatively or deal with it as typical form-expanded. In the first case, the formulae will directly signify pure form, the primary intelligible; in the second case they will directly signify typical form-expanded. This form-expanded, however, is itself the primary intelligible in a secondary manifestation; the form-expanded is therefore revelatory of pure form.

This is in fact Aristotle's position. Let us consider first the definition of syllable: "In a sense not even any kind of matter will be present in the formula of syllable, e.g. particular waxen letters or the letters as movements in air, for in these we have already something which is part of the syllable only in the sense that it is its perceptible matter. For even if the line when divided passes away into its halves, or the man into bones and muscles and flesh,

it does not follow that they are composed of these as parts of their essence, but rather as matter; and these are parts of the concrete thing but not also of the form i.e. *that to which the formula refers.*"¹⁰³

The definitory formula for syllable is a statement of what any entity must be to be a syllable. The definition must cite only the indispensable and uniform features of syllables. Since the actual constituents of a given syllable are not, except in rare cases, the constituents of any other, the definition cannot directly name the material parts of syllables. It must, however, acknowledge the uniform fact of a syllable's having some letters or other. It must for two reasons. First we have never met syllabic form apart from its matter, the way we have encountered circles that were not made of any tangible stuff. We cannot therefore adequately apprehend syllabic form apart from matter.¹⁰⁴ Second, syllables are in fact material—enunciative, perceptible entities. A definition which ignored matter would be untrue.¹⁰⁵

A definition relevant to material things must cite not the stuff of this or that individual, but the *kind* of stuff proper to such individuals. This is to cite not matter but a determinacy which is at once borne by matter and revelatory of pure form. The formula in its totality cites a formal effect qua having a characteristic milieu. If a syllable is "a pronounceable combination of letters," then the phrase "of letters" indicates by "letters" that syllabic form takes to itself only a certain matter. By the prepositional structure of the phrase "of letters," the subordination of matter to form is even more precisely suggested.

The whole formula "a syllable is a pronounceable combination of letters" indicates a typical form-expanded, once by the "a syllable" and once again by the whole predicate phrase following

¹⁰³ 1035a13-22. Italics mine.

¹⁰⁴ See Z, II, 1036a31-b7.

¹⁰⁵ Z, II, 1036b22-31, which commences, "And so to reduce all things . . . to eliminate matter is useless labour; for some things surely are a particular form in a particular matter. . . ." Somewhat later in the same passage: "an animal is something perceptible, and it is not possible to define it without reference to movement—nor, therefore, without reference to the parts' being in a certain state [i.e. their being qua matter under the aegis of form] . . ."

"is." The predicate phrase analyzes the form-expanded, exfoliates it into two factors not sharply cut off from one another. One factor is signified by "a pronounceable combination"; the other by "of letters." Typical form-expanded is form-having-its-formal-effect-in-a-characteristic-milieu. "A pronounceable combination" largely signifies effect; "of letters," largely domain, milieu. (This is why Aristotle says that one part of a definition plays the part of matter and the other that of form.)¹⁰⁶ The domain is cited not for its own sake—not in a way that cuts it off from effect—however, but in a way that keeps it covered by the effect. In "Man is a rational animal," "rational" signifies part of the effect of a certain form, and "animal" signifies the remainder of the effect and also the domain of all the effect. "Animal" signifies sentience, vitality, and organization qua belonging to a bodily something.

If the definition of syllable or man directly expresses formal-effect-in-a-domain, it ultimately expresses simply form. One definition amounts to the claim that syllabic form is such as to accomplish a certain effect, a certain determinate unity, in a certain domain. The other in effect reveals human soul as the form—the 'this'—which makes a certain sort of matter a human being. If we view these definitions this way, we can see why Aristotle says such definitions refer to form.¹⁰⁷ We can see the justice of: "The letters are parts of the formula of form,"¹⁰⁸ and "The brazen circle then, has matter *in its formula*."¹⁰⁹ Definitions which pertain to perceptible, material, individuals directly express form-expanded, but mediately—via form-expanded—express form the primary intelligible. They phrase *the* form, the "this," in such a way as to keep it germane to factual reality. They use the essential aspects of factual reality—including a certain materialization—to express primary intelligible reality. They actually rely on, rather than impugn, the subordination of matter to form.

This disposes of the problem originally raised by such defi-

¹⁰⁶ 1035a7-10.

¹⁰⁷ 1035a13-22.

¹⁰⁸ Z, 10, 1035a11.

¹⁰⁹ Z, 7, 1033a4.

nitions as that of syllable.¹¹⁰ Other definitions such as that of circle make no reference at all to physical matter. The question associated with them is only why they lack the reference, and this has virtually been resolved. These definitions take a form apart from physical matter. Since in this stage of discussion, Aristotle recognizes none but physical matter, he treats all these definitions as pertaining simply to pure form. "Those things which are the form and matter taken together, e.g. the snub or the bronze circle, pass away into these materials, and the matter is a part of them; but those things which do not involve matter, but are without matter, and whose formulae are formulae of the form only, do not pass away—either not at all or at any rate not in this way."¹¹¹

The two types of definition which have been considered have now been explained. One type ultimately elucidates pure form, but *via* form-expanded—and in such a way as to keep pure form relevant to the physical world. The other relates more directly to form alone, and keeps it clear of its physical manifestations. "In one kind of formula, then, the formula of such [material] parts will be present, but in another it must not be present, where the formula does not refer to the concrete object."¹¹²

The explanation is actually incomplete although it does accomplish the purpose of preserving the primacy of form as essence and as the determinative principle of *ousiai*. The account skips over the fact that there is intelligible matter—that there are individual geometrical circles, as well as individual perceptible things. There seems to be method in the evasion. Aristotle's full theory of definition combines what he has said of each definition separately. The definition of syllable serves particularly well to bring out the fact that form-expanded is revelatory of pure form. The definition of circle makes more clear that we can attain a relation to form *qua* freed of materialization. Aristotle's full position about definitions relevant to wholes is that every definition relates to pure form *via* typical form-expanded. This in fact is his position except in the early paragraphs of *Z*, 10. To see that this is so, intelligible matter needs first to be described.

¹¹⁰ 1034b26-34.

¹¹¹ *Z*, 10, 1035a24-31.

¹¹² 1035a22-23.

Cognitively, we are greatly given to treating something as separate—an object in its own right—even though the something does not exist separately. We can, for instance, focus on form—for example, concavity—apart from matter. We can, again, take typical form-expanded—‘man,’ or ‘the snub’—and discuss it as though it stood apart from individuals. A third instance of the same general sort is our providing ourselves with non-physical individuals—such as the entities studied in geometry.¹¹³ We can, for example, consider this perceived cup-brim, and can eliminate from it its color, frangibility, brim-nature, and so on, until we are left with this geometrical circle. The new entity is imperceptible though still immediately cognized.¹¹⁴ As Aristotle has said in Z, 10,¹¹⁵ the entity is not implicated in *physical* changes at all; it comes to be and ceases to be by virtue of our cognitive acts. It is, nevertheless one of many circles. Since it is one of many circles, it must, also, be a form in a matter. It is one determination of an indeterminate ethereal stuff which Aristotle calls intelligible matter.¹¹⁶

Since geometrical circles are as much individuals in their realm as syllables or men are in the factual physical world, the definition of circle ought to be exactly comparable to a definition for some sort of physical thing. This is abundantly confirmed by a passage in H: “Therefore one kind of substance can be defined and formulated, i.e. the composite kind, whether it be perceptible or intelligible; but the primary parts of which this consists cannot be defined, since a definitory formula predicates something of something, and one part of the definition must play the part of matter and the other that of form.”¹¹⁷ Pure form cannot be *directly* expressed by any definition. Every definition reveals a pure form, however, via form-expanded. Suppose “A circle is a plane closed figure with a perimeter uniformly distant from the center.”

¹¹³ See *Met. M*, 3, esp. 1077b23-31.

¹¹⁴ See Z, 10, 1036a1-9, quoted below p. 496, n. 133.

¹¹⁵ Z, 10, 1035a24-31.

¹¹⁶ Z, 10, 1036a9-14: “And some matter is perceptible and some intelligible, perceptible matter being for instance bronze and wood and all matter which is changeable, and intelligible matter being that which is present in perceptible things not *qua* perceptible, i.e. the objects of mathematics.”

¹¹⁷ H, 3, 1043b28-33.

The formula directly states a certain formal effect qua proper to a certain domain. It ultimately points, however, to circularity, the primary intelligible reality which achieves this effect in a domain susceptible of receiving such a form.

The definition of circle and the definition for syllable are exactly parallel. There is still a certain difference between the two types of definition. The ground of the difference is stated by Aristotle as follows: "In the case of things which are found to occur in specifically different materials, as a circle may exist in bronze or stone or wood, it seems plain that these, the bronze or the stone, are no part of the essence of the circle, since it is found apart from them. Of things which are *not* seen to exist apart, there is no reason why the same may not be true. E.g., the form of man is always found in flesh and bones and parts of this kind; are these then also parts of the form and the formula? No, they are matter; but because man is not found also in other matters we are unable to perform the abstraction."¹¹⁸ Intellectually, we have to operate abstractively, hewing to what is essentially common among perceived individuals, and pushing into the background what is idiosyncratic. This puts an upper limit on the typical form-expanded we can obtain for any given set of individuals; the limit is not necessarily an obfuscation. We do not find the human soul apart from bodies, and it probably does not exist apart. Consequently, this form in its secondary manifestation—typical form-expanded—must, and probably also should, be rational *animal*, the form as having a physical perceptible domain. We do observe both perceptible and geometrical circles. What this form requires is an extensive domain, whether physical or non-physical. Accordingly, circularity in its guise of typical form-expanded—'circle,' 'such and such a plane figure'—is freed from brute physical matter more than soul or syllabic form is. The superior formality of 'circle' as compared with 'man' or 'syllable' does not, however, mean that soul or syllabic form is any less a primary intelligible.

The principal factors in definition have now all been brought to light, with one exception. The functioning of the intellect has not

¹¹⁸ Z, 11, 1036a32-b7.

been examined. Aristotle's position in Z, 10-11 certainly involves and is compatible with what he says elsewhere about intellect; but he does not here discuss that faculty. Given Aristotle's view of cognition, he need not do so. For him, all cognition is essentially self-transcendent; that is, it puts us into relation to factually real others, and through them, to their causes and principles. Sense-perception is open-ended; we perceive not images but things themselves.¹¹⁹ (Even geometrical individuals are not, basically, imaginary in the sense of being purely private "mental" beings. They are simplified real bodies.) The things themselves are each some form as formally effective in a particular milieu. Once we confront some individuals and recognize a determinacy particularized in each and yet common to them all, we are cognizant of form being effective in a typical milieu—we have grasped typical form-expanded. This form-expanded can be intellectually internalized. When it is, we have a concept.¹²⁰ The concept is not an object per se of our discernment; it is a means by which we can subsequently recognize other real individuals of the same sort.¹²¹ Our contribution to typical form-expanded is only a certain simplification of real fact; and the simplification does not subtract the reality from the fact. Moreover, the factually real individuals contain and are governed by a primary intelligible; and the typical form-expanded is likewise, in its own (non-particular) way, a manifestation of that primary intelligible. The series of objects—this bronze circle, this geometrical circle (the bronze individual simplified), 'circle' (typical form-expanded), circularity (pure form)—ranges all the way from an intelligible factual reality to a primary intelligible. All the members are mind-independent in point of determinacy, although without intellect, and attendant faculties, we should not, of course, have become cognizant of them.

Objects of the sorts just mentioned in the series above are the principal factors in Aristotle's Z, 10-11 account of definition.

¹¹⁹ See *De Anima* III, 8, as well as II, 5-12.

¹²⁰ *Posterior Analytics* II, 19, esp. 100a9-100b3.

¹²¹ See *De Anima* II, 8, esp. 429a26-28: "It is a good idea to call the soul 'the place of forms' though (1) this description holds only of the intellectual soul and (2) even this is the forms only potentially not actually."

There are individuals. These are either factual realities constituted by form in particular physical matters, or they are simplified factual realities, such as geometrical circles. The simplified realities, while not perceptible, are still constituted by a form in particular matters. No definition deals directly either with some of these individuals or with a whole set taken as a collection. A definition will, however, be relevant to individuals, just by virtue of the fact that typical form-expanded is *any* of these individuals, shorn of idiosyncrasy. Typical form-expanded is a universal—a species—and a universal is a departicularized version of an individual: "Man and horse and terms which are thus applied to individuals, but universally, are not substance [form, the primary reality, ousia] but this particular formula [particular form-expanded] and this particular matter treated as universal."¹²² The entity directly signified by the definitory formula is typical form-expanded, the universal. The universal is itself expressive of pure form; the definitory formula, therefore, ultimately signifies form alone, the primary intelligible, the ousia of ousiai. "It is clear . . . the soul is the primary substance and the body is matter, and man or animal is the compound of both taken universally" ¹²³

The remainder of Z, 10 constitutes the second stage of the whole exposition Z, 10-11; the remainder may now be considered. It contains a fresh argument supporting the priority of form.

As Aristotle has already noted: "As the formula is to the thing, so is the part of the formula to the part of the thing . . ." ¹²⁴ The internal complexity of the formula pertaining to wholes must reflect the internal complexity of the wholes themselves. He now adds: "The parts of the formula, into which the formula is divided, are prior to it, either all of them or some of them." ¹²⁵ This must mean that something involved in the definition governs it as something in the whole determines the whole to be what it is. Next, the definitions for wholes and the definitions for the material parts of such wholes are contrasted. The definition of a semicircle is that it is such and such part of a circle; the definition of finger,

¹²² Z, 10, 1035b28-30.

¹²³ Z, 11, 1037a5-6.

¹²⁴ 1034b20-27.

¹²⁵ Z, 10, 1035b4-6.

that it is a certain part of a man.¹²⁶ All these parts are such as can be obtained by some literal act of dividing a whole—a physical or imaginative division. The parts are defined by reference to their wholes, and not vice versa. The net conclusion is, therefore, that the material parts of wholes are posterior, rather than prior, in nature to their wholes: "Therefore, the parts which are of the nature of matter, and into which as its matter a thing is divided, are posterior. . . ." ¹²⁷ Since the material parts are posterior in this way, and since a whole is yet in some sense a whole of parts, the whole contains something else which is other than its parts and prior to them. Definitions relevant to wholes clearly must correspond to the "something else" rather than to the parts. So far as parts figure at all in the definitions relevant to wholes, they are employed as a means of expressing the 'something else'. As we already know, the something else is form, in two states—typical form-expanded which is the universal nature borne by the whole, and form the primary determinant which endows the whole with determinacy. Aristotle remarks on both: "The parts which are of the nature of matter . . . are posterior; but those which are of the nature of parts of the formula [i.e. those which are typical form-expanded], and of the substance according to the formula [pure form] are prior, either all of them or part of them." ¹²⁸ In the last analysis, it is pure form which has primacy; pure form is that the presence of which in matter constitutes a whole thing with a determinate nature of its own; "And since the soul of animals (for this is the substance of a living being) is their substance according to the formula, i.e. the form and essence of a body of a certain kind (at least we shall define each part, if we define it well, not without reference to its function, and this cannot belong to it without perception) so that the parts of the soul are prior, either all of them or some of them . . ." ¹²⁹

¹²⁶ 1035b6-11.

¹²⁷ 1035b11-12.

¹²⁸ 1035b11-14.

¹²⁹ 1035b14-19. The attribution of parts to soul (form) can only be a manner of speaking, until the question of parts of form is settled in Z. 12. Z as a whole cannot possibly justify the interpretation which makes Aristotle posit parts within pure substantial form.

Form, the primary intelligible reality, determines the whole individual. Thereby it governs also the material parts of the whole. Severed from the whole, the parts lose their roles, that is, their power qua parts, and often even their structure. A finger severed from the body is removed from the aegis of soul, and is a finger in name only.¹⁰⁰ Because form determines the factual whole, it also determines the universal.

In passages following on the argument just examined, Aristotle seems to propose the universal—that is, species—as one kind of secondary instance of pure form, and the individual as another. The universal is founded upon the individual, to be sure, but it is founded upon the individual qua informed. The generalization, or simplification, by which the universal is achieved from the individual does not set the universal at a greater distance from pure form. There is hardly a question of “distance” in the case of the individual or the universal; the individual and the universal are each pure form in a milieu. The individual however is form in a particular matter and the universal is form in a typical domain. In terms of factual reality, the universal is only an aspect of the individual; the universal does not exist apart.¹⁰¹ In terms of clarity and stability, over-all perspicuousness, however, the universal is superior to the individual.

When we recognize an individual for what it is, we find it to be of a kind with others. We cannot cognize the individual intellectually, qua particular. We possess particulars in their full concreteness only in a direct confrontation; to recognize and name them we must employ universals, and thus we somewhat transcend particularity. Our native level, so to speak, as intellectual beings is the level of universality. The individual lies below this level; and prime matter below the individual. Pure form is above the level of universality. The universal, however, is that secondary version, of pure form, in which and through which we approach pure form as directly as we can. As Aristotle says, a definition is of the universal *and of form*.¹⁰² “But when we come to the

¹⁰⁰ 1035b25.

¹⁰¹ See Z, 16, 1040b25-28.

¹⁰² Z, 10, 1035b35-1036a2, and Z, 11, 1036a29.

concrete thing, e.g. *this* circle, i.e., one of the individual circles, whether perceptible or intelligible (I mean by intelligible circles the mathematical, and by perceptible circles those of bronze and of wood)—of these there is no definition, but they are known by the aid of intuitive thinking or of perception; and when they pass out of this complete realization it is not clear whether they exist or not; but they are always stated and realized by means of the universal formula [typical form-expanded]. But matter is unknowable in itself." ¹³³

With this passage the gist of the solution of all the Z 10-15 difficulties has been achieved. Form, the primary intelligible, is the principle on the one hand for individual *ousiai* and, on the other, for universals. A species is not absolutely identical with pure form; but, like the individual, still is that form, expanded. Since the universal species is determined by pure form, it expresses pure form. The formula which directly signifies and exfoliates the species—into genus and difference—must inevitably reveal and depend upon form the primary intelligible. Since the universal—rather than the individual—is sufficiently de-materialized to be thoroughly accessible to mind and to be exempt from the vicissitudes of process, it is closer to form, in know-ability, than is the individual. This know-ability must not, as we shall see, be confused with factual reality or with primary intelligible reality.

Z, 10 has settled all doubts as to the primacy of pure form. Z, 11 is mainly a defense of the identity of form and essence. It begins with the observation that we can free some forms rather thoroughly from *physical* matter so that a definitory formula—like that of 'circle'—can be free of any patent reference to physical matter. We can go even farther and think of circularity, the pure form. Can it be, then, that we ought always to press as far as we can away from matter? Should no definitions refer to physical matter? In short, what precisely is the essence of a material whole?

Aristotle poses the problem in traditional terms: "Some people already raise the question even in the case of the circle and

¹³³ Z, 10, 1036a2-10.

the triangle, thinking it is not right to define these by reference to lines and to the continuous, but that all these are to the circle or the triangle [evidently the universal circle, etc.] as flesh and bones are to man, and bronze or stone to the statue; and they reduce all things to numbers and they say the formula of line is 'two.' And of those who assert the Ideas some make 'two' the line-itself, and others make it the Form of the line; for in some cases they say the Form and that of which it is the form are the same, e.g. 'two' and the Form of two; but in the case of 'line' they say this is no longer so." ¹²⁴

There is certainly reason to suppose that the essence of an individual "x" is not identical with the individual itself. The definition relevant to this "x" signifies not this "x" but a species common to "x's". A species in turn, however, can be regarded as an instance of a more rarified formality. Should not the refinement of thought be carried as far as possible? "And it is possible to make one thing [e.g., unity] the Form-itself of all, and to hold that the others are not Forms; but thus all things will be one." ¹²⁵

This is just the difficulty of Platonism, that things patently different in nature—a line and a two, men and spirits—will have the same essence. The genuinely distinctive fact of matter—some sort of indeterminate continuum for the line, ¹²⁶ flesh and bones for men—is entirely ignored. "Some things surely are a particular form in a particular matter . . ." ¹²⁷ "It leads away from the truth and makes one suppose that man can possibly exist without his parts, as the circle can without the bronze. But the case is not similar; for an animal is something perceptible, and it is not possible to define it without reference to movement . . ." ¹²⁸ The definition pertaining to given individuals must take account of the fact that they have parts—matter—and that the parts are in a certain state—namely, dominated by form. ¹²⁹

¹²⁴ 1036b7-17.

¹²⁵ 1036b18-20.

¹²⁶ See 1036b35-1037a2.

¹²⁷ 1036b23-24.

¹²⁸ 1036b26-29.

¹²⁹ See 1036b29-32.

The rectification of Platonism, and Pythagoreanism, requires a proper grasp of what universals are. The universal is the individual de-particularized.¹⁴⁰ Hence the species is in a way other than the individual; but the universal is analogous to the individual in composition.¹⁴¹ We have had occasion to note this before.¹⁴² The individual is composed of form and matter; the species is composed of genus and difference. Genus, however, is not matter, and the generalizing step from individual to species is not the same as the generalizing step from species to genus. Genus and difference together express exactly what species expresses, namely form. The step from individual to species is the step from form-in-this-matter to form as having a typical effect in a typical domain. What drops out of account is individual matter. The step from species to genus—for example “man” to “animal,” is the step from total typical form-expanded to partial typical form-expanded. As was noted before,¹⁴³ genus is not matter, but corresponds to matter; and it corresponds not to sheer matter, but to matter as bearing some formal effect.

The refinements—“man” to “animal,” to “thing,” to “unity”—do not purify form-expanded; they only make it vaguer and vaguer. We come nearest to possessing form, cognitively, at the level of species; and our definitions ought to render the species rather than any more general universal.

The Platonic sort of error involves more than an unnecessary preference for generality over specificity, however. It consists also in too close an identification of form and universal. The universal is never precisely pure form; it is never really constitutive of an individual. It is, in the first place, form-expanded. In the second place, it is, even as form-expanded, simplified. The universal under which we can subsume individuals has previously been found in them; and, prior to our acts, the universal did not lie ready-made in the individuals, like a skeleton. We accomplish the demarcation of the universal. Pure form and form-displayed-in-

¹⁴⁰ 1037a5-7.

¹⁴¹ 1037a9.

¹⁴² See above, pp. 487 and 490.

¹⁴³ See above, pp. 487-488.

this-individual do not differ in content. That is, they stand to one another as a formal cause *contracted* (a formal cause per se), and the same formal cause *expanded* into formal effect. There cannot be more content, so to speak, in the effect than in the cause; and the formal effect is the formal cause, in a milieu. The universal, however, is not merely form-expanded, that is, form, displayed in *this* individual; it is also form-expanded *generalized*, a determinacy illumined by thought and thereby rendered non-individual. The universal is typical. The universal species is the intellectual version—the accessible portion—of individual determinacies and they in turn are expanded versions, mediumized versions, of pure form.

It follows that species has a kind of identity with pure form; there is no content in the species which is not pure-form-having-its-formal-effect. On the other hand, the species is other than pure form, strictly speaking. Species is other than the form *qua* absolute, the form under no conditions of medium. In view of this identity and difference, species may well be called the λόγος of form, the version of form which brings about an understanding of form. Indeed, Aristotle seems to use λόγος, in connection with species and form, in quite this sense.

Λόγος rarely is equivalent simply to ὄνομα, "name." When λόγος is used for "word" or "set of words," it signifies words as carrying meaning, and the emphasis is on the meaning, on the universal.¹⁴⁴ Λόγος can also be used simply for a universal,¹⁴⁵ and even for the determinate nature of an individual.¹⁴⁶ Λόγος is close in meaning to εἶδος (form);¹⁴⁷ but, all the way through Z 10-11, λόγος is linked to form—the λόγος is of form—rather than flatly

¹⁴⁴ In Z, 4 (1030a6-11) for example we have the following: ὥστε τὸ τί ἦν εἶναι ἔστιν ὅσων ὁ λόγος ἔστιν ὁρισμός. [λόγος here means an account, a formulation, not a set of verbal signs.] ὁρισμός δ' ἔστιν οὐκ ἂν ὄνομα λόγῳ ταῦτο σημαίνει. [λόγος is here the *meaningful*, ampliative, predicate phrase.] (πάντες γὰρ ἂν εἰεν οἱ λόγοι ὅροι· ἔστι γὰρ ὄνομα ὁτιοῦν λόγῳ, ὥστε καὶ ἡ 'Πιάς ὁρισμός ἔστι'), ἀλλ' ἂν πρῶτου τινός ᾗ.

¹⁴⁵ As in Z, 10, 1035b5-6: ὅσα μὲν γὰρ τοῦ λόγου μέρη καὶ εἰς ἃ διαιρεῖται ὁ λόγος, ταῦτα πρότερα, ἢ πάντα ἢ ἑνια.

¹⁴⁶ As in Z, 10, 1035b28-31: ὁ δ' ἄνθρωπος καὶ ὁ ἵππος ... οὐκ ἔστιν οὐσία, ἀλλὰ σύνολόν τι ἐκ τούτῳ τοῦ λόγου καὶ τησδε τῆς ὕλης ὡς καθόλου.

¹⁴⁷ See, for example, *De Anima* I, 1, 403a25: εἰ δ' οὕτως ἔχει, ὁφλόν ὅτι τὰ πάθη λόγοι ἐνυλοὶ εἰσιν. See also *Ibid.* 403b2, and Z 11, 1036b5-6.

identified with it.¹⁴⁸ In the translation of Z 10-11 used here, *λόγος* has been uniformly rendered by "formula." While both the Greek and English terms are used, in Z 10-11, in such a way as to keep us mindful that a definition is a statement, "*λόγος*" and "formula" preponderantly signify not the words of the definition but the set of equivalent universals (species = genus + difference) which the words mean.¹⁴⁹ The universal, species or genus plus difference, is the *λόγος*, and the *λόγος* is of form. It is, seemingly, no accident that in Z, 10-11 the term *λόγος* is used almost to the entire exclusion of the standard terms for definition (*ὁρισμός*) and universal (*καθόλου*).¹⁵⁰ *Ὅρισμός* has more of a verbal connotation than *λόγος*, and *καθόλου* stresses the generality rather than expressiveness of the universal. The *λόγος* which is species, or genus plus difference, expresses form.

If species is the formula of form, it is also the formula of essence. It is not essence-absolute, but essence-understood. This is Aristotle's position. The concluding portion of Z 11 refers us back to Z, 4, 5 and 6; there is no abandonment of the claim that form is essence, the primary reality, the separable 'this,' even when form is the form of concrete *ousiai*: "What the essence is and in what sense it is independent, has been stated universally in a way which is true of every case . . ." ¹⁵¹ This passage can also be taken to refer to the conclusion of the argument about form in Z, 10; there also, form is established as essence and as primary.¹⁵²

Essence, form, is independent of matter. What carries a kind of reference to matter is not essence, precisely and absolutely, but the formula of essence.¹⁵³ A definition formulates, expresses, essence and, in doing so, may appear to depend in some way on

¹⁴⁸ See, on *λόγος* of form: 1035a11; a20-23; a28-30; b35-1036a1. See also 1036b14 and 1037a21-25.

¹⁴⁹ See all the passages cited in no. 131, and also Z, 10, 1034b20-26.

¹⁵⁰ *Ὅρισμός* appears twice, once with *λόγος*. See Z, 10, 1034b20, and Z, 11, 1036a28. See Z, 10, 1036a1 and Z, 11, 1036a28 for the appearance of *καθόλου*.

¹⁵¹ 1035b14-20.

¹⁵² 1035b14-19.

¹⁵³ The expression is (1037a23) *ὁ λόγος ὁ τοῦ τί ἦν εἶναι*.

the material parts of the thing having the essence. The definition does not actually depend on matter; the individual with its matter is never defined.¹⁵⁴ There is a definition of the individual ousia "with reference to its primary substance."¹⁵⁵ That is, the definitory formula, the sentence, directly expresses the species of this and that individual ousia; and the species is in turn the expression of the substantial form which makes these individuals what they are. The definition is concerned only with form. It is concerned directly with form-expanded and indirectly with pure form.

The identity of form and essence has been preserved. The *ousia* of a concrete thing is form identical with essence.¹⁵⁶ It follows, however, that the thing itself—since it is form in matter, not form alone—is not identical with its own essence.¹⁵⁷ Since form is in the thing, however, not apart from it, the consequence is not fraught with the difficulties met with in Platonic philosophy.¹⁵⁸

(To be concluded)

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¹⁵⁴ 1037a22-27.

¹⁵⁵ 1037a28.

¹⁵⁶ 1037a34-b4.

¹⁵⁷ 1037b4-7.

¹⁵⁸ If essence were apart from the individual, the latter would be utterly indefinable. See this *Review* X, pp. 323-24.

SOME RECENT WORK ON LEIBNIZ, 1946-56 (Concluded).³²

7. *Chronology minimized: Friedmann and Grua.* At the end of the previous installment I remarked on the light that could be expected from a closer attention to the chronology of Leibniz's thought. The twentieth century's interest in this chronology ties in, of course, with the vogue among its scholars to treat time as the resolver of contradictions. Whereas earlier generations, when confronted by apparent inconsistencies in a thinker, would have appealed to different modes of discourse (loose vs. exact, figurative vs. literal, etc.) to resolve the contradiction, the nineteenth and especially the twentieth centuries have resorted to Time. The theories of Vaihinger, Adickes, and Kemp Smith about Kant, and of Jaeger about Aristotle, are prominent examples.

Applied to Leibniz, this interest in the *Entwicklungsmoment* led almost necessarily to a new attention to that period of his thought which had previously been most neglected, viz., up until ca. 1676. Although Erdmann's edition had given a fairly well balanced sampling (restricted to primarily philosophical papers), little attention had been paid to points of difference between these and more mature writings. Cassirer joined, if he did not initiate, the new trend, devoting the concluding part of his book (1902) to the period 1663-86. Willy Kabitz's book,³³ far from comprehensive yet very valuable so far as it went, substantially advanced our understanding of the differences. (Couturat's two books³⁴ were concerned mainly with Leibniz's middle period, the texts dealt with clustering most heavily around ca. 1680-90.)

³² Continued from this journal, Vol. X, (Dec., 1956) pp. 333-49.

³³ *Die Philosophie des jungen Leibniz* (1909); cf. also his article "Die Bildungsgeschichte des jungen Leibniz" *Zeitschrift für Geschichte der Erziehung und des Unterrichts* 2.164-84 (1912).

³⁴ Cited in n. 17 supra.

Since then, more and more things have been published—especially by Jagodinsky and in the Prussian Academy edition—that belong to the years 1675 and before.

The interest in Leibniz's early writings was not spurred on by any doctrinaire motive; for instance, there was no temptation, as there has been in the case of some other thinkers, to hypothesize a youthful view which was subsequently rejected in some dramatic way comparable to Aristotle's break with the Academy or to Kant's being awakened from his dogmatic slumber. So if scholars should come to conclude that there is no essential or major difference between Leibniz's earliest and his latest doctrines, the conclusion would not shock us; and neither would the opposite conclusion. We are uncommitted.

One of the best known "chronologizers" was Ludwig Stein, in his book *Leibniz und Spinoza* (1890). "D'après lui—I quote the paraphrase of Georges Friedmann, "whose aim it is to refute Stein—Leibniz serait passé par une période spinoziste, par un accord avec Spinoza sur les points essentiels . . . Jusque vers 1684, il n'a pas eu d'idées philosophiques originales . . . Leibniz aurait été longtemps indifférent aux conséquences impies d'une doctrine philosophique telle que le panthéisme . . . On ne relèverait pas chez Leibniz d'opposition de principe au spinozisme avant sa lettre à Arnaud, de janvier 1688."

If a present-day writer wished to combat Stein's thesis, he might try looking for help to the *Leibniziana* published since Stein's day; or, as an independent and complementary line of approach, he might reexamine and reevaluate the evidence cited by Stein. Friedmann's method is primarily the latter. Although he makes capable use of the Prussian Academy edition and other post-Stein materials, his main concern is to show that "Stein a pris une position dogmatique et impossible à défendre dès l'époque où il écrivait" (p. 10). His fundamental strategy for carrying out this aim is simple: Leibniz held all his major doctrines before he knew, or knew at all well, the doctrines of Spinoza. As an auxiliary line of argument, Friedmann shows how genuinely contrary it would have been to the spirit, the tenor of Leibniz's lifelong phil-

⁴¹ *Leibniz et Spinoza* (Paris, 1946) cited in note 25, supra.

osophy to have ever toyed with Spinozism, even briefly. And incidentally, he also evaluates the personal relationship between the two men, their characters, and the personal aspects of Leibniz's treatment of Spinoza living and Spinoza dead. His book is by no means a mere refutation of Stein's, a positive quantity canceling a negative one to yield the net result of zero. It has independent interest and value and would have been worth writing and reading even if Stein had never written.

Nor does he fight Stein as Brutus fights Marc Antony, but rather as Brutus fights Cassius. They are at one in basic objective, and differ only on the strategy by which to execute it. The objective is to exalt Spinoza. Friedmann's book has about it an air of scrupulous fairness, which makes itself felt precisely because it is such a palpable effort for the author. By the time he is through, it is very clear that his emotional sympathies—not always the obedient servants of his intellect—lie with Spinoza. But whereas Stein's way of elevating Spinoza was to claim that so great a man as Leibniz was profoundly influenced by him, Friedmann's way is to argue that so fundamentally different a personality could never break into the Spinozistic outlook, could make only the most superficial contact with it.

There is a certain uncompromising starkness in Spinoza that makes this response natural, or at least frequent; it takes cool detachment to appraise Spinoza's character less admiringly, and equally cool argument to appraise Leibniz's more favorably. It was one of the weaknesses of Russell's brilliant book that he accepted the vulgar and unfavorable appraisal of Leibniz's character, developing it into his hypothesis of a double philosophy—a private philosophy on the one hand, and a philosophy for princes and (especially) princesses on the other. If this interpretation is not "easily refuted by the facts,"⁴² it is because one must bring to the facts a sensitive and receptive willingness to listen to them. The outstanding accomplishments of Jean Baruzi⁴³ along this line, defended with fine scholarship by Dietrich Mahnke,⁴⁴ are pre-

⁴² Loemker, *op. cit.* (in n. 4 supra), p. 548, n. 12.

⁴³ *Leibniz et l'organisation religieuse de la terre* (1907); *Leibniz* (1909) (the latter cited in n. 36 supra).

⁴⁴ See nn. 15 and 17 supra.

served and developed by the extremely competent work of Gaston Grua.⁴⁵ Grua is able to show, in particular and in detail, that Leibniz was not so concessive as has been supposed. "Généralement, les textes les plus discrets ou les plus superficiellement mondains d'apparence recèlent une trace, parfois même hardie ou inopportune, de sa pensée totale" (*Textes* vi).

8. *Plan of Grua's book.*⁴⁶ *Jurisprudence* is an eminently usable book: beautifully organized, clearly written, richly and accurately documented and indexed. What is more, and more important, it is sympathetic and full of intelligent insight. It is the kind of book that both the scholarly specialist and the unspecialized student can study with profit. Five years earlier, Grua has published 900 pages of texts (cf. n. 2 *supra*), most of them not previously published, or published only in excerpts (e.g., by Baruzi). These texts are mainly concerned with philosophy of law on the one hand, and ecumenical theology on the other, plus a good deal of metaphysics so far as it bears on these two topics; a considerable proportion of them is marginal notes and other jottings of Leibniz's written in the course of his reading. There are also a number of letters (e.g., the illuminating correspondence with Morell on mysticism). Most of the remaining texts bear no date by Leibniz himself; Grua offers a conjectural date in each case, with the reasons for his dating fully indicated. This is one of the many fine features of his edition. While Grua's edition of these texts is preliminary in that it omits various 'diplomatic' details which the definitive Prussian Academy edition will include,⁴⁷ it is nevertheless of high interim value, and of permanent value for its editorial work of selection, arrangement, and cross-reference.

⁴⁵ *Jurisprudence universelle et théodicée selon Leibniz* (Paris, 1953); cf. his *Textes inédits...* (Paris, 1948), cited in n. 2 *supra*.

⁴⁶ I speak now of the *Jurisprudence*. Similar remarks apply to his editorial work in *Textes inédits*.

⁴⁷ See the review in *Philosophische Studien* 2 (1-2) 209-11 (1950) by Erich Hochstetter, himself one of the editors of PA. The new editorial policies of PA, announced by Kurt Müller in PA 1 (4) xxxii and first carried out in PA 1(5) (1954), include the giving of more 'diplomatic' information than the previously published volumes had done. In this same *Vorwort* (pp. xxii-xxiii), Müller gives credit for PA 1(3) (published 1938) to Paul Schrecker, a fact which for political reasons had not been announced in that volume itself.

Grua's *Jurisprudence* makes extensive use of these texts. Its basic plan is simple and obviously sensible. Part I concerns "universal jurisprudence," i.e., justice as it is univocally common to God and to man. Part II turns to the divine justice (theodicy) in particular. The expected third part that would deal similarly with human justice in particular is deferred to a sequel volume. (A critical edition of the *Théodicée* is also announced as in preparation, p. 2.)

The very plan of Grua's book presupposes that justice is ascribed univocally to God and to his rational creatures, and the univocity of justice in turn presupposes the univocity of being. Grua's description of Leibniz is set in the following broadly Thomistic framework, that Leibniz (1) teaches the univocity of being as between God and creatures, and (2) is an essentialist in the sense outlined by Gilson.

9. *The notion of being.* It is very probable that Leibniz does accept the univocity of being. At least, univocity seems to be a logical consequence from some propositions that he asserts explicitly. However, before feeling confident of our conclusion, there are several points that we should not fail to consider, pertaining (a) to Leibniz's attitude toward ontology in general, and (b) to the distance between God and creatures.

(a-1) Thomistic analogy is never explicitly denied. Leibniz doesn't reject it, in the explicit sense; he ignores it. Moreover, univocity is never explicitly asserted, except in various statements of his earlier years.

This silence is characteristic of Leibniz's attitude toward ontology, as ontology is conceived by the Aristotelian-medieval tradition. The senses of being, Being and beings, being as act, the categories, the transcendentals—these are topics which he passes by. Though his views about them can often be inferred, the ensemble of such questions is clearly not a live subject of inquiry for him. In consequence, we are often left in the dark as to how he would reply to the various difficulties that had been found by the medievals in the views that he endorses.

(a-2) It does not follow that he was unaware of these difficulties. There are one or two hints that he thought of himself

not as solving the stock difficulties, but simply as picking the views which scholastic discussion had shown to have the *least* difficulties. Thus, concerning God's simplicity he writes in 1708 (G 6.576): "Quand Mr. Locke déclare . . . qu'il ne comprend point comment la variété des idées est compatible avec la simplicité de Dieu, il me semble qu'il n'en doit point tirer une objection contre le P. Malebranche; car il n'y a point de système, qui puisse faire comprendre une telle chose . . ." In other cases, he thinks that the preceding centuries of discussion have had a definite upshot, which can be simply accepted without serious reexamination, as for instance that future contingents are determined (*Theodicy* § 36).

(a-3) There are other areas of ontology that Leibniz also slights. For instance, he accepts a more or less Aristotelian view that concrete substances are the only real beings; that accidents are unreal in this technical sense, or somehow less real than substances; and that accidents of accidents, relations between substances, and merely possible substances are unreal and mental—whether it be only the human intellect, or the divine intellect as well, in which they reside. But these opinions are bristling with unsolved problems to which Leibniz pays scant attention.

(a-4) The relation of ontology to logic is also neglected. Although we grasp what Russell and Couturat mean when they say that Leibniz's metaphysics follows from his logic, there is an equally clear sense in which it dictates the logic. E.g., his metaphysics is responsible (i) for his refusal to build a logic of relations, (ii) for his neglect of "dialectical" or self-applicative questions of the sort Russell raises, and (iii) for his assumption that logic should be directly correlated with ontology (in contrast to the view that logic as second-intentional need not directly correlate with ontology which is first-intentional).

(b) When we duly consider all these ways in which Leibniz takes ontology for granted, we feel disinclined to take even his explicit statements about it at face value. Each one will need to be carefully weighed in the context of broader considerations. Now there is no doubt that Leibniz does constantly compare and assimilate man to God. Both are spirits, differing as finite and infinite (Grua, *Textes* 559, *Jurisprudence* 244, 246-48). And some-

times (*Jurisprudence* 20, 81, 96) he says, differing *only* as finite and infinite, as if to deprecate or minimize the difference. Yet, almost as constantly, he brings out the *difference* between finite and infinite, as a difference in kind (*Jurisprudence* 248-49). And stress on the difference certainly comports with his mathematical views: infinite number is a contradiction in terms. (As he concisely expresses himself to Des Bosses—11 March 1706; G 2.304, there is infinite multitude but no infinite magnitude.)

A right grasp of the infinite is, indeed, absolutely indispensable for his theory of knowledge. The difference between necessary and contingent truths is based upon the difference between finite and infinite complexity.⁴⁸ To the human mind, that difference is an unbridgeable one. We cannot perform any infinite analysis; and since any truth about the actual world qua actual involves all other such truths, there is not a single truth about the actual world qua actual that we humans can know in a purely a priori way.⁴⁹ Hence, though all truths are identities and are known by God as identities, we humans see them as falling into two classes: the finitely complex truths, which even we can subsume under the principle of identity, and the infinitely complex ones, for the handling of which we must turn to that other "great principle," the principle of sufficient reason. The distinction between hypothetical and absolute necessity is also based on the distinction of finite and infinite. The possible worlds being as they are, and God being as he is, God could not have chosen another possible world for actualization than the one he did choose; and if one cares to say that *in that sense* the other worlds were not possible after all, so be it. The point of present importance is that a distinction which is insignificant for God—finite versus in-

⁴⁸ It does not coincide with the difference between truth about mere possibles and truth about actuals. Russell (*Mind* (N. S.) 12.183 n. 2 (cf. n. 34 supra)) had deduced that some truths about possible substances, being infinitely complex, must be contingent; now Grua brings to light a marginal note of ca. 1695 in which Leibniz actually says this (*Textes inédits* p. 353). Actually, the same thing had been said in *Causa Dei*, § 14 (G 6.440), but not so pointedly.

⁴⁹ I am giving my own interpretation here. The knowledge that this is the best of all possible worlds involves the knowledge that there is an actual world, which is known a posteriori.

finite—is radical and paramount for man, and that this makes the distinction between man and God itself paramount and radical (from man's point of view), and for the same reason.

In short, in comparing man and God, Leibniz is at pains to set forth the resemblances on the one hand, and the differences on the other. He draws up an inventory of resemblances and of differences of the sort described by John Wisdom;⁵⁰ and it may be that, like Wisdom, he deliberately refrains from weighing the resemblances against the differences. He may even regard the question "Is man more like God, or more unlike God?" as a non-sensical question, based on the false presupposition that resemblances and differences can be weighed or rated against each other. And if that be so, then the alternatives Univocity—Analogy—Equivocity come from someone else's preconception, not from Leibniz. As I said above, the very framework in which the question is posed is Thomistic (at least on this point). One consults St. Thomas for the questions, and only turns to Leibniz for the answers. For one who approaches Leibniz (or any philosopher) in this way, to find new problems, or even a new canvass of possible alternative answers to old problems, would be inherently impossible. This is my fundamental criticism of Grua's fundamental procedure.

But having made this point, let me accept Grua's framework for the sake of discussion and see how far it can do justice to Leibniz. By elimination, we place Leibniz in the univocist school. He does not totally sunder God and man as Meister Eckhart for instance does, and so is not an equivocist; and we have seen the good reasons for denying that he is an analogist. And besides this negative argument, there are some positive affirmations which move us to call him a univocist. But if we pass on to infer from this labeling that he suffers from the difficulties which (according to analogists) are inherent in any version of univocity, then we will have prejudged the question whether he has a peculiar and successful version.

Let us consider this question with special reference to pan-

⁵⁰ E.g., in the papers collected in his *Philosophy and Psycho-Analysis* (Oxford, 1953).

theism. I suppose that Leibniz would have agreed with Gilson (*The Spirit of Mediaeval Philosophy* p. 449) that "without the doctrine of analogy the identification of God and being leads to pantheism." And Leibniz wishes to reject pantheism; he regards the rejection as one of his major points of disagreement with Spinoza. (That is why I select this particular illustration, in order to return in § 11 to some chronological questions about Leibniz's views on pantheism.) He must, then, either accept analogy or distinguish God from being.

He follows the latter course. For him, God is not He Who Is. And here three points of difference from St. Thomas may be noted. (i) In God, *esse* is not identical with *essentia* but rather is included in it.⁵¹ (ii) For St. Thomas, "this sublime truth" ⁵² that God's *essentia* is *esse* is a truth of revelation; Leibniz's nearest counterpart, that God's *essentia* includes *esse*, is a truth of natural reason. (iii) Leibniz does not even regard revelation on this point as supplementing natural reason, or as relevant to the discussion. The medieval practice of citing particular passages of Scripture as *prima facie* evidence for or against a certain view has all but disappeared. Appeals to revelation are not only rare, but, when they occur, reserved and conditional.⁵³

⁵¹ A passage that seems to contradict this—"In Deo existentia non differt ab Essentia" (Grua, *Textes* 302, "1686?")—is given away by the sequel (*italics mine*): "vel, quod idem est, Deo essentiale est existere".

⁵² *Contra Gentiles* 1.22 ad *Hanc autem*; signalized by Gilson, *Le thomisme* ⁵, 136 (1948).

⁵³ There are sporadic exceptions (Grua, *Jurisprudence* 17-8); e.g., (Grua, *Textes* 263, 2 Dec. 1676) existence of the world from eternity proved by John 5.17. The *Discourse* has a number of citations, identified in the edition of Lucas and Grint (see n. 5 *supra*). But the statement of 25 July 1707 to Hansch (Erdmann p. 445, Loemker p. 963), that creation and resurrection can be known only by revelation, seems to be unconditional.

There is no doubt that Leibniz could have cited Scripture much more extensively if he had wished to do so, and that he would have agreed with St. Thomas and many other doctors that some passages are to be taken literally and others figuratively, the ground of discrimination being the coherence with an overall theory. A striking instance in St. Thomas is his treatment of two passages in Exodus, 3.14 and 33.11. The former passage, this sublime truth as he calls it, he takes in the most literal and pregnant way, and makes it the foundation of his system (Gilson, *op. cit.* in n. 52, pp. 123-39; *The Spirit of Mediaeval Philosophy* (New York, 1936) p. 433

Leibniz can avoid pantheism, then, for he is not forced into it; whether he does avoid it remains to be discussed. The point that I want to make at present is this: It is idle to compare Leibniz's system with St. Thomas'—or with any other—point by point; one should compare the whole systems. We cannot defend Thomism, for instance, by pointing out that without analogy we land in pantheism, for this is true only if the other premisses of Thomism be retained. The most that our argument can prove is that Thomism is *self-consistent*. This proof does not bear on the question whether there is any other self-consistent philosophy.

Leibniz's view of being, stated with special reference to God and to man, seems to be this: man is essentially like God, and essentially unlike him; he differs from God *only* as the finite from the infinite and the created from the creator. If this be paradox, it is no more so than the notion of analogy; and it is a paradox with which the whole Platonic and Judeo-Christian tradition has had to struggle.

10. *Leibniz an essentialist?* I turn now to Grua's second underlying thesis, that Leibniz is an essentialist. Grua means by this that Leibniz teaches the priority of essence over existence (*Jurisprudence*, pp. 46-47, 528-33; cf. 20, 55, 138, 267-68, 299), to which doctrine is contrasted "une thèse de la primauté de l'existence comme celle de S. Thomas, plus modeste dans ses prétentions explicatives," but which "peut plus aisément rendre compte de la diversité des faits" (533). Essentialism as thus understood includes the doctrine of non-actual possible worlds, and thus prepares the way for the optimism according to which God chooses to create the best of all these possible worlds.

It seems to me beyond doubt that Leibniz is an essentialist *in this sense*. But there is grave danger of passing from this sense to another, sc., that he reduces existence to essence. It is essentialism in the latter sense that has been made notorious by

n. 9 et passim). The latter, "The Lord spoke to Moses face to face, as a friend speaks to his friend." is set aside as an instance where "Scripture speaks according to the opinion of the people" (S. Th. I-II, 98, 3 ad 2; Victor White, O. P., "St. Thomas's conception of revelation", *Dominican Studies* 1.3-34 (1948), p. 21.).

Etienne Gilson (*Being and Some Philosophers*, etc.) and others. Now I would be willing to take over from Gilson "the proposition that if anyone is an essentialist in Gilson's sense, Leibniz is; but I would add the minor premiss—here taking issue with Gilson—, Leibniz is not an essentialist. The particular case is important because it is the case par excellence; if we can sustain the minor premiss, we shall have good reason to think that Gilson's essentialist is a man of straw.

It is true that to defend Leibniz in this matter is to defend him against himself; he certainly does court misunderstanding. But the misunderstanding is very easily cleared up once it is noticed. "Chez les créatures mêmes, l'existence se définit en termes d'essence" (*Jurisprudence* 47)—true, but only in Leibniz's technical sense of "definition." For Leibniz, real definitions are "causal": they give the cause, or more generally the reason ("ground") of the thing defined. And Leibniz assuredly does hold that essence gives the reason for existence; it gives all the reason that there can be, we might say. But it does not follow that it wholly makes up existence, or constitutes it in the sense that existence is nothing but essence; Leibniz is still free to hold that existence goes beyond essence, adds something to essence (these phrases needing elucidation, of course).

Once we are made conscious of this subtle point, we see the evidence in an entirely different light. What is the evidence to prove that Leibniz reduces existence to essence? Just the passages where he defines existence by essence; but this is only evidence if we identify reduction with definition. But that identification finds no warrant in Leibniz's own views about definition; and so the case against Leibniz collapses.

Leibniz does not make the defense that I have made for him; he does not anticipate the neo-Thomist criticism and reply to it. But since the criticism presupposes a view of definition that is not Leibniz's view, my reply is latent in his system. And my inter-

²⁴ I take this to be the general import of Ch. 4; though actually he speaks primarily with respect to Wolff, not Leibniz. If it should turn out that Leibniz differs from Wolff on the point in question, and that Gilson is right about Wolff though not about Leibniz, we would still not have here an instance of an important philosopher who was an essentialist.

pretation makes sense of several propositions that are otherwise baffling or inconsistent.⁵⁵ Most of these propositions are duly considered by Grua himself, in another place (pp. 344-45). One of these propositions is that in an important sense existence is *not* a predicate; namely, that God, by conferring existence on a possible, does not thereby change it (by adding a predicate to it); so that the answer to the question, "caractéristique de cette doctrine essentialiste: que gagne le meilleur monde à passer du possible à l'acte?" (p. 344), is, Existence; or if "que" be understood to mean "quel prédicat," then the answer is, None at all. Another proposition is that God's will, though it follows his understanding, is distinct from his understanding. For God to understand that such-and-such is the best possible world is not the same as for him to make that world actual. God's understanding is prior to his will in a way proportionate to that in which essence (the object of his understanding) is prior to existence (the object of his will).⁵⁶ And so, though Leibniz grounds existence in essence (essentialism in Grua's sense), he does not subsume it under it (essentialism in Gilson's sense). Gilson and Grua have failed to prove that the one essentialism involves the other.

11. *Pantheism as a test case.* The interpretation that I have offered purports to give Leibniz's most carefully considered view on the nature of existence and its relation to essence. There are some passages that seem to contradict it, or at least to offer an embarrassment to it; and the mention of this fact reminds us of the question raised in § 7. How far can such discrepancies be explained chronologically? The question of chronology is too large to be discussed here in its generality, and I must confine myself to a single test case. Leibniz's position on pantheism is particu-

⁵⁵ Russell, *Critical Exposition* (see n. 34 supra) pp. vi-vii, falls into the natural misunderstanding. As a result, he sees here one more case where "Leibniz fell into Spinozism whenever he allowed himself to be logical; in his published works, accordingly, he took care to be illogical."

⁵⁶ There is a notable resemblance between Leibniz's doctrine here and the views of some recent Oxford writers on reasons. Partly in criticism of the emotive theory of ethics and partly in refinement of it they have observed that an evaluation is not to be identified with the reasons or grounds for it, even if these reasons are entirely sufficient and no other, further *reasons* for it could be given.

larly suitable, for the reason that it has already been mentioned (§ 9) in connection with Grua, and on the other hand it bears on Leibniz's relation to Spinozism, and thus on Friedmann's book.

In a letter of about October 1671 to Duke Johann Friedrich of Hanover, Leibniz speaks of "harmonia universalis, id est Deus" (PA 2 (1) 162.29). Similarly, he writes to Conring on 8 February 1671 (PA 2 (1) 79.28), "Ostendisse mihi videor esse quendam ultimam Rerum rationem (id est Deum), Harmoniam Universalem, Mentem sapientissimam potentissimamque;...". Again, in a paper (PA 4 (1) 532. 10-1) which the editors date "1671 (?)," he says: "...Jenes macht dass er sein muss Ratio ultima rerum, und also die höchste Macht; dieses dass er sein muss Harmonia maxima rerum, und also die grösste Weisheit." And in a paper of several years earlier (the editors date it "1668-69 (?)"), written for the Catholic Demonstrations, he is even more explicit (PA 6 (1) 499.9-11; quoted Loemker 32); "Visio beatifica seu intuitio Dei de facie in faciem est contemplatio universalis Harmoniae rerum quia Deus seu Mens Universi nihil aliud est quam rer. harmonia, seu principium pulchritudinis in ipsis." And finally, the latest passage in this vein that I have been able to locate, " and the only one later than the early 1670's (Grua dates it "1694-98?"), has a qualifying context: "Ja Gott ist die höchste Vernunft, Ordnung, Zusammenstimmung [i.e., harmony], und Kraft und Freiheit, also je mehr man ihn besitzt, wird man dessen allen fähig" (Grua, *Textes* 586).

In this last passage one notes (a) that God is called the *highest* reason, etc., and so is not identified with reason, etc., *tout court*; (b) that the whole string of identifications shows

⁵⁷ Jagodinsky's publications (apart from the extracts quoted or translated elsewhere) are not available to me. I gather that none of the papers he publishes are later than 1676.

An apparent counter-instance, cited by Grua, *Jurisprudence* p. 329 n. 23, is found in Dutens 6(1) 306 No. 69. Belonging to the 'Leibniziana' first published by Feller, it probably belongs to the period 1696-8 (Ravier, *op. cit.* in n. 7 *supra*, p. 161). "Sapientis erit semel in universum sibi firmiter imprimere pulchritudinem futurae vitae, id est, Dei, in quo consistit et amor Dei, seu harmoniae rerum." But if this proves that God *is* the harmony of things, it also proves that God is the love of God and that God is the future life. I take this passage, like the one quoted from *Textes* 586, as a passage in the mystical rather than in the analytical vein.

that each one of these identifications is not made in the sober or scientific spirit in which Leibniz says, e.g., that in God there are understanding, will, and power, but is more elevated and mystical in tone. It need not, therefore, be associated with the other passages as a statement of the same sober and scientific doctrine as they, twenty or twenty-five years later.

Now there are some passages of a different tenor to be considered. Early in November 1671, so just about the same time as the letter to Duke Johann Friedrich quoted above, Leibniz writes to Arnauld (G 1.73 = PA 2 (1) 174.8): "idem esse amare omnes et amare Deum, sedem harmoniae universalis." Here God is not the universal harmony but the seat of it. (And note the other identification: though it is the same thing to love all men and to love God, no one would propose to conclude from this that 'all men' is the same thing as God.) That God is the seat of the universal harmony may doubtless be paraphrased by saying that the harmony is *in* him (cf. Grua *Textes* 268, "Dec. 1676?": "in eo . . . est harmonia"). But elsewhere, Leibniz is more precise. A few lines further on, he says: "quod . . . continuatur, oritur ex harmonia rerum, id est a Dei voluntate." In May 1685 he writes to Veit von Seckendorf (PA 2 (1) 546.1-3), "Contingentium enim rerum existentia non ex earum essentia sive possibilitate sed ex Dei voluntate, vel quod eodem redit, harmonia rerum universali sequitur." These two passages seem to identify the will of God with the universal harmony, but we must resolve the ambiguity between two senses of 'the will of God,' (i) that which he wills and (ii) the faculty or power by which he wills it. Passages about to be cited will show that the universal harmony can be identified with (i) but not with (ii). In the paper *De vera methodo* . . . , for which Grua's dating (*Textes*, 4 n. 1) "December 1675" is plausible, Leibniz speaks (G 7.327) of the highest mind, "cujus voluntas sit ultima ratio rerum; causa volendi harmonia universalis." The possibility of taking 'will' once again in sense (i) is confirmed by the following very famous declaration to Wedderkopf, May 1671 (PA 2 (1) 117.18-21: "Quae ergo ultima voluntatis divinae? intellectus divinus. Deus enim vult quae optima item harmonicotata intelligit eaque velut seligit ex numero omnium

possibilium infinito. Quae ergo intellectus divini³ harmonia rerum. Quae harmoniae rerum³ nihil." Here 'will' is taken in the second sense, and here we get Leibniz's most careful statement of the relationship. God's will as a faculty depends on, and is defined by (in Leibniz's technical sense of definition; but is not reduced to) his understanding; God is the 'seat' of the universal harmony that is 'in' him because it is in his understanding; and we are now prepared to appreciate a passage (Grua *Textes*, 12-3, 16: "1679"?) in which Leibniz identifies harmony with certain possibilities, *qua possible*. Harmony is a property of possible worlds, which different worlds have in different degrees; God by his understanding knows which possible world has the property of harmony in the highest degree, by his will decides or wills to make that world actual, and by his power makes it actual. It results that in a certain sense this actual world is the harmony, i.e. the most harmonious possible world, but the identity is not of the verbal kind that produces mere synonyms.

Light is thrown on Leibniz's identifications by the explanation (PA 4 (1) 532.15-8), a few lines after one of the passages already quoted, that "zwischen der Universal-Harmonie und der Ehre Gottes ist kein Unterschied, als zwischen Körper und Schatten, Person und Bild, radio directo et reflexo, in dem dass was jene in der Tat, diese in den Seelen ist derer die ihn kennen."

The passages that I have assembled seem to me to suggest the following summary statements: (a) Leibniz speaks about the universal harmony in two veins, a more sober, scientific, analytical vein and a more religious and mystical vein. In the mystical vein he says that the universal harmony is God; in the analytical vein he says that it is a content of God's understanding, and is the object of God's will. (b) Statements in both veins can be found as early as 1671. (c) Statements in both veins can be found as late as the 1690's, but after ca. 1676 the relative frequency of the two kinds changes sharply. The mystical statements about the harmony become very infrequent, and the analytical statements become abundant.

Real proof of the third conclusion would of course require much more evidence, but if it should stand up, we would have

here a good instance of the importance of chronology." And my purpose in selecting this particular instance was to make a point that concerns both Grua and Friedmann.

Grua minimizes the chronological changes in Leibniz's thought, calling them changes in nuance or detail rather than in fundamentals. Now this is partly a question of fact (I mean gross, immediate fact, relatively independent of one's broader theoretical interpretation); for instance his section (*Jurisprudence* 329-30) on "Dieu harmonie ou sa cause?" takes no account of the chronological aspects whatever. But it is also partly a question of evaluation: Two people can agree that Leibniz changed his views on such-and-such a matter, while disagreeing as to whether the change is a major change or a mere point of detail. Now Grua is particularly concerned to bring out Leibniz's originality within the tradition to which he allied himself; and since the point had already been made by Kabitz (op. cit. in n. 39, p. 127) that the five *Grundgedanken* that he finds in Leibniz's thought from the earliest years contain little that is novel, the novelty consisting in their integration by mutual adaptation into a tight system, it follows that Grua's own concern would be better served by a concentration on the mature, and therefore more original, versions of Leibniz's doctrines.

If chronology would strengthen Grua's conclusions, it would alter Friedmann's. On the particular topic of universal harmony, Friedmann does not attend (pp. 22-7) to the chronological shift, any more than Grua does. But if my conclusions above are right,

²² And also of the interplay of the three kinds of variation mentioned at the end of Part I (§6): chronological phases, affective moods, and expository styles. When a difference of style is accompanied by a difference of mood, I call the conjunction of style and mood a 'vein'. In the case at hand, the chronological difference consists in the different relative frequency of the analytical and the mystical vein.

Two other early passages that either are, or sound, pantheistic are these: (1) *De arte combinatoria*, 1666 (G 4.41 = PA 6(1) 229.12 = Loemker 120): *Deus est substantia, creatura accidens*; (2) PA 6(1) 474.23-4 ("2. Hälfte 1671," hence roughly simultaneous with the letters to Duke Johann Friedrich on the one hand, and to Arnauld on the other): "*natura* [Ablative case] *seu Deo*," which is strikingly reminiscent of Spinoza's *Deus sive natura*.

the outright identifications of the universal harmony with God become very infrequent after about 1676. This date is so close to the time when Leibniz became familiar with Spinoza's doctrines that a causal connection suggests itself. The outright identification is pantheistic. Did Leibniz begin to deliberately avoid this turn of expression, as part of his effort to dissociate himself from Spinoza? If so, here is a negative influence of Spinoza on Leibniz. Leibniz never was a thoroughgoing pantheist, as the simultaneous more 'analytical' statements show. But he certainly did have a penchant for some pantheistic-sounding phrases. Friedmann argues that Spinoza had no significant influence on Leibniz one way or the other. But if we weaken this thesis to saying that he had no significant *positive* influence, we will have a view that is compatible with the negative influence that I have conjectured.

12. *Brunner and Belaval*. Two other books testifying to the strong French interest in Leibniz remain to be discussed. I shall have to content myself with saying very briefly that both are excellent: sane, well-balanced, sympathetic, accurately documented, and enriched by historical perspective. Fernand Brunner's book⁵⁹ is written from approximately the same standpoint as Grua's; it seems to me meritorious that he explicitly outlines his standpoint more fully than Grua does. Brunner sees in Leibniz the prototype of "le philosophe moderne [qui] cherche à faire de l'univers un ensemble intelligible, maniable et utilisable. Chez les anciens, il s'agit au contraire de l'intelligible en soi, et l'âme, au lieu de comprendre trop tôt, s'approche de ce qui doit la comprendre, c'est-à-dire de l'intelligence véritable. Quoique Leibniz ait dépassé plus que d'autres les limites de l'individualité moderne, . . . cependant la rationalité moderne . . . prive sa doctrine de l'unité à laquelle elle tendait, et la situe malgré tout, semble-t-il, au-dessous des grandes doctrines antiques et médiévales" (p. 289). I take this to imply that Leibniz tried to do equal justice to two paramount interests, God and the world, in a situation which by metaphysical necessity admits of only one. If that

⁵⁹ *Etudes sur la signification historique de la philosophie de Leibniz* (Paris, 1950; reprinted 1951).

be so, then Leibniz's failure was necessary. But it would be fair to place Leibniz in the human situation by mentioning the other side of the paradox: One who contents himself with one paramount and one subordinate interest necessarily neglects the latter because it has no rationale as subordinate unless it has a certain autonomy. Thus, those who take the opposite course to Leibniz's find themselves in just as much of a quandary.

Yvon Belaval's book⁶⁰ does not claim to be an original work of scholarship; but a more attractive and judicious exposition could hardly be imagined. There is nothing in English anywhere nearly so good. The first part (pp. 13-194) presents Leibniz and his ideas in biographical context; in this plan it resembles Meyer's book,⁶¹ but Meyer's is dense and difficult to follow. Part II (pp. 197-280) is a systematic account. In addition to the clarity of the book, the skill with which full documentation is unobtrusively blended into the text deserves particular comment.

13. *Lewis and Alexander*. Another work of high quality is Mlle. Geneviève Lewis's edition⁶² of Leibniz's letters to Arnauld, 1686-90. The absence of Arnauld's extremely incisive replies prevents her edition from being a complete substitute for Gerhardt's (G 2.11-138), but her contribution is to have published the letters as they were actually received by Arnauld,⁶³ in contrast with Gerhardt's which publishes Leibniz's copies. Most of the discrepancies are slight, and pertain more to social tact than to philosophy, but some others seem to be changes made by Leibniz on his own copies at one or another of the two periods (1695-7, 1707-8: Lewis p. 2) at which he was planning to publish this correspondence. The presence of the word 'entelechy' seven times in the Hanover version of the letter of 9 October 1687, corresponding each time in the Hague version to 'substantial form' or some other expression, is particularly important; it may be that Leibniz had used 'sub-

⁶⁰ *Pour connaître la pensée de Leibniz* (Paris, 1952).

⁶¹ Rudolf W. Meyer, *Leibnitz and the Seventeenth-Century Revolution*, translated by J. P. Stern (Chicago, 1952).

⁶² *Lettres de Leibniz à Arnauld d'après un manuscrit inédit*. Avec une introduction historique et des notes critiques (Paris, 1952).

⁶³ Actually, a transcript made in 1763-76, of uncertain accuracy. It is now at the Hague.

stantial form' in 1687, and then in 1695-97 or later had replaced it by 'entelechy.' (Only a look at the Hanover papers themselves, or photostats or the like, could settle this point; Grotefend's and Gerhardt's printed editions, on which Mlle. Lewis's collation is based, do not give diplomatic information of this sort.) If that is so, then one of the few occurrences of this term that is definitely dateable to before 1697 is removed (cf. Lewis p. 19 n. 6), and 'entelechy' seems to join the group of terms—'monad' (cf. n. 35 supra), 'preestablished harmony'—that are innovations of the late 1690's. The adoption of the term is of no direct philosophical interest, but can be of chronological interest as furnishing a terminus post quem; e.g., the occurrence in *Grua Textes* 29 casts doubt on Grua's dating "1683-1686".

H. G. Alexander's edition of the Leibniz-Clarke correspondence⁶⁴ does something very unusual: it gives *both* sides of the exchange, reproducing Clarke's edition of 1717. Though Clarke was not the equal of Arnauld as a critic of Leibniz, his criticisms are worth reading, even though the exchange degenerated into intransigent acrimony on both sides. However, the correspondence proper is only half of Alexander's book. The balance—introduction and appendices—supplies information, references, extensive quotations from Newton's *Principia* and *Optics*, and extracts from letters to the Princess of Wales and others bearing on the correspondence, all of which equips the reader with the background to appreciate the real, living issues involved. The conception of space as *sensorium Dei* is seen to be more than the naiveté that Leibniz treated it as being, and if Leibniz's position still emerges as the stronger one, one becomes aware of the price he paid: he is strong where Newton is weak just because he is weak where Newton is strong. He never beat Newton at his own game.

⁶⁴ *The Leibniz-Clarke Correspondence, Together with Extracts from Newton's Principia and Opticks, Edited with Introduction and Notes* (Manchester, 1956). A volume in the same series as Lucas and Grint (cf. n. 5 supra).

Attention should be drawn here to C. D. Broad's very valuable paper, "Leibniz's last controversy with the Newtonians," *Theoria* 12.143-68 (1946); reprinted in his *Ethics and the History of Philosophy* 168-91 (1952).

One of the many interesting points of information included by Alexander is Clarke's concession (p. xxix) that in calling space and time qualities or properties of God, he is using the words 'quality' and 'property' in an unusual sense.

The organization and editorial good judgment displayed in Alexander's edition make it a pleasure to use.

14. *An analytical approach.* Collingwood rejected "the view, commonly held by his Oxford teachers, that in studying the history of philosophy it is necessary to ask, first, 'What did Plato think?' and secondly, 'Was he right?'"⁶⁵ However, all the authors whose books are here under review have been at one in accepting the distinction that Collingwood rejects. But as to which question is the more important, they split neatly into two schools. Every single one of the authors reviewed up to this point is mainly concerned to ask, 'What did Leibniz think?'; and whether he was right is incidental and almost irrelevant to the other question. The other school has, at the present time, but one lonely member.⁶⁶

In writing on 'Leibniz and philosophical analysis,'⁶⁷ R. M. Yost, Jr. applies the thesis that Ayer broached in *Language, Truth, and Logic*, that a large part of traditional metaphysics—and all of that part of it that is valid—is really philosophical analysis in which the authors were analysts *malgré eux*. Among analysts, Yost seems to have been influenced most strongly by Russell (not merely his book on Leibniz but his whole life's work) and by Broad (especially his examination of McTaggart). But there is one aspect of Russell's work on Leibniz (his book and his 1903 review, see n. 34 supra), written while he was still positively

⁶⁵ R. G. Collingwood, *An Autobiography* (1939), pp. 68-72; *The Idea of History* (edited by T. M. Knox, 1946), p. 300. See also Knox's preface, p. xi, and Leo Strauss's discussion in this journal, V, p. 582 ff.

⁶⁶ I am speaking now of books. But I cannot refrain from citing Gustav Bergmann's recent article, "Russell's examination of Leibniz examined", *Philosophy of Science* 23, 175-203 (July 1956) a substantial contribution which while primarily concerned with the second question (and thus in the school of Russell and Broad), pays considerable attention to the first.

⁶⁷ *Leibniz and Philosophical Analysis* (University of California Publications in Philosophy, Volume 27: Berkeley and Los Angeles. 1954).

influenced by Bradley and McTaggart and before he had adopted the vicious-circle principle, an aspect which completely dropped out later and of which I have found no trace in Yost; this is the attention he paid to dialectical questions that involved self-reference or something like it. An age that has a renewed interest in dialectic and a somewhat reduced confidence in the unshakeable universality of the vicious-circle principle will surely not allow this aspect to lie dormant for long.

Yost says (p. 4) that Leibniz "did not clearly distinguish between the analysis of intuitional fields, i.e., the kind of activity practiced some time ago by analytical psychologists, and the analysis of concepts, especially concepts of specific intuitional fields". This is not accurate enough. It isn't that Leibniz was groping for the distinction but didn't quite get clear about it; the whole thrust of his philosophy was to deny and overthrow any such distinction. On p. 181 Yost says that Leibniz's ideal language would include some "primitive syncategorematic terms . . . at least a symbol for identity and symbols for alternation and conjunction." On the contrary, Leibniz's ideal language would include no primitive syncategorematic terms whatever, because the *primitive* terms of his *ideal* language were dictated by his ontology which allowed only concrete substances and their accidents. This discrepancy between Leibniz's ontology and his logic was brilliantly demonstrated by Russell (in part by dialectical considerations) and inspired Wittgenstein in the *Tractatus* to try to conceive an ideal language that really wouldn't have any primitive syncategorematic expressions. It is surprising to find an analyst overlooking these results. In his concluding section (pp. 204-06), Yost raises the most fundamental and, to my mind, his most interesting question about Leibniz's ideal language: "Is Leibniz' scheme for an ideal language compatible with his scheme for showing that it is usable?" The best language that is available to human beings he calls the language of cognition. The difficulty that he points out is that "if Leibniz' ideal language claims that its ontological commitments embrace everything there is, and yet the ontological commitments of his language of cognition embrace all this and more besides, then there is an incompatibility between

his scheme for an ideal language and his scheme for showing that it is usable by human beings" (p. 205).

In this passage Yost recurs to a problem that he has pressed throughout the book: what is the status of the complexes which we finite human beings are unable to resolve into their simples? Must they not be beings in their own right, somehow other than or additional to their ingredients? Yost's serious attention to this problem is one of the fine features of his book. In his last paragraph (p. 206), Yost poses a dilemma for Leibniz that involves another aspect of the same problem.

A statement of analysis will contain two kinds of expressions: *analysanda* and *analysantia* (and then a sign of identity connecting the two). Now, in which of Leibniz's two languages is a statement of analysis to be expressed? "If both kinds of expressions are formulated in Leibniz's ideal language, then statements of analysis would be trivial. But if both kinds of expressions are formulated in his language of cognition, then statements of analysis would be synthetic and *a priori*."

This is a neat dilemma. It would only require a slight twist or nuancing to make it into a dialectical objection of the kind Russell employed in his early work, namely by taking the proposition itself, 'Every proposition can be expressed either in the language of cognition or in the ideal language,' as an example of its own falsehood, owing to the fact that propositions of analysis have the function of *connecting* the one language to the other.

But whichever way we put the dilemma, it is a dilemma *for* some view. Our present question is, is it a dilemma for Leibniz? In asking this, we shift from the question 'Was Leibniz right?' to the question 'What did Leibniz say?' Certainly the latter question is logically prior, in that if Leibniz didn't say so-and-so, then the question whether Leibniz was right in saying so-and-so is obviously out of place. It becomes a question about some possible Leibniz, we might say, but not about the one and only actual Leibniz. In the present matter, closer attention to the actual Leibniz would lead us to bring into account his theory of points of view, and in particular the radical difference between the point of view of the infinite being, for whom all truths of analysis are

indeed trivial, and the points of view for all other beings, however intelligent; and it would carry us further into the question how such finite beings, e.g., Leibniz himself, can know so much about the viewpoint of the infinite being, a viewpoint which they cannot possibly share.

In the works under review, we have seen in fact a concentration on one or the other of the two questions about Leibniz: What did he say, and Was he right? The first is of no inherent interest; it is only a prelude to the second. The second has no independence; it cannot be asked without the first. That scholars tend to concentrate on one or the other member of the couple is a human weakness, but one that effort can surmount to some extent. The clear lesson of the past decade is that the two questions, though distinct, need to be asked together. This is a truth which is obvious—but not trivial.

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DISCUSSION

KARALIS AND OTHER MINDS

JOE ULLIAN

IN a recent issue of this *Review*¹ Mr. Karalis attempts to demonstrate that numerically identical acts of thought can occur in different minds, where numerical sameness is to be contrasted with mere similarity. His discussion raises several interesting points, and while I do not wish to dispute his conclusion I think it can be shown that his arguments are not so cogent as he imagines them to be.

Two acts of thought, indisputably, are either identical or distinct. How, Karalis asks, could we know them to be distinct? "Only if acts of thought are compared . . . can they be known to be different,"² and such comparison logically requires that both acts of thought be known by the person effecting the comparison. Hence, it is argued, I cannot know that your thought differs from mine unless I know your thought, and if I know your thought, it, and not merely a thought, similar to it, must be present to my mind. But surely this argument invokes an unduly high standard of knowledge. Suppose I find that eggplant will not grow in my garden. I perhaps suspect that the soil composition and moisture content there present are simply not conducive to the cultivation of eggplant, but since I know nothing of soil analysis this is as far as my thoughts go. And so I bring a sample of the soil from my garden to a soil analyst, a man trained in geology and agriculture and the pertinent branches of chemistry. After he has performed his analysis I return to his laboratory to be told exactly why it is that I cannot grow eggplant, and as I sit there awaiting his report I observe

¹ Nicholas Karalis, "Knowledge of Other Minds," this *Review*, IX (June 1956), 565-68.

² *Ibid.*, p. 566.

that he is gathering his thoughts together. Now I do not know what these thoughts are, but unless I have been seriously mistaken in judging the man's qualifications as a soil expert I at least know this: his thoughts are different from my own. He knows more than I do, and I can know that he knows more than I do—and therefore that he knows the truth of propositions which have never been known by me—without knowing what it is that he knows. I do not have to compare my knowledge directly with his, and much less do I need to have his knowledge in order to be in a position to know that there are differences between what he knows and what I know. And if it be insisted that in such a case I do not really *know* anything about the extent and kind of his knowledge but that I merely have strong reasons for believing certain things about them, then I ask how much that is short of mathematics can possibly qualify as knowledge.

Mr. Karalis would perhaps protest that I have missed his point. His discussion centers on cases where two persons might ordinarily be said to be believing, or to be thinking about, the same thing. You and I both believe that $2 + 2 = 4$; how can I know whether or not my act of thought is different from yours? I cannot know this, Karalis asserts, unless I know your thought, and I cannot know your thought unless I have it, in which case I have a thought which is identical with yours. But my thought is in *my* mind, while yours is in *your* mind, which is to say that their spatio-temporal contexts differ. Moreover, our thoughts differ in respect of their external relations, their relations to other thoughts, unless our mental histories be absolutely identical. So Karalis must consider such apparent differentiae to be merely accidental adjuncts of the acts of thought themselves. But then what sort of difference between our thoughts would allow them to be counted as numerically distinct? One begins to suspect that only difference in content would render our thoughts disparate on Karalis' analysis, and if this is so his thesis boils down to the rather drab pronouncement that different individuals can believe or doubt or disbelieve the same propositions.

But to return to Mr. Karalis' argument: let us suppose, as he does, that I do have to know both thoughts A and B in order to

know that they are distinct. Karalis claims that from this it follows that "the belief that acts of thought which occur in two different minds are not the same logically implies the belief which is its contradictory."³ But this is not so. What follows is simply that there can be no knowledge on, say, my part to the effect that you have a thought which is numerically distinct from every thought of mine. For had I such knowledge it would be necessary, on Karalis' premise, for me to have your thought, so that what I knew would be false, a contradiction. What is required for Karalis' argument is the additional premise that what cannot be known cannot be true. This is a premise with great plausibility, but it is certainly not a truth of logic. In fact it is just such applications of it as this which lead one to wonder whether it is a truth at all.

Is it possible that the mind of each human being has an element of uniqueness, in the sense that each human being has, at some point in his life, a thought which never has occurred and never will occur to any other mind? This does not seem to be a particularly fantastic hypothesis, and yet its truth would apparently be unknowable. Does this make it self-contradictory? One is reminded of the old sense-datum saws, perhaps first suggested by Professor Lewis. Suppose that our color spectra are exactly reversed, so that when you see red I see violet. Suppose that the perceived relations of the colors to one another and to other qualia, if colors are directly related to other qualia by bonds other than those like compresence, are the same for each of us. Then our quality spaces would be structurally, but only structurally, identical. If this were so we could never know, nor could anyone else, that we had differing impressions when we used the same color-words. Many who have written on the subject of sense-data have dismissed this sort of speculation as a kind of verbal travesty,⁴ and Mr. Karalis would perhaps join with them, even if not for the same reasons. What is to be emphasized is that

³ loc. cit.

⁴ See, for example, Mr. Paul's article "Is There a Problem About Sense-Data?" reprinted in *Logic and Language*, 1st series, ed. by A. G. N. Flew, 1955.

there are two moves which can be made here, and that to dismiss each apparent instance of a possible truth which would be unknowable if true as either a contradiction or a case of linguistic derailment is to choose one of the moves rather than the other. The alternative is simply to acknowledge that there may be unknowable truths, an acknowledgment which at least has the virtue of humility.

Karalis offers a second demonstration of his thesis, but it too is open to criticism. In fact a crucial step of the argument is manifestly fallacious: "Since only non-natural events which can occur twice in time as numerically the same can be true or false, and since an act of belief is a non-natural event which can occur twice in time, it follows that an act of belief can be true or false."⁵ This is like arguing that since only persons over thirty-five can be president of the United States, and since Anthony Eden is over thirty-five, it follows that he can be president.

And so it is my conclusion that Mr. Karalis has fallen short of fulfilling his stated purpose, which was "to prove that we have knowledge of other minds."⁶ He has succeeded, however, in making his thesis at least plausible, and, what is much more important, he has brought his ingenuity to bear upon a kind of problem which is too much neglected in contemporary metaphysics.

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⁵ *Op cit.*, p. 568.

⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 565.

TILlich'S DISTINCTION BETWEEN METAPHYSICS AND THEOLOGY

HENRY VEATCH

REMARKABLE though it is for its versatility and suggestiveness, I still wonder if Professor Tillich's discussion of metaphysics and theology¹ may not be somewhat unclear in its central thesis. For it would almost seem as if Professor Tillich had made out such an exceedingly good case for the intimate relationship between metaphysics and theology as actually to threaten their distinguishability.

Thus if I understand him correctly, Prof. Tillich professes to find the root of the distinction between the two disciplines in theology's peculiar orientation toward the existential situation or "concrete place" (p. 58) at which or in which the divine ground of being has manifested itself. This it is that is at once theology's point of departure, as well as its ultimate point of reference. In contrast, metaphysics and ontology are represented as being rather frigidly objective by comparison, indifferent to their own existential origins and directed rather "towards the observation and analysis of the categorical structure of being and its general spheres" (p. 59).

And yet I wonder if such a way of differentiating theology from metaphysics, for all of its plausibility and convenience, is really adequate. For one thing, one cannot help suspecting that such a characterization of metaphysics and ontology is less a characterization of the metaphysical enterprise as such than it is a characterization of the way that enterprise has sometimes been conducted by certain overly complacent metaphysicians. For while many of the latter have doubtless written and spoken as if they fancied themselves to be seated on the throne of God, this fact would seem to be more indicative of what metaphysicians

¹ See this *Review*, X (September, 1956), 57-63.

ought to avoid than it is an indication of what the differentia of metaphysics itself really is.

Indeed, Prof. Tillich himself seems to recognize that right within the domain of philosophy—yes, in first philosophy and ontology even—it is quite possible that one's original concern for philosophy may have sprung from an initial shock or arrest that one may have received from the ground of being—a shock that may involve an actual conversion or turning about, and that may have been mediated through the protreptic of a teacher—a Socrates, an Epicurus, an Augustine, a Bergson, a Whitehead, perhaps. Not only that, but just as the theologian must always refer his explanations and interpretations back to the experience of divine self-manifestation which is the source and norm of all his activity, so also has it not often been suggested that many a philosopher's total activity is entirely centered around and controlled by certain basic insights and awarenesses that presumably precipitated his philosophical activity in the first place?

"But," Prof. Tillich might counter, "all this has to do only with the existential origins and the continuing existential sources of a particular man's metaphysics or ontology. However, when one looks at such a metaphysics or ontology, considered as a finished system and an ordered science, then it will become apparent that it is of the very nature of metaphysics to deal only with the 'universal-essential,' to the neglect of the 'concrete-existential'" (p. 58).

Yet, surely this won't do either. For again, while it is easy enough to find metaphysical systems which have disregarded the concrete-existential in favor of the universal-essential, this would seem to be a comment simply on the inadequacy of those systems rather than on metaphysics itself. Indeed, no sooner do people begin to recognize that being involves the concrete-existential quite as much as the universal-essential, than the consequence seems to be not a discarding of metaphysics for theology, so much as a reorientation in metaphysics. Nor am I speaking here merely of Heidegger and Sartre. For one might likewise say of such diverse and heterogeneous figures as Aristotle, Locke, and Bergson that each tried in his own way, though with what success had

perhaps best be left unsaid, to orient metaphysics at least toward the concrete, if not also toward the existential. Not only that, but many of us today would say that "this unity of the concrete-existential and the universal-essential" (p. 58), so far from being the thing that "gives theology its special position," is really the proper concern of metaphysics. In fact, it might be said that the really pressing and urgent problem that confronts metaphysics right now is none other than that of trying to understand and explain this very unity.

Suppose then it be granted that Prof. Tillich cannot make good his attempted differentiation of theology from metaphysics on the ground of the one's being existence-directed, the other world-directed (p. 60); of the one's requiring existential involvement, the other analytic detachment (p. 62); of the one's being concerned with the concrete-existential, the other with the universal-essential. Does that mean that Prof. Tillich is left altogether without resource, so far as the distinction of theology from metaphysics is concerned? Hardly. For there remains the more traditional ground of distinction in terms of the notion of revelation. Nor does Prof. Tillich seem averse to falling back on such a mode of differentiation. Theology, he says, is "dependent on revelation" (p. 60), and "revelation," he explains, "is the self-manifestation of ultimate reality in ecstatic experiences, expressed in symbols." Now certainly no one would think of speaking of metaphysics in any such language as this. Accordingly, may we then say that for Prof. Tillich the distinctive thing about theology is that it bases itself upon revelation, while metaphysics can appeal only to a strictly and properly human experience as that is illuminated by the merely natural light of reason?

But again the matter would appear to be not quite so simple, the minute we scrutinize Prof. Tillich's words a little more closely. For revelation, we are told, is not to be "taken in the distorted sense of authoritative divine information" (p. 60). Perhaps not. But faith, too, we are told, is not "belief in statements without evidence" (p. 62). Again, perhaps not. But then what has happened to the distinction between theology and metaphysics? For if faith be merely "the state of being ultimately concerned"

(p. 62), surely any and every philosopher or metaphysician worthy of the name must experience just such a concern, and must experience it precisely *qua* philosopher or metaphysician. And does not Prof. Tillich acknowledge as much himself, when subsequently he proceeds to characterize the double risk that is run by the theologian as well as the philosopher in such a way as to leave them practically indistinguishable?

And in similar fashion, it would seem possible to push our query as to what there is about revelation as Prof. Tillich describes it, that would make it distinctive of theology. True, such revelation is said to take place "in ecstatic experiences, expressed in symbols." Nor is there any doubt but that the religious data, as they might be called, with which the theologians would seem to be properly concerned are characteristically couched in mythical, figurative and symbolic language. But then the question arises as to what is to be the norm or standard for the interpretation of such religious symbols. Is it to be a purely philosophical standard or a properly theological one? Now as I read him, Prof. Tillich would seem to incline in the direction of answering this question in such a way as to make philosophy the final arbiter of the meaning of religious truth and to deprive theology of any real or ultimate autonomy of its own.

Now I am not speaking here of Prof. Tillich's altogether legitimate insistence that theology must make use of philosophy instrumentally, availing itself alike of philosophical language and philosophical ideas. This much would be admitted on all hands, save possibly by the most extreme of the biblically oriented theologians, as Prof. Tillich calls them. No, the question is not one as to whether philosophy can sometimes perhaps be instrumental to theology; rather the question is one as to whether theology in such a context can claim to be ultimately and finally architectonic with respect to the philosophy or philosophies that serve it.

Indeed, in this connection one cannot but be reminded of the somewhat old-fashioned, but none-the-less quite straightforward, way of distinguishing theology from philosophy, according to which theology is supposed to rest on truths that surpass and outrun the comprehension of our finite human reason. As

a result, such truths can only be revealed to man; they cannot be discovered by him. Likewise, and for the same reason, man's acceptance of these truths must needs be merely on faith; it cannot be because their truth has been made evident to him either immediately or by demonstration.

But at once I can imagine Prof. Tillich protesting that all this is simply to take revelation "in the distorted sense of authoritative divine information" and faith in the equally distorted sense of "belief in statements without evidence." Maybe so. But at least by so doing, we would seem to have provided ourselves with a clear-cut and readily understandable distinction between theology and philosophy, whereas on Prof. Tillich's view one becomes suspicious lest the proper role of theology is simply to submit itself to philosophic interpretation and eventually to undergo what Prof. Tillich has elsewhere very aptly dubbed "philosophic transformation" (*Systematic Theology*, pp. 230 ff.).

It's true, of course, that in the context of what might be called the absolute and the eternal there can presumably be no final difference between theology and philosophy. After all, it is scarcely to be supposed that God Himself needs to have certain truths revealed to Him, which truths in turn he can do no other than simply accept on faith. And even we ourselves may be in a condition of now "seeing through a glass darkly, but then face to face." But whatever may be the promise for us in the hereafter or in the New Jerusalem, such is not our present condition; and the instant question would seem to be as to just how theology and philosophy are to be distinguished from one another in this present condition of ours. And this, I am afraid, is just what is not made clear by Prof. Tillich's exposition.

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BOOKS RECEIVED

SUMMARIES AND COMMENTS *

ALVIN PLANTINGA AND STAFF

D'ALVIELLA, COUNT GOBLET. *The Migration of Symbols*. Introduction by Sir George Birdwood. New York: University Books, 1956. xxiii, 277 pp. \$5.00—A welcome re-issue of a pioneer study first published in 1894. The author explains the recurrence of certain basic Eurasian decorative motifs—e.g., the triskelion, the swastika, and the caduceus—by tracing their migration from one culture to another. The range of the author's archaeological samples is very wide, and a wealth of illustrations allows the reader to check on his inductive claims; the archaeological and historical evidence is well integrated. — C. M.

ALBERTI, LEON BATTISTA. *On Painting*, tr. with Introduction and Notes by John R. Spencer. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1956. 141 pp. \$3.50—Alberti's *Della pittura* was the first, and in many ways the most important, of the Renaissance treatises on painting, elaborating as it does the theoretical backgrounds of the influential new art of 15th-century Florence. This edition presents the work with distinction. The translation—the first in English since 1755—is based upon the known manuscript sources, and has been provided with a helpful introduction and notes. Diagrams serve to clarify Alberti's accounts of perspective. — V. C. C.

ARISTOTLE. *De Anima*, ed. by Sir David Ross. Oxford Library of Classical Writers. New York: Oxford University Press, 1956. ix, 110 pp. \$2.40—Conformably to the practice of the series to which this edition belongs, the critical apparatus accompanying the Greek text is simplified, reporting (in the main) only the readings of the six oldest manuscripts, except for eighteen passages on which the readings are given more fully, as samples. In his Latin preface Sir David briefly evaluates the Greek commentators and reports the contributions of the Western editors, particularly Torstrik (1862). In the text he proposes a number of readings of his own, and his edition (besides being elegant, handy, and reasonably priced) will be of value to scholars as well as to students. — R. W.

* Books received will be acknowledged in this section by a brief resumé, report, or criticism. Such acknowledgement does not preclude more detailed examination in a subsequent Critical Study. The summaries and comments will be written by the Managing Editor and his staff of assistants, with the occasional help of others. Reports have been contributed, in this issue, by V. C. Chappell, Omar K. Moore, and Rulon Wells.

- ARISTOTLE. *Parva Naturalia*, ed. by Sir David Ross. New York: Oxford University Press, 1955. xl, 355 pp. \$7.20—Sir David Ross, now nearing his eightieth birthday (April 15, 1957) has published another of his valuable critical texts, provided, like its predecessors, with a commentary. He has made full use of the contributions of Drossaert Lulofs, Forster and Nuyens, at the same time judging them with an independent mind and adding views and arguments of his own. This book greatly facilitates the study of these physiological-psychological treatises which form so indispensable a supplement to the *De Anima*. — R. W.
- BAGEHOT, WALTER. *Physics and Politics*. Boston: Beacon Press, 1956. xvii, 164 pp. \$1.25—Subtitled "Thoughts on the Application of the Principles of 'Natural Selection' and 'Inheritance' to Political Society," this book first appeared in 1867, but still offers insight into social psychology and the nature of civilization. The biographical introduction is by Hans Kohn. — E. T.
- BAUDELAIRE, CHARLES. *The Essence of Laughter and Other Essays*, ed. by Peter Quennell. New York: Meridian Books, 1956. 223 pp. \$1.35—A handy volume containing representative selections from all of Baudelaire's major works except *Les fleurs du mal*, including *Le peintre de la vie moderne* and *De l'essence du rire* in entirety, and selections from *Les paradis artificiels*, *Petits poèmes en prose*, his journals and notebooks, and his letters to his mother. The editor supplies a short introduction, largely biographical. — D. S.
- BAUDELAIRE, CHARLES. *The Mirror of Art: Critical Studies*, tr. and ed. by Jonathan Mayne. Anchor Books, A 84. Garden City: Doubleday and Co., 1956. xxi, 370 pp. \$1.45—Baudelaire's art criticism in a generous paperback sampling. Included are reviews of the salons of 1845, 1846, and 1859, the essay "On the Essence of Laughter," and a study of Delacroix. Many of the art works mentioned in the text are pictured in the volume's 64 pages of illustrations. — V. C. C.
- BEAUFRET, JEAN. *Le poème de Parménide*. Epiméthée: Essais Philosophiques. Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1955. viii, 93 pp. 444 fr.—A new translation of Parmenides' poem, preceded by a long introduction. M. Beaufret's attitude towards, and interpretation of, the Parmenidean fragments have been influenced heavily by Heidegger, as has, in some cases, his choice of readings. The Greek is included, however, on pages facing the translation, and departures from the standard text of Kranz are noted. — V. C. C.
- BOCHENSKI, I. M. *Contemporary European Philosophy*, tr. by Donald Nicholl and Karl Aschenbrenner. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1956. xviii, 326 pp. \$5.00—In brief compass, this book gives most helpful summaries of the leading philosophical influences of our day, both by individuals and by schools. "Contemporary" is taken to mean

"since the First World War," and "European" means "mostly French and German," though there are separate chapters on Russell, Croce, and Whitehead, and mention is made of James and Dewey. An unusually comprehensive bibliography is included. — D. R.

BOTERO, GIOVANNI. *The Reason of State*, tr. by P. J. and D. P. Waley; *The Greatness of Cities*, tr. by Robert Peterson. Introduction by D. P. Waley. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1956. xv, 298 pp. \$5.50—This translation of Botero's sixteenth century work, supposedly an attack on Machiavelli, is based on the Italian edition of 1948. The work is written as 'advice to the Prince' and covers a variety of subjects from the construction of fortresses to the morality of the ruler. The principal theme is the necessity for the restoration of morality to politics. Because of the importance of the Counter-reformation in Botero's time, special attention is also given to the role of the church and religion in the securing of an ideal state. — J. E. B.

BOULDING, KENNETH. *The Image*. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1956. 175 pp. \$3.75—By using certain basic tools of analysis of modern information theory, particularly the principle of feed-back, the author tries to develop what might be called a new Logic of Appearance—Eiconics. Eiconics is the science—not the philosophy—which is to study how individuals, cultures, and cultural sub-groups attain to their respective "images," i.e., to those belief-constellations which, functioning somewhat analogously to the control of—say—a thermostat, determine what messages are taken as significant; significance may consist in behavioral consequences, or "outgoing messages," or it may consist in modification of the "control" mechanism, the image, itself. Having shown examples of the role of the "image" in economics, politics, history, and natural science, the author concludes by raising some questions concerning the epistemological implications of his new science. — C. M.

CARLSTON, KENNETH S. *Law and Structures of Social Action*. New York: Columbia University Press, 1956. xii, 288 pp. \$5.50—This work is primarily a study of law as a sociological factor, culminating at the level of internationalism. It is most valuable as a study of the historical and societal factors involved in legal behavior. The necessity for the exercise of responsible freedom on the part of every person, group, and state in order to achieve this goal is stressed throughout. — J. E. B.

CARNAP, RUDOLF. *Meaning and Necessity: A Study in Semantics and Modal Logic*. 2nd Ed. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1956. x, 258 pp. \$5.00—Five recent journal articles—including "Meaning and Synonymy in Natural Language" and "Empiricism, Semantics and Ontology"—have been appended to the main study as it first appeared in 1947, to form this second edition. The articles serve as a kind of commentary on key sections of the original work, interpreting and clarifying, sometimes modifying, a number of its doctrines. — V. C. C.

CASTELLI, ENRICO. *L'indagine quotidiana*. Roma: Fratelli Bocca, 1956. 206 pp.—A philosophical diary, bringing together the previously published "Prelude to the Life of an Ordinary Man," "Commentary on Common Sense," and "Common Experience," with a new essay, "The Right Time." — A. R.

CHAPMAN, JOHN W. *Rousseau—Totalitarian or Liberal?* New York: Columbia University Press, 1956. viii, 154 pp. \$3.25—The author's thesis is that Rousseau is fundamentally a liberal with a streak of totalitarian sentiment. Confusion within Rousseau's thought between freedom and social cohesion, individuality and patriotism, as well as a confusion of moral and political freedom, give rise to the dual emphasis. Although he centers upon a genuine problem for Rousseau, the author fails to recognize the importance of the general will as a means of solving the conflicts he notes. — J. E. B.

COHEN, MORRIS R. *A Preface to Logic*. New York: Meridian Books, 1956. 244 pp. \$1.25—An attractive paperback reprint of Cohen's illuminating studies in the philosophy of logic. — A. C. P.

DEFERRARI, ROY J., and SISTER M. INVOLATA BARRY. *A Complete Index to the Summa Theologica of St. Thomas Aquinas*. Washington: Catholic University of America Press, 1956. ix, 336 pp. \$20.00—An index listing all the places in which words occur in Thomas' *Summa Theologica*. Only philosophically indifferent words have been omitted. — R. G. S.

DOBZHANSKY, THEODOSIUS. *The Biological Basis of Human Freedom*. Page Barbour Lectures for 1954 at the University of Virginia. New York: Columbia University Press, 1956. 144 pp. \$2.95—The author argues that biological evolution and genetic determinants rather than prohibiting or providing purpose make man's freedom and creation of his own purpose possible. Numerous interesting and well-illustrated corrections of misconceptions of biological theory are provided; some are commonplace, but others are genuinely enlightening. — J. R.

DONNELLY, MORWENNA. *Founding the Life Divine: An Introduction to the Integral Yoga of Sri Aurobindo*. New York: Hawthorne Books, 1956. 246 pp. \$3.95—Based on personal acquaintance with the master and a study of his works, this book provides an excellent introduction to the thought of one of the great spiritual leaders of our time. A. Basu contributes a helpful foreword. — D. R.

FESTUGIÈRE, A. J., C. P. *Epicurus and His Gods*, tr. by C. W. Chilton. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1956. xii, 100 pp. \$2.25—An English translation of an historically oriented inquiry into Epicurean thought concerning religion. The theme of *ataraxia* and its consistency with a belief in the existence of the gods is developed in relation to Epicurus' thought concerning friendship, religion, and the Stoic doctrine which grew out of Plato's *Timaeus*. — J. E. B.

- FICHTE, JOHANN GOTTLIEB. *The Vocation of Man*, ed. with Introduction by Roderick H. Chisolm. The Library of Liberal Arts, No. 50. New York: Liberal Arts Press, 1956. xx, 154 pp. \$0.75—A welcome reprint of this neglected classic in a modernized version of William Smith's translation. The editor's introduction summarizes the argument and places the book in its context among Fichte's other works. — D. R.
- FREUD, SIGMUND. *Delusion and Dream and Other Essays*. Boston: Beacon Press, 1956. 238 pp. \$1.45—The title essay of this volume is a study of Wilhelm Jensen's *Gradiva: a Pompeiian Fancy*, the text of which is printed as an appendix. Three other very brief essays by Freud on related topics are included. In his introduction, Philip Rieff shows that Freud "looked not for evidence but for meaning" and this helps us to understand how a fictional character could as legitimately serve his purposes as an actual case history. — D. R.
- FRY, ROGER. *Vision and Design*. New York: Meridian Books, 1956. 302 pp. \$1.35—A photographic reprint of the 1920 edition of Fry's graceful essays on painting, sculpture, and the principles of aesthetics criticism. — A. C. P.
- GARDEIL, H. D., O. P. *Introduction to the Philosophy of St. Thomas Aquinas*. Vol. III, *Psychology*. St. Louis: B. Herder Book Co., 1953. xiii, 303 pp. \$4.00—The first volume of this French textbook series to appear in English. Gardeil's exposition is usually in the form of a paraphrase of Thomas' conclusions on questions raised by Aristotle's *De Anima*, but he also treats the more peculiarly thomistic problems of knowledge of individuals, the soul, and God. The Value of this work as an introduction to Thomas' psychology is enhanced by the inclusion of almost sixty pages of texts in an appendix. — R. F. T.
- GNOLI, RANIERO. *The Aesthetic Experience According to Abhinavagupta*. Serie Orientale Roma, Vol. XI. Roma: Istituto Italiano per il Medio ed Estremo Oriente, 1956. xxxii, 122 pp. L. 5,000—Presents the Sanskrit text, together with an English translation by Gnoli, of the tenth century treatises by Abhinavagupta. The text, called the most recent "creative stimulus" to the study of aesthetics in India, is in the form of a commentary on the fourth- or fifth-century work attributed to Bharata, concerned with instructions for the production of drama. As the translator's introduction states, this early manuscript has been a unique source in the development of Indian aesthetic thought. — E. T.
- GRUNSKY, HANS. *Jacob Boehme*. Stuttgart: Fr. Frommanns Verlag, 1956. 348 pp.—In this exposition of Boehme's key conceptions, the author tries to show that the seventeenth-century Silesian mystic's work can and should be viewed as an original, coherent philosophic system. Includes detailed biographical sketch, bibliography, indexes, illustrations and diagrams. — C. M.

GUZZO, AUGUSTO. *La Scienza*. Biblioteca di Filosofia, X. Torino, Italy: Edizioni di "Filosofia," 1955. cxlii, 528 pp. L. 3,000—A study of the epistemological presuppositions of science, with discussions of the relation of science to mathematics, and the relative value of inductive and constructive methods. Part Two is a history of scientific method from Pythagoras to Einstein. Part Three develops a theory of the relation of science to nature, attempting to determine man's place in nature and to analyse the degree to which he is independent of nature. — A. R.

HALL, A. R. *The Scientific Revolution, 1500-1800: The Formation of the Modern Scientific Attitude*. Boston: Beacon Press, 1957. xvii, 390 pp. \$1.75—A detailed scholarly history of natural science during the centuries when the modern scientific attitude was formed. The author is specially interested in contrasting Greek and medieval science with the modern. While stating some of the continuities between the old and the new conceptions of nature, he sees modern science as making a decisive break with the procedures and theories of the past. Its chief advances, among others, were the removal of magic and esoteric mystery from science, and its insistence on rigorous standards of observing and experimenting. The detailed learning which this volume exemplifies makes it a valuable guide to the scientific literature of the sixteenth, seventeenth, and eighteenth centuries. — C. L.

HARRIS, ROBERT T., and JARRETT, JAMES L. *Language and Informal Logic*. New York: Longmans, Green and Co., 1956. viii, 274 pp. \$3.50—This well-written work is apparently intended for the secondary school student or the layman interested in the problems of communication. The "cautious attitude" the authors take toward many classifications, ancient and modern, is admirable. Problems, exercises, and sources for advanced reading are included. — R. P.

HEIMSOETH, HEINZ. *Studien zur Philosophie Immanuel Kants: Metaphysische Ursprünge und ontologische Grundlagen*. Köln: Kölner Universitäts-Verlag, 1956. xi, 257 pp. DM17—This volume brings together flux essays by an eminent scholar on the origins, development, and import of Kant's philosophy, chiefly in its metaphysical aspects. Four of these were separately published between 1924 and 1926, but until now have been difficult to obtain, despite great demand. Their appearance here will be welcomed. The thesis emerging from these studies is that the critical philosophy originates in metaphysical probings concerning the nature and presuppositions of being, and issues in doctrines which, despite psychological, epistemological, and ethical presentation, are intended to have definite ontological import. — L. K. B.

HOURLANI, GEORGE F. *Ethical Value*. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1956. 233 pp. \$4.50—The thesis of this essay in philosophical analysis is that ethical words are used referentially, that for the most

part they have a single unitary sense, and that they refer to whatever is "happy-making" or satisfying. The author supports this conclusion by means of detailed refutations of some of the criticisms brought against naturalism, paying special attention to the "naturalistic fallacy" argument as developed by Moore, Ewing and the contemporary non-cognitivists. He concludes that philosophical analysis ought to reject the "method of introspection" in favor of inductive inquiries into the ways in which as a matter of fact people use ethical words. — A. C. P.

JANKÉLÉVITCH, VLADIMIR. *L'austérité de la vie morale*. Paris: Flammarion, 1956. 251 pp.—A scholarly and imaginative contribution to ethics and aesthetics. The author sees in certain types of abstract art an affectation of austerity which he interprets as compensation in the aesthetic realm for moral lassitude, and a symptom of the decadence which characterizes our age. Decadence is natural and inevitable; in fact, everything is decadence, but in some ages, notably ours, decadence becomes monstrous. The author distinguishes two types of austerity: the limited and rational, and the infinite. Rational austerity is the austerity of the scientist, who denies himself everything but abstract relationships. Through this austerity, the aesthetic and moral realms are joined, in a Platonic fashion; but when this sort of austerity is applied to ethics, it results in a stylized and unproductive ethics. It is necessary to turn to infinite austerity, in which it is seen that the moral "cure" is itself a further "malady," but a malady which is a continuous cure. Even infinite austerity, however, is not enough; in the end, "C'est l'amour qui importe, non l'austérité." — D. S.

KANT, IMMANUEL. *Werke*, ed. by Wilhelm Weischedel. Bd. II, *Kritik der reinen Vernunft*. Wiesbaden: Insel-Verlag, 1956. 724 pp. DM 22—The first-published volume of a new Kant edition, which is to include, in six volumes, all the works published during Kant's lifetime. The editor has modernized Kant's text to some extent, but only where he thought no question of interpretation to be involved. Despite its compactness, the volume contains both versions of all the sections and passages which differed in the *Kritik's* first two editions; a number of variant readings, suggested by the editor's predecessors, have been recorded in footnotes. The edition as a whole promises to carry out admirably its intended function of a *Studienausgabe* — V. C. C.

KANAL, S. P. *Dialogues on Indian Culture*. Delhi: Panchals Press Publications, 1956. vi, 92 pp.—Non-dialectical dialogues in which a professor, after defining culture in terms of the ideals of a society, attempts to explain to his students the meaning of basic Indian ideals: Karma, Artha, Dharma, Moksha, the four stages of life and social institutions of the Vedic age (1000 B. C.). These ideals are presented uncritically, with the general reader in mind. — D. S.

- KIERKEGAARD, SOREN. *Attack Upon "Christendom."* Boston: Beacon Press, 1956. xviii, 303 pp. \$1.45—A paperback of the 1943 translation of Kierkegaard's last work. In it the author brilliantly satirizes the established church as he knew it. — E. T.
- KLUBACK, WILLIAM. *Wilhelm Dilthey's Philosophy of History.* Columbia Studies in the Social Sciences, No. 592. New York: Columbia University Press, 1956. x, 118 pp. \$3.00—An intellectual biography, sketching the development from Dilthey, the theologian, to Dilthey, the philosopher of history and culture. The major intellectual influences are presented in the variegated setting of the contemporary scholarly community and the dominant modes of thought and controversies in that community. A systematic exposition of Dilthey's thought follows. Altogether a lucid and interesting introduction to Dilthey. — R. G. S.
- KNOX, CRAWFORD. *The Idiom of Contemporary Thought.* London: Chapman and Hall, 1956. x, 206 pp. 18 s.—Based largely on popular scientific, psychological, and anthropological material, this essay attempts to unify the facts of experience and morality in terms of an underlying spiritual medium. This medium is variously identified with God, pure consciousness, and Brahman. — R. F. T.
- KRONER, RICHARD. *Speculation in Pre-Christian Philosophy.* Philadelphia: Westminster Press, 1956. 251 pp. \$5.75—The first volume of a projected three volume series, this book is at once a history of ancient philosophy and an attempt to explore and defend the thesis that "what is called Greek ontology was not only a strictly logical, but also a religious, concern." The following two volumes of the series will deal with medieval and modern philosophy from the perspective of the relation between speculation and revelation. Kroner argues that speculative philosophy and revealed religion, although exhibiting ineradicable differences of approach, fundamentally deal with the same problem, viz., the "apprehension of the Ultimate"; and that the history of philosophy is best understood in terms of the relations between these approaches. The argument is rich in insight and is developed with real power; but at crucial points there is a lack of clarity which detracts somewhat from the force of the book. — A. C. P.
- VAN LAER, P. HENRY. *The Philosophy of Science.* Pittsburgh: Duquesne University, 1956. xvii, 164 pp. \$3.75—This first volume of a projected two volume work deals with "science in general," which is understood to include theology and philosophy. The first two chapters analyze the concept of a science and issue in a descriptive definition which is then developed in subsequent chapters; among the topics of this development are abstraction as an intellectual operation, the necessity of scientific statements, induction and deduction, hypothesis and theory. The book presents neither an investigation of particular sciences nor epistemological arguments in the modern mode, but rather a finished doctrine, not original in conception, but competent in development,

frankly building upon an assumed realist-hylomorphist base a scheme of deliberate abstractness and rigid formality. — L. K. B.

MAHADEVAN, T. M. P. *The Idea of God in Saiva-Siddhanta*. Annamalaiar: Annamalai University, 1955. 43 pp.—Four lectures, delivered at Allahabad and Benares in 1953. They present a straightforward summary of the basic principles of Saiva-Siddhanta, with emphasis on its versions of the cosmological and moral arguments for the existence of God and on the highest function of God as the redeemer of Souls. — D. R.

MAISELS, M. *Thought and Truth*, tr. by A. Regelson. New York: Bookman Associates, 1956. 359 pp. \$5.00—An extensive essay in philosophical anthropology. The author maintains that "... man is himself the absoluteness of being, and the entire world is his impression and his truth." He then tries to show that the history of philosophy and the history of religion confirm and illustrate this view. The historical and illustrative material predominates; as a result the author's central contentions receive less than adequate development and clarification. — A. C. P.

MARCEL, G. *Royce's Metaphysics*, tr. by Virginia and Gordon Ringer. Chicago: Regnery, 1956. xix, 180 pp. \$4.50—An early work of Marcel's, mainly expository, written because he held that a contemporary philosopher cannot reflect on questions of time and eternity and of the nature of the individual without close scrutiny of Royce's solution. Marcel develops Royce's conception of absolute idealism from the analysis of certain perennial problems of epistemology. The problematic approach lends cogency to a lucid exposition. — R. G. S.

MARX, CARL. *The Poverty of Philosophy*. Moscow: Foreign Languages Publishing House [London: Lawrence & Wishart Ltd.], 1955. 266 pp. 3s.—Marx's extended reply to Prudon's *Philosophy of Poverty*. The (anonymous) translation is based on the first (French) edition of 1847, but embodies the corrections made by Engels for the German editions of 1885 and 1892. Engels' two prefaces, together with other material relevant to the book's occasion and content, are also included. — V. C. C.

MEREDITH, GEORGE and HENRI BERGSON. *Comedy: An Essay on Comedy* [Meredith]; *Laughter* [Bergson], ed. with Introduction and Appendix by Wylie Sypher. Anchor Books, A87. Garden City: Doubleday and Co., 1956. xvi, 260 pp. \$0.95—Two celebrated essays on the comic, reprinted together with a long appendix written for this volume by the editor. The appendix itself, bulging with learned references, is a comprehensive essay on the place of comedy in the human situation, past and present. — V. C. C.

MILL, JOHN STUART. *On Liberty*, ed. with an Introduction by Corrin V. Shields. The Library of Liberal Arts, No. 61. New York: Liberal Arts Press, 1956. xxviii, 141 pp. \$0.65—A new edition of a famous classic,

printed with elegance and taste. Mr. Shields' introduction succinctly reviews Mill's life and work, outlines the essay, and points up some of its problems. — V. C. C.

MILLER, PERRY. *Errand into the Wilderness*. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1956. x, 244 pp. \$ 4.75—A collection of ten essays and addresses, all but one of which have been published previously. Among them is a fascinating essay showing that Jonathan Edwards consciously developed his homiletical methods in terms of Locke's psychology and epistemology. These pieces constitute "a rank of spotlights on the massive narrative of the movement of the European culture into the vacant wilderness of America"; each is prefaced by a newly written introduction indicating its relevance to the unifying theme of the volume, viz., "the obsessive American drama: nature vs. civilization." It is this attempt to civilize nature that constitutes the "errand into the wilderness." The volume is dominated throughout by Miller's conviction that intellectual history is as crucial to the understanding of a nation or a culture as is social or economic history; and the illumination which the essays actually afford is compelling evidence for his conviction. — A. C. P.

MORRIS, CHARLES. *Varieties of Human Value*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1956. xv, 208 pp. \$5.00—An extension of the author's earlier works, *Paths of Life* and *The Open Self*. The primary data of the present study are the opinions expressed by college students of six nations concerning thirteen possible "ways to live." The data-collection procedures leave something to be desired, though the analysis of the students' responses is both careful and illuminating. One important result is the isolation of five value dimensions by factor analysis. The author offers his study as "... an attempt to bring the socio-humanistic disciplines within the scope of the program of unified science." — O. K. M.

LEONARD NELSON. *System of Ethics*, tr. by Norbert Guterman. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1956. xxiii, 284 pp. \$5.00—Part of the second volume of a three volume work, this book is an attempt to deduce the consequences of the basic principles formulated in Nelson's *Critique of Practical Reason* (the first volume, which was published in 1917). The author is perhaps best known in this country in connection with the Nelson-Grelling paradox; his ethical position is Kantian in general outline. He holds that philosophical ethics is a scientific enterprise in the sense that rigorous logical methods are appropriate to it, though it is independent both of physical science and of metaphysics. Accordingly, his ethical system is developed in terms of deductions "from such *sui generis* and indefinable concepts as "duty" and "ideal." Nelson's philosophic method is uncompromisingly rationalistic. And though his case is stated for the most part with clarity and incisiveness, it is to be regretted that this volume does not include a translation of the crucial sections of his *Critique of Practical Reason* in which

he deals with some of the questions arising from this way of doing ethics. — A. C. P.

NORRIS, LOUIS WILLIAM. *A Philosophy of Tensions Among Values*. Chicago: Regnery, 1956. x, 242 pp. \$4.50—This book claims to state a "method of polarity" whereby philosophy can be advanced significantly. This method presupposes a conception of knowledge as rooted in value and of truth as encompassing contrary or "contrapletive" positions. Finding in experience irreducible oppositions demanding a definite method of treatment, it prescribes for this a "calculus," which is then applied to "typical philosophical problems." A vast amount of reading—somewhat over-documented by more than four hundred citations and references—are brought to bear rather externally on the problems treated, which themselves are hardly more than posed in terms of the polarity concept. — L. K. B.

PIAZZESE, ANTONIO. *Principi di filosofia*. Placenza: Casa Editrice La Nostra Tribuna, 1956. 247 pp.—This book attempts to place the problems of logic, epistemology, science, history, and ethics on a new scientific basis. — A. R.

PLATO. *Phaedrus*, tr. with an Introduction by W. C. Helmholtz and W. G. Rabinowitz. The Library of Liberal Arts, No. 40. New York: Liberal Arts Press, 1956. xvii, 75 pp. \$0.60—A smooth and natural translation, with footnotes to explain lost Greek puns and point out apparent interpolations in the original text. The introduction seems gratuitous and sometimes overblown. — V. C. C.

PLATO. *Protagoras*, tr. by B. Jowett, revised by Martin Ostwald; ed. with an Introduction by Gregory Vlastos. The Library of Liberal Arts. New York: Liberal Arts Press, 1956. lviii, 69 pp. \$0.75—Jowett's *Protagoras* has been revised extensively for this new edition, and helpful section titles have been provided. The editor's fifty-page introduction could stand alone; it is a solid and scholarly examination, with footnotes, cross-references, and logical analyses, of the great Socrates-Protagoras quarrel. — V. C. C.

ROSSI, PIETRO. *La storicismo tedesco contemporaneo*. Torino: Giulio Einaudi Editore, 1956. 543 pp.—A study of post-Hegelian German historicism. There are chapters on Dilthey, Windelband, Rickert, Simmel, Weber, Spengler, Troeltsch, and Meinecke. The development of historicism as a form of Romanticism which treats history as a realization of an absolute principle, to its use as a justification for the relativity of values is traced, and its return to "the affirmation of the absolute" in the work of Troeltsch and Meinecke analyzed. — A. R.

DE ROUGEMONT, DENIS. *Love in the Western World*, tr. by Montgomery Belgion. New York: Pantheon, 1956. 336 pp. \$4.50—A consideration of one of the perennial paradoxes of Western society, which upholds monogamous marriage as the ethical norm, and yet is forever fascinated

by romantic passion outside of marriage. The treatment of this fascination by the medieval legend of Tristan and Iseult, and the subsequent reappearance of this legend or its theme in Western literature down to the present, is examined. A theory of the *eros-agape* dichotomy is developed. The author concludes that the appeal of extra-attachment is illusory. — W. S. L.

SAMBURSKY, S. *The Physical World of the Greeks*. New York: Macmillan, 1956. x, 255 pp. \$4.00—Sambursky, a physicist at the Hebrew University in Jerusalem, sheds light on Greek thought from the perspective of modern science. Within its self-imposed limits (the biological disciplines are almost completely ignored, with the result that Aristotle comes off rather worse than Democritus), this is a first-rate exposition—clear, concise, and thorough. — R. F. T.

SANTAYANA, GEORGE. *Essays in Literary Criticism*, ed. by Irving Singer. New York: Charles Scribners Sons, 1956. xxviii, 414 pp. \$7.50—An anthology of critical writings drawn from Santayana's published works. The value of the book is enhanced by the editor's introductory essay entitled "Santayana as a Literary Critic." — D. R.

SCHRÖDINGER, ERWIN. *What Is Life? and Other Scientific Essays*. Anchor Books, A88. Garden City: Doubleday and Co., 1956. viii, 263 pp. \$0.95—A reprint of selected chapters and complete non-technical essays by the former Nobel prize physicist. — J. R.

SIMARD, E. *La nature et la portée de la méthode scientifique*. Quebec: Presses Universitaires Laval, 1956. 408 pp.—This presentation of scientific methodology tries to avoid metaphysical issues without being unphilosophical. Drawing from a wide range of material, the book describes clearly but rather generally what empirical scientists are concerned with, how they proceed, what they accomplish. The five parts deal with the roles in science of definitions, physical laws and theories, induction, and the interplay of reason and immediate experience. Despite the slant indicated by the many quotations from St. Thomas and Aristotle—peculiarly but pleasantly combined with passages from Einstein, Schrödinger, de Broglie, Eddington, etc.—a rather objective presentation is achieved. — L. K. B.

SPINOZA, BARUCH. *How to Improve Your Mind*, tr. by R. H. M. Elwes. Wisdom Library. New York: Philosophical Library, 1956. 90 pp. \$0.95—A reissue of *De Intellectus Emendatione, On the Improvement of the Understanding*, in Elwes' translation of 1884. In handy format with a short biographical note by Dagobert D. Runes. — R. P.

TAYLOR, A. E. *Plato; The Man and his Work*. New York: Meridian Books, 1956. xi, 562 pp. \$1.95—Taylor's lucid and provocative analyses of Plato's dialogues, which attempt to tell "just what Plato has to say about the problems of thought and life, and how he says it," reprinted in a soft-cover edition. The original was published in 1926. — C. L.

TENKKU, JUSSI. *The Evaluation of Pleasure in Plato's Ethics*. Helsinki: Societas Philosophica, 1956. 234 pp.—A detailed study of Plato's treatment of hedonism in the *Protagoras*, *Gorgias*, *Phaedo*, *Republic*, and *Philebus*. The work is more noteworthy for its attention to a field hitherto out of focus in studies of this length than for its insight. — R. P.

VOEGELIN, ERIC. *Order and History*. Vol. I, *Israel and Revelation*. Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1956. xxv, 533 pp. \$7.50 —This is a "philosophic inquiry concerning the order of human existence in society and history." The first in a projected series of six volumes, it deals with the cosmological myth as the principle of organization in the imperialistic societies of ancient Mesopotamia and Egypt. The imbalance of such an order is diagnosed, and the emergence of the historical order of ancient Israel is analyzed. The order of history is also treated as manifesting itself in different modes of symbolizing: 1) the participation in being, 2) the pre-occupation with the lasting and the passing, 3) the construction of symbols "to interpret the unknown by analogy with the really or supposedly known. The history of symbols is a progression from compact to differentiated experiences and symbols." — A. R.

WILSON, JOHN. *Language and the Pursuit of Truth*. New York: Cambridge University Press, 1956. 105 pp. \$1.75—This book claims to be an attempt to present semantics to the general public. "Semantics," however, turns out to be a general rubric for some of the logical doctrines of recent ordinary language philosophy. Oversimplification leads Wilson to present as the discovery of modern "semantics" an extraordinarily naive linguistic subjectivism. — A. C. P.

ZIMMER, HEINRICH. *Philosophies of India*, ed. by Joseph Campbell. New York: Meridian Books, 1956. xvii, 687 pp. \$1.95—A paperbound reprint of a controversial work published posthumously in 1951. The emphasis is on the metaphysics of the systems and their Hegelian interrelations, with much illuminating attention given to the imagery and symbolism in the sources. Reviewed by Daniel Ingalls in the *Journal of the American Oriental Society* 72, (1952), 117-20 and T. M. P. Mahadevan in *Pacific Affairs*, 25 (1952), 401-05. — R. P.

ZUCKERKANDL, VICTOR. *Sound and Symbol: Music and the External World*, tr. by Willard R. Trask. Bollingen Series, Vol. XLIV. New York: Pantheon Books, 1956. vii, 399 pp. \$5.00—The author brings a musical competence to bear upon an original treatment of music as a natural phenomenon. This attempt to treat music, not primarily as a product of artistic genius, but as a part of experience in general, involves a study of motion, time and space. The analysis of musical time and motions develops those concepts after the manner of the philosophers of process. Most interesting is the consideration of musical space in which Zuckerkandl elaborates what he alleges is Heidegger's suggestion of space as "force" from "out there." — J. E. B.

Encyclopedia of Morals, ed. by Vergilius Ferm. New York: Philosophical Library, 1956. x, 682 pp. \$10.00—An encyclopedia of both philosophical ethical theories and anthropological observations of moral practices. The volume consists of selected articles and numerous cross references to these articles. Many of the articles themselves are well done, but some of the references are questionable. The only counsel under the heading "atheism" is "see Spinoza"; under the heading "associationism" there is no mention of the Mills. — D. S.

Existentialism from Dostoevsky to Sartre, ed. by Walter Kaufmann. New York: Meridian Books, 1956. 319 pp. \$1.45—This well designed anthology is a paperback, but not a reprint. Often sizable chunks from the works of nine writers and philosophers are included, and Mr. Kaufmann ties them all together in a series of pithy prefaces. Some of the selections are well known; others—e.g., Jaspers' "On My Philosophy"—appear here for the first time in English, in translations by the editor and others. Mr. Kaufmann's lively introduction attempts to characterize existentialism as a whole, and to place its various representatives in relation to each other; it does both nicely. The volume as a whole, in fact, is a first-rate introduction to existentialism. — V. C. C.

The Role of Philosophy in the Catholic Liberal College, ed. by Charles A. Hart. Proceedings of the American Catholic Philosophical Association, Vol. XXX. Washington: American Catholic Philosophical Association, 1956. 247 pp. \$3.50—In addition to four papers on various aspects of the teaching of philosophy, this volume includes historical studies and a discussion of aesthetics. — E. T.

Society and Self in the Novel, ed. by Mark Schorer. English Institute Essays, 1955. New York: Columbia University Press, 1956. xviii, 155 pp.—Six beautifully written essays dealing with the relation of society to self in the novels of Cervantes, nineteenth-century English writers, Proust, Sinclair Lewis and Joyce. Though there is a great deal of individual variety, the authors see the structure of the novel in terms of a tension between private vision and an unsatisfying public truth; it is the task of the novelist both to portray and to resolve this tension. — A. C. P.

Tulane Studies in Philosophy, Vol. V. New Orleans: Tulane University, 1956. 93 pp. \$2.00—A group of eight essays on diverse philosophical problems. Edward G. Ballard discusses the problem of categories, trying to show that they are fundamental yet derived concepts; James K. Feibelman defends a doctrine of the reality of universals; Robert C. Whittemore criticizes traditional theism and suggests an alternative theistic doctrine. Other essays discuss supposition in medieval logic, responsibility, homogeneity and invariance, contingency and causality, and some epistemological problems in historical inquiry. — C. L.

The Varieties of History: From Voltaire to the Present, ed. by Fritz Stern. New York: Meridian books, 1956. 427 pp. \$1.45—A book of writings, by practicing historians of the past two hundred years, on the writing of history. The selections, mostly whole essays or lectures, are divided into two groups: the first surveys modern historiographic movements as exemplified in individual historians; the second shows historians' attitudes to certain persistent problems of their craft. It is hard to discern the book's organizing principles; the variety, too, of the selections is a bit bewildering, though many of the pieces are individually absorbing. The volume is a paperback original edition. — V. C. C.

ANNOUNCEMENTS

The Metaphysical Society of America will hold its eighth annual meeting at Indiana University in Bloomington, Indiana, on March 22 and 23, 1957. The program includes a Symposium entitled "Substance, Process, and Being," with George K. Plochmann, Albert W. Levi, and Laurence J. Lafleur as participants; and the following papers: "Ideology and Postulational Metaphysics" by William Oliver Martin, "The Nature of Spiritual Being" by William Carlo, "Current Trends in British Philosophy" by John Wisdom, "Heidegger's Ontology" by Thomas D. Langan, and "The Ontological Status of Values" by Richard Barber. The Presidential Address, "The Problem of Being and Analogy," is to be given by George P. Klubertanz. Those wishing to join the Society should communicate with the secretary, Sidney C. Rome, 1700 Main St., Santa Monica, California.

Professor Martin Buber will give a series of four lectures devoted to the question, "What can philosophical anthropology contribute to psychology?" at the Lisner Auditorium in Washington, D. C. on March 18, March 25, April 1, and April 8, 1957. The lectures are under the auspices of the Washington School of Psychiatry.

The Fifth Interamerican Congress of Philosophy and the Second Congress of the Interamerican Society of Philosophy will be held at Gallaudet College, Washington D. C., from July 8 through July 12, 1957. All philosophers in the hemisphere are invited to attend.

The Twelfth International Congress on Philosophy will take place at Venice and at Padua in the first half of September, 1958. The Congress will have three themes: (1) Man and Nature, (2) Liberty and Value, and (3) Logic, Language, and Communication. There will be three papers on each theme; copies of these papers will be sent by the end of October, 1957, to all who are on the rolls as active participants in the Congress. Those who wish to take part in the discussions centering around these papers should send the complete text of their observations and criticisms (limited to 250 typewritten lines) to the Secretariate, Via Donatello 16, Padova, Italy, no later than the end of March, 1958.

Roland Houde, Department of Philosophy, Villanova University, is preparing a bibliography of bibliographies of philosophers—ancient, medieval, and modern. Anyone knowing about uncommon or little-known bibliographies is invited to correspond with him.

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